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In the United States, the largest agency of formal ed-
ucation is public in nature in that it is supported through 
taxation and is open to those who wish to avail themselves 
of its facilities. The second agency is private in nature 
in that it is supported primarily through tuition and pri-
vate contributions and is open to those who meet the re-
quirements and who usually are financially able to afford 
the experience. 
Much has been written in the area of law as it pertains 
to the public schools and more is appearing each day in books, 
magazine~ and newspapers in a form which the layman can under= 
stand. As public education has grown, its administrators, 
especially, have become aware of the benefits to be derived 
from a knowledge of the legal aspect of school operation; 
however, there is much information which still lies buried 
in the maze of legal literature. Likewise, private edu~ 
cation is growing. However, aside from some work1 concerned 
lRobert F. Will, "An Analysis of the Legal Responsibil-
ities of State Departments of Education for Non-Public Schools," 
(Unpub. doctoral diss~rtation. University of Maryland, 1958). 
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with the constitutional and statutory status of private 
schools, little has been done which involves the legal rami-
fications of the interpersonal relationships of those con-
cerned with private schools. This study is concerned with 
the problem: What are the interpersonal relationships of 
the professional personnel, patrons and students of the pri-
vate schools which have come before the courts for liti-
gation? The study is concerned primarily with private 
schools of the elementary and secondary type~ but examples 
from schools of higher education are included. The emphasis 
2 
is on non~charitable type schools; however, where this dis-
tinction does not "color the law" examples from such charitable 
institutions of higher learning are used. 
Need of the Study 
The well known phrase, "Ignorance of the law is no 
excuse," is as important in the operation of private schools 
as it is in any other business or private activity. Not 
only is efficient operation dependent upon knowing what is 
unlawful but also upon what is lawful. To serve to the 
fullest extent of their capacities, it would seem necessary 
that all concerned with the activity of private schools not 
only be academically prepared to teach and guide but also 
prepared and secure in the knowledge that they are doing 
everything legally possible to maintain the best possible 
educational organization. 
3 
Private law 9 as well as public law 3 applies to pri= 
vate schools. The halo effect from the concept that the 
"king can do no wrong 9 11 which hangs over public schools is 
noticeably less apparent when the courts deal with private 
schools. Private schools are looked upon as corporations 
and thus come under private corporate law or are simply 
viewed as businesses for monetary gain and are so considered 
by the courts. It is this very fact that makes an aware= 
ness of the law important to those concerned with private 
schools. The private schools and their personnel may be 
sued in the civil and criminal courts. Those who are 
employed by the organization or administer it become liable 
for any crime, tort, or act of neglect or malfeance. The 
leniency of the courts toward public school corporations is 
not as often found here. For those, then 3 who should natu-
rally be concerned with their responsibility and legal 
recourseJ a source o~ such information bec6mes important. 
This information does exist; however, it is in such a rorm 
that until recently. only lawyers were equipped to ferret it 
out. The information presented in this work is not meant to 
eliminate the services of members of the legal profession 
nor will it. 
Purpose 
In any society or group of people there are rules and 
regulations which guide the activities of the members. Few 
rules or regulations have ever been so clearly written or 
understood that no disputes or misunderstandings have 
arisen concerning them. These disputes and others not nee= 
essarily involved with violations and misunderstandings of 
specific rules and regulations are often settled in the 
courts. Legal sanctions or principles grow out of such 
court decisions which can serve as valuable guides in future 
interpersonal relations. With the knowledge that there has 
been litigation in the past involving private schools and 
that most likely there will be litigation in the future, it 
is the purpose of this study to discuss those interpersonal 
relations which have resulted in litigation. Such a 
discussion~ it is hoped 9 will reveal the legal sanctions 
and principles which have grown out of the litigation so 
that those involved in private school work may avoid or at 
least be aware of those situations which ·often lead to ex-
pensive and disasterous litigation. 
Research Procedure 
There are several possible starting places when orie 
sets out to search the law. For the purpose of the present 
study, the broad topic method has been chosen. In doing so, 
the outlines which appear in the different digest and ency= 
clopedical systems have been of assistance. 
The legal principles evolving from case law are 
divided» classified or keyed in three major types of works-= 
the encyclopedical type, the digest type and the annotated 
4 
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report type. Three compilations of an encyclopedical nature--
American Jurisprudence, Corpus Juris and Corpus Juris 
Secundum were used. The nine series of the American Digest 
System were used as well as the Supreme Court Digest and the 
Federal Digest. American Law Reports was used for annota-
tions. 
The above could only be used to determine broad topics 
and principles which are dealt with in case law. It is true, 
that through a reading of these distillations, one is able 
to obtain the beginnings of an understanding of at least 
what principles and disagreements come before the courts; 
however, in such a work as this dissertation, it was im-
possible to stop there. It was necessary to search the orig-
inal sources. This was done by referring to the court opin-
ions and decisions which are noted in the encyclopediae and 
the digest systems. The National Reporter System contains 
the opinions and decisions of courts of record. There are 
nine regional reporters~ The Atlantic Reporter, The North-
eastern Reporter, The Southeastern Reporter, The Southern 
Reporter, The Southwestern Reporter 9 The Pacific Reporter, 
and The Northwestern Reporter. The Supreme Court Reporter 
and The Federal Reporter are also part of this system. The 
New York Supplement is a part of this system which contains 
only New York cases. 
After the broad topics which were to be selected for 
inclusion in this work were designated, the digest systems 
were studied for material relating to the topic being worked 
upon. From the digest outline, sub-topics and headings 
were noted along with cases cited. From here, there was no 
direct route. The procedure involved reference and cross-
reference in the digest system itself, annotated reports, 
6 
the National Reporter System and Shepard's Citations. 
Shepard's Citations was used to trace the history of the 
precedent of a case . From this volume it was possible to 
determine if later cases have disapproved, modified or 
reversed the decis i ons of the case at hand. Also, anytime a 
principle from one case is cited in another, this appears 
under the citation of the original case in Shepard's Citatiora. 
It was not possible to read all of the cases involving 
a principle of law. · However, it was necessary to read those 
cases cited in the encyclopedical works from which the broad 
principles had been distilled and also certain of the cases 
which were cited in the digest system in order to understand 
the more specific principles and exceptions. 
All of the broad topics were considered in an initial 
study of the material . This was done in order that the 
complete outline of the dissertation could be kept in mind. 
Then, as each topic was considered separately, any material 
which was uncovered that referred to another topic was noted 
for further study under that topic . 
Clarification of Terms 
( 
"Agent" refers to an i ndi vidual acting for another at 
the other's direction . 
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11Cross=suit 11 is a case of litigation instigated by the 
defendant against the plaintiff which is tried simultaneously 
with the plaintiff 1 s case, 
11 Gratuitous licensee 11 is one abroad on the property of 
another who may or may not benefit from the presence of the 
licensee. 
11 Invitee 11 refers to' one who is abroad on the property 
of another at the request of the other, and they stand in tre 
relationship of guest to host. 
"Nominal damages II are awards or judgments of a token 
amount. 
"Parol evidence 11 is oral testimony admitted into evidence 
to explain or prove the existence of a contract. 
11 Private Law 11 is for the benefit of the ind.ividual and 
is composed of the law of contractJ agency, property 1 owner-
ship and sale of real property, proprietorship, and the law 
of pleading and procedure. 
"Public law 11 includes constitutional, administrative 
and criminal law and is concerned with the state in its poli= 
tical or sovereign function. 
11 Servant II for the purposes, .of this work means the same 
as agent o 
11 Statute of Fraud II has nothing to do with fraud.9 per §_§)' 
but is a statute which requires a certain kind of evidence 
for certain classes of contracts. 
"Tort II is a wrong against a person or property which 
violates or interferes with a right vested in the person or 
property. 
"Ultra vires" is a descriptive term which means beyond 
the scope of authority. 
8 
CHAPTER II 
CONTRACTS - DEFINITION AND EXPLANATION 
A contract is a form of agreement which contemplates 
and creates an obligation. There are many contracts which 
a private school may enter such as those with builders and 
vendors, but this section will be concerned only with tuition 
contracts and teachers' contracts of employment. 
Before approaching the specific contracts of tuition 
and teacher employment, it is necessary that a foundation 
of the idea of contract in its broader sense be laid. The 
author does not attempt to penetrate deeply the subject of 
contracts, for that is not necessary, nor is it the major 
purpose of this work. It is necessary, however, to formu-
late general definitions, pres~nt the essential elements of 
a contract, identify parties, and discuss the various kinds 
of contracts as they relate to tuition or teacher employment. 
As the subject is unfolded, more specific explanations will 
be given where needed. 
Contract Defined: The opening sentence of this chapter is 
a definition of a contract, but it certainly lacks the spec-
ificity one would desire if it were to be used as a criter-
ion to determine if, in fact, a contract existed between 
two parties. Black is slightly more specific when he says 
9 
a contract is "An agreement upon sufficient consideration 
to do or not to do a particular thing. 11 2 He refers here 
to a simple contract. Sir William Anson, in his Principles 
of ih2. English Law of Contracts, defines a contract as an 
"Agreement enforceable at law, made between two or more 
persons, by which rights are acquired by one or more to acts 
or forbearances on the part of the other or others. 11 3 These 
definitions coupled with a study of the basic elements of a 
contract should give a better understanding of what a con-
tract really is. 
The concensus is that there are at least four basic 
elements in every contract; however, the elements are 
stated differently in many sources. Simply stated, they are 
as follows: (1) The parties involved have legal capacity; 
(2) The mutual agreement is,' intended to result in legal 
liability; ( 3) There is a giving and receiving of an ade-
quate consideration; and (4) The agreement is in harmony 
10 
with law and public policy. 4 Edwards, as well as other authors, 
adds a fifth element which declares that the contract must be 
specific in rights and liabilities to the extent that they are 
2Henry C. Black, Black's Law Dictionary (St. Paul, 1951), 
p. 394. 
3Alfred W. Bays, Cases .§!.!1£. Materials on Business Law 
(Chicago, 1951), p. 78. 
4rbid., p.. 88. 
11 
enforceable.5 This additional element undoubtedly has 
reference to what is known as ambiguous or uncertain language 
which has been used and if no party is aware or has reason 
to believe that the language will be differently understood 
by the other,ll no contract will result. However, "Ir either 
party is aware of the ambiguity and knowsl or has re~son to 
know, the mea'ning which will be adopted b? the other party; 
a contract is formed, and he is bound by that meaning. In 
other wordsja party using language is bound by the sense in 
which he reasonabli should have apprehended it would be under= 
stood by the other party."6 It is here that parol evidence 
is admitted to explain the terms of a contract and to deter-
mine if the parties were truly in mutual agreement. There-
fore, the existence of the contract hinges rather on mutual 
' 
agreement and understanding of the sense of the subject 
matter ultimately and not necessarily on any seeming vague-
ness on the race of the contract. 
Mention has been made in the preceding statement of the 
parties to a contract. As Anson stipulated in the above qua= 
tation (footnote 3)i two or more parties must enter into the 
agreement. This implies that there must be two or more legal= 
ly competent parties. A legally competent party iS 9 in m9st 
I 
instances, an adult (in terms or the individual state 
statutes) of such mental capacity and is or such 
5Newton Edw~rds$ The Courts and the Public Schools 
(Chicago 9 1955), Po 200. 
6Ba ys 9 p • 161 o 
physical capacity that the terms are understood and one not 
otherwise deprived by law of entering into a contract. The 
requirement of adult status may be misleading. Contracts 
with legal minors are voidable at the option of the minor 
except in the case of an implied or express contract for 
necessaries which is binding upon the minor. These con~ 
tracts are binding, however, on the other party should he 
be an adult. 
Kinds of Contracts: It is possible to classify contracts 
from several standpoints; however, here it is most important 
to consider only two classifications. One from the stand-
point of form and expression and the other from the ~.tand-
point of validity are of importance. Actually, the latter 
often depends upon the former. In regard to form and ex-
pressions, there are three types of contracts--express, im-
plied and constructive. The distinction between these types 
was set forth in Hertzog v. Hertzog. 
'Express contracts are, where the terms of the agree-
ment are openly uttered and avowed at the time of making; 
as to deliver an ox or ten loads of timber, or to pay a 
stated price for certain goods. Implied are such as reason 
and justice dictate; and which, therefore, the law presumes 
that every man undertakes to perform. As, if I employ a 
person to do any business for me, or perform any work, the 
law implies that I undertook and contracted to pay as much 
as his labour deserves. If I take up wares of a tradesman 
without any agreement of price, the law concludes that I 
contracted to pay their real value.' 
This is the language of Blackstone, 2 Comm. 443, and 
it is open to some criticism. There is some looseness of 
thought in supposing that reason and justice ever dictate 
any contracts between parties, or impose such upon them. 
All true contracts grow out of the intentions of the parties 
to transactions, and are dictated only by their mutual and 
]2 
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accordant wills. When this intention is expressed, we call 
the contract an express one. When it is not expressed, it 
may be inferred, implied, or presumed from circumstances as 
really existing, and then the contract, thus ascertained, is 
called an implied one. 
,LConstructive contracts are distinguished from implied 
contracts in that_7 in one case ,Lconstructive_7 the contract 
is mere fiction, a form imposed in order to adapt the c~se 
to a given remedy; in the oth:r~mplied_J it is a fact 
legitimately inferred. In one constructive_]' the intention 
is disregarded; in the other implie_g_/ it is ascertained 
and enforced. In one ~onstructive..,7; the duty defines the 
contract; in the other L,'fmplied..]', the contract defined the 
duty. 
We have, therefore, in law three classes of relations 
called contracts. 
1. Constructive contracts, which are fictions of law 
adapted to enforce legal duties by actions of contract, 
where no proper contract exists, express or implied. 
2. Implied contracts, which arise under circumstances 
which, according to the ordinary course of dealing and the 
common understanding of men, show a mutual intention to con-
tract. 
3. Express contracts, already sufficiently distinguish-
ed. 
The court continues to amplify the concept of an implied 
contract by saying 
The law ordinarily presumes or implies a contract when-
ever this is necessary to account for other relations found 
to have existed between the parties. 
Thus if a man is found to have done work for another, 
and there appears no known relation between them that accounts 
for such service, the law presumes a contract of hiring. But 
if a man's house takes fire, the law does not presume or 
imply a contract to pay his neighbors for their service in 
saving his property. The common principles of human conduct 
mark self-interest as the motive of action in the one case, 
as kindness in the other; and therefore, by common custom, 
compensation is mutually c ounted on in the one case, and in 
the other not. 
A party who relies upon a contract must prove its ex-
istence; and this he does not do by merely proving a set of 
circumstances that can be accounted for by another relation 
appearing to exist between the parties. 
Every induction, inference, implication, or presumption 
in reasoning of any kind, is a logical conclusion derived 
from, and demanded by, certain data or ascertained circum-
stances. If such circumstances demand the conclusion of a 
cont~act to account for them, a contract is proved; if not, 
not. r 
14 
From the standpoint of validity, contracts may be class-
ified into three types also--binding, voidable and void. 
Binding contracts are such that include all of the basic 
elements and are enforceable against each of the parties 
by the other. The voidable contract has been discussed 
above in respect to minors. Most voidable contracts have 
some defect in form or subject matter; however, a voidable 
contract binds each party until the legally offended party 
successfully avoids the contract by litigation. Sometimes, 
as in the case of a contract between a minor and an adult for 
other than necessaries, only one party, the minor in this 
case.,, has the privilege of avoiding the contract. In other 
cases, the step to avoid may be taken by either party. A 
voidable contract may become 9 in fact 9 a binding contract 
by ratification which may involve overt behavior indicating 
acceptance of the terms of the contract after notice of de-
feet, or may simply be a failure to act promptly to recind t~ 
contract after discovery of some defect which renders it void-
able. Should a failure to act become evident, the court will 
7 
Hertzog v. HertzQB_.,, 29 Pa. St. 465 (1857). 
infer an acquiescence to the terms of the contract and de-
clare it ratified. This is especially true if the second 
party has acted upon this failure to act of the first party. 
A void contract is, to be sure, no contract at all. It 
is so lacking in form and subject matter that it is unen-
forceable. All contracts against law and public policy are 
8 
void. 
The next two chapters deal specifically with coritrac-
' 
15 
tual relationships. Chapter III is cor1cerned with employment 
contracts and Chapter IV is concerned with tuition contracts. 
Chapter Vis a discussion of school rules and regulations, 
and that chapter should also be considered in the light of 
contract principles since school rules and regulations, 
expressly or impliedly, become parts of some employment 
contracts and most tuition contracts. 
·'.'··:~ 
8Bays, p. 216. 
CHAPTER III 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 
There are many texts and treatises which deal with the 
rules and principles of employment contracts.9 In general, 
it is found that contracts of employment in private schools 
are governed by the same rules and principles as other em-
ployment contracts. 10 In this chapter, some of these will 
be presented as background and introduction; however, major 
emphasis will be placed on those which are illustrated in 
litigation connected directly with private schools. 
A contract consists basically of an offer and an accept-
ance which may be accomplished verbally as well as in writ-
ten form. Any contract may be oral provided there is no 
statute stipulating otherwise. (At least sixteen states 
stipulate specifically by statute that contracts of employ-
ment for public school teachers must be written). However, 
no state declares that teachers in private institutions of 
learning must enter into written contracts. Although this 
9For example see~ Samuel Williston and George Thompson, 
Selections from Williston 1 s Treatise on the Law of Contracts 
(New York, 1938); Restatement of the Law~ Contracts (St. 
Paul, 1932); Arthur Corbin, Corbin on-=contracts (St. Paul,19:Q. 
lOMcLaughlin v. Hall, 61 P. 2d 1219 (1936). 
16 
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is true~ most of the states in the Union have adopted pro-
visions involving a Statute of Fraud which by their terms 
cover, in many instances, employment contracts in private 
schools. Where operative, the Statute of Fraud provides 
that any contract which is not to be performed within one 
year of its making must be in writing to be enforceable. It 
is true that teaching contracts are often nine or ten month 
contracts; however, even such a contract falls under the 
Statute where the performance thereof shall not be completed 
within one yearo For example, assume that the school year 
runs from September 10th until June 27tho If a teacher enters 
into an oral contract for the next school year beginning on 
September 10th, anytime before June 27th the contract is not 
enforceable under the Statute because it cannot be performed 
within a year of its making. 
The statement above, that the contract is not enforce-
able, actually has reference to the recovery of the agreed 
compensation for the period of the contract should it be 
breached. It is not possible to exact the specific perform= 
ance of an employment contract for such a contract involves 
personal service. A decree for specific performance would 
be in the order of involuntary servitude which is illegal. 
Rather, in the event of a breached enforceable contract, the 
remedy is found in a suit in contract for compensatory 
damages. 
For the injury caused by the non-performance of most 
contracts the primary if not the only remedy of the injured 
party is an action for damages for the breach. 
18 
In fixing the amount of these damages, the general pur-
pose of the law is, and should be, to give compensation, that 
is, to put the plaintiff in as good a position as he would 
have been in had the defendant kept his contract. In some 
cases, this rule of law enables the court to fix with math-
ematical exactness the amount of a plaintiff's recovery ... ; 
but frequently the jury must estimate under proper instruc-
tions from the court the amount which the plaintiff should 
receive. 
* * * 
Compensation involves not only -assessment of gains pre-
vented by the breach but also of losses ensuing which ·would 
not have occurred had the contract been performed. From these 
must be deducted any saving to the plaintiff due to the non-
performance of the contract. The result will give the net 
loss to the injured party. 
* * * 
••. it is necessarily true that at the time of the breach 
of contract the time for performing the contract had arrived. 
It is, therefore, performance that the injured party was then 
entitled to, and it is not the · contract of which he has been 
wrongly deprived by the breach, but the performance of the 
contract. The law in giving him a right of action for dam-
ages, therefore, should adjust the damages in such a way as 
to equal the value of the performance ••• 11 
In the case of a breached unenforceable contract (except 
void or voidable), the remBdy is found in a suit in equity 
for nominal damages if no injury has beeri incurred or for 
compensatory damages if there exists partial performance for 
which the plaintiff has not been paid. The principle here 
is that no man may benefit from the labors of another with-
out compensating him. Of course this does not mean that there 
may not be gratuitous labor. (Also, this principle is ab-
rogated when public funds are involved and the contract is 
llwilliston and Thompson, pp. 832~834. 
ultra vires in nature). 
It is usually said that the plaintiff is under a duty 
to mitigate damages; but the truth seems rather to be that 
damages which the plaintiff might have avoided with reason-
able effort without undue risk, expense, or humiliation are 
either not caused by the defendant's wrong or need not h~2e 
been, and, therefore, are not to be charged against him. 
* * * 
Cases 9 where humiliation of the plaintiff would follow 
a possible mitigation of damages, arise almost exclusively 
in regard to contracts of employment.9 either where possible 
mitigation involves further dealings with the wrongdoer, or 
where the nature of the possible subititute for the agreed 
employment is unreasonably inferior. j 
As the above quotations from Williston and Thompson in-
dicate, where an employment contract is breached by the em-
player, it is incumbent upon the employee to mitigate the 
damages by seeking compensation somewhere else. However, 
a teacher or principal is not expected to accept employment 
19 
outside his field. Further, it is possible to incur damages 
beyond those resulting from the breached contract in attempt-
ing to mitigate. For instance, if one loses money on the 
sale of a house and incurs great expense in moving to a new 
job, these are loses due to attempted mitigation and are 
figured in the determination of net damages; howe-ver, ex-
cept in unusual cases, the net damages may not exceed the 
wages or salary promised under the contract. 
Cases from Litigation Involving Private Schools~ Only one 
l2Ibid., p. 847. 
l3Ibid., pp. 848-849. 
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case was found wherein the private s-0hool sued an employee 
for a breach of contract. Although this is as possible as 
the reverse situation 9 it does not often happen. Since the 
school cannot obtain a judgment for specific performance, 
it must seek damages. Damages would have to be figured on 
what the school lost as the result of the employee's breach 
less what the school saved by not having to pay the employee. 
Damages might also be figured on the difference between wrat 
the school was paying the defaulting employee and the expense 
of obtaining and paying a replacement should the replacement 
receive higher wages. Net damages, except in some extra-
ordinary case, would probably not be of sufficient worth to 
entail litigation. 
The following (except for one 14 ) are cases initiated by 
employees against private schools~ 
--=~=In Prudeaux v. Douglas 9 the teacher plaintiff alleged 
that in his oral agreement he was to receive $300.00 a month; 
however, the owner defendant contended that the agreement was 
for $100.00 a month. The court said: 
Where a teacher's claim against the owner of a trade 
school for an amount above $500.00 as the balance of salary 
under an alleged oral agreement to pay $300.00 per month 
was not corroborated by at least one credible witness and 
other circumstances tending to show the stipulation in the 
contract for that salary, recovery was barred.15 
14Boston Conservatory of Music v. Dulfer, 152 N.E. 
230 ( 1926) 0 
15Prudeaux v. Douglas, 54 So. 2d 360 (1951). 
This case illustrates an added danger or difficulty with 
oral contracts. The plaintiff must not only prove the ex-
istence of a contract but has the added burden or proving 
21 
the terms. A credible witness to the contract is the simplest 
solution, but in this case there was none. Without a witness, 
the court had to weigh the testimony of the two adversaries .• 
The defendant was able to show that his usual practice in 
hiring did not reflect the claims of the plaintiff and the 
court held that the~ 
•.. evidence was insufficient to sustain a judgment for the 
amount computed on the basis of a salary of $300.00 per 
month. 
=====In the instance of a written contract for a year or 
any specified period of time, the continuance of the rela-
tionship after that time implies a renewal of the terms of 
16 
the contract. This point of law was discussed in McLaugh-
lin v. Hall and the court said: 
Where the headmaster of a private school, who was em-
ployed for one year under a written contract, resumed his 
duties at the beginning of the succeeding school term and was 
discharged after one month 9 the presumption to be applied 
is that the headmaster was employed for the second year at 
the rate of compensation received during the first year, re~ 
gardless of when the first year's employment ended.17 
=====It has been said that the plaintiff must be able to 
prove the existence of a contract. In Pelotte v. Simmons, 
the school in question was run by an association of churches 
l6Dickey v. Putnam Free School 9 84 N.E. 140 (1908). 
17McLaughlin v. Hall, 61 P. 2d 1219 (1936). 
through a board of trustees. The trustees entered an em-
ployment contract for the principalship with the plaintiff; 
however., such contracts had to be approved by the executive 
board of the association. This approval did not occur. The 
plaintiff sued the trustees individually on the contract. 
The court struck down the plea of contract because the con-
tract had not been approved and went on to say, 
Where the trustees of a school acted as such in em-
ploying a teacher, and the teacher knew that they were 
trustees, they were liable only in their representative 
capacity~ and not in their1gersonal capacity, for a breach 
of contract of employment. 
also, the court stated that, 
The defendants, though exceeding their authority, were 
held not liable for the princi£al's salary under the con-
tract made as school trustees.~ 
When the plaintiff brought his suit against the trustees as 
individuals, he erred because he neglected to allege and 
22 
prove a lack of good faith or fraud on the trustees' part. 
-----The case of Behnke v. ~ Verein Einigkeit, illustrates 
the rule of law that the customs of a locality and occupa-
tion become part of a contract. As is so often the situation, 
the plaintiff Behnke, was hired by contract for a year to 
teach physical education; however, July and August were va-
cation months for the school and Behnke, as was the custom, 
was himself free. Sometime during his contract year, his 
l8Pelotte v. Simmons., 152 S.E. 310 (1930). 
19rbid. 
tendered resignation as of September 1, was accepted. The 
school refused to give him his wages due for July and August 
because he had taken a summer job. The court said in its 
dee is ion that., 
Where a teacher was employed from year to year at a 
fixed salary per month under a contract whereby by custom 
July and August were vacation months during which he might 
use his time as he saw fit, and his employer accepted his 
resignation tendered to take effect September 1, he is en-
titled to his salary for July and August, when he performed 
all the services required from the time of the tender to 
September 1, though hO was employed by a third person dur-
ing July and August.2 
--==-In.Boston Conservatory of Music v. Dulfer, the con-
tract between the school and Dulfer, a music teacher, pro-
vided that if Dulfer should sever relations with the school 
that he would pay one-half of any fee paid to him by stu-
dents he should directly or indirectly obtain for instruc-
tion as a result of his association with the Boston Con-
servatory of Music. Dulfer also implied in his agreement 
to abide by the school's rules and regulations. There was 
23 
a rule against fa~ulty smoking in class or practice rooms, 
and Dulfer was warned several times to stop smoking in these 
places. He did not, and as a result he was fired. Although 
he did not obey the rules, he did not breach the contract, 
l?.§1.'.. ~· The court in its decision said: 
••• a provision in a contract that if the teacher should 
sever his connection with the school he should share with 
it any fees he might subsequently receive from pupils ob-
20Behnke v. ~ Verein Einigkeit, 180 Ill. App 319 
( 1913). 
... ', 
tained through the school is held to have no application 
where the employment21s discontinued in the manner provided 
for by the contract. 
This case turned on a technicality as to who really breached 
the contract. The court upheld the jury which decided that 
since there was no contract after the breach, the plaintiff 
could not be held to its provisions. 
-----In Dickey v. Putnam~ School, 22 a private school and 
a public school shared the same building. As it happened, 
24 
there was one principal over both schools. The public school 
paid $lj600.00 of the principal's salary and the private 
school paid $400.00. When the principal's contract was re-
newed by the public school» the trustees of the private 
school neither approved nor disapproved the renewal. The 
principal continued in his position unaware of the lack of 
approval on the part of the private school. The court held 
for the principal in his suit for the additional $400.00, 
since the private school had allowed the principal to continue 
without his knowing of any change, it had ratified the or-
iginal contract and was in fact liable to the principal for 
its share of his salary. 
---==The decision in Condell v. The New School for Social 
Research was based in part on the reasoning behind the shop 
right rule. 
21Boston Conservatory of Music v. Dulfer, 152 N.E. 
230 ( 1926) . 
22Dickey v. Putnam Free School~ 84 N.E. 140 (1908). 
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/jhi7 shop right, ... shortly stated., is that where- a servant, 
during his hours of employment, working with his master 1 s _ 
materials and appl-iances 9 conceives and perfects an invention 
for which he obtains a patent, he must accord his master a 
nonexclusive right to practice the invention •.. This is an· 
application of equitable principles. Since the servant uses 
his master's time, facilities and materials to attain a con-
crete result, -the latter is in equity entitled to use that 
which embodies his own property and to duplicate it as often 
a~ he may23ind occasion to employ similar appliances in his 
business. 
However, whereas- in the case of patented inventions the 
title remains with the inventor (except where the contract 
stipulates otherwise), in this case the court said: 
Th~atrical sceri~ry, designed by an instructor in a 
private school maintaining a studio theater and executed by 
him and students in the course of his employment, became 
the schoOl's property, and he was not entitled to recover 
damages because of the school's agreement with a third party 
to U:s.e the scenery.24 
-----In Bechtel v. Combs Broad Street Conservatory of Music, 
the court said: 
The fact that part of the agreed compensation of a 
teacher for his services consists in instruction from another 
member of the faculty does not place such a teacher in the 
position of a pupil and render him liable to be dischar~ed 
for failure to comply with his instructor's. directions. '.J 
Here the plaintiff 8s minor daughter became a member of the 
faculty of the conservatory and part of her compensation con-
23Bays, pp. 465-466. 
24condell v. The New School for Social Research, 48 
N.Y.S. 2d 733 (194~ -
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Bechtel v. Combs Broad Street Conservatory of Music, 
71 Pa. Super. Ct. 426 (1919). 
sisted of one music lesson a week. Her instructor for this 
lesson directed her to play at the commencement exercises. 
This she refused to do and because of her refusal, was dis-
missed. The court decided that, 
••• the refusal of the daughter to play in a commencement 
concert was not a failure to comply with the terms of the 
contract, and the employer is liable for the ~~mages sus-
tained by reason of the daughter's discharge. 
==---In the case of Mackey v. United Civil Service Training 
Bureaus, the plaintiff, Mackey, was an agent of the school 
who solicited students for the school. Under his contract, 
Mackey was to receive a share of the fees of the students 
he acquired for the school. Mackey sought his commission 
as of the making of the contracts with the parents. How-
ever, the court said that the, 
Evidence is held to establish that the contract to 
solicit students for the school entitled the agent to his 
commissions as they were received from the students, 
and not to a full balance of the commissions on27he basis 
that the student's contracts had been financed. 
Of course, if the contract had so stipulated, the school 
could have been liable for the commission at the time of 
the contract; however» this point was not clear in the con-
tract, and the court reasoned that the commission was pre-
dicated on the fulfillment of the tuition contracts and 
not on the mere making of the contracts. 
26Ibid. 
27Mackey v. United Civil Service Training Bureaus, 
61 P. 2d 1311 (1936). 
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Summary 
Employment contracts may be either written or oral 
(except where state statutes require a written form). It 
is often the case, however, that an oral contract may fall 
under the provision of the Statute of Fraud which requires 
that contracts not to be performed within one year must be 
in writing. If an oral contract is of this nature, it is 
not enforceable in its entirety subsequent to a breach. 
Should an unenforceable contract be breached, the injured 
party may look to the court of equity for remedy at least 
to the extent of performance. Oral contracts should always 
be witnessed by at least one credible witness. 
Where an employer breaches a contract, it is incum-
bent upon the employee that he attempt to mitigate his 
injury from the breach. He should do this by seeking em-
ployment of a similar nature. He need not, however, in-
cur great expense, inconvenience or bring humiliation 




Tuition contracts (even those including board, cloth-
ing and other charges) have been held, generally, to be 
28 entire contracts in that the entire contract price, 
29 whether to be paid in installments or not, may be recov-
ered by the school should the other party breach the con-
tract. Where a contract is for a definite payment and 
28Asheville School for Training in Christian Lead-
ership v. Kirk, 269 Ill. App. 365 (1935); Bergman v. Bou-
~' 82 A. 2d 760 (1951); Bingham v. Richardson 60 N.C. 
215 ll863); Bouligny v. Kirk 79 D. & C. 332 (1956~; Bredt v. 
Perkiomen School, 47 D. ~ 691 (1943); Dunbar v. Peekskill 
Military Academy, 93 N.Y.S. 2d 642 (1949); Fessman v. Seeley, 
30 S.W. 268 (1895); Fisher v. Hicks, 277 S.W. 799 (1926); 
Hall v. Mount Ida School for Girls, 155 N.E. 418 (1927); 
Ham v. Miss C.""""E:" Mason 1s"school, The Castle, 61 S.W. 2d 7 
fl933);"ltartridge School v. Riordari";-112 N.Y.S. 1089 (1908); 
Hitchcock Military Academt v. M_yerj, 245 P. 219 ( 1926); 
Hoadley v. Allen 291 P. 01 (1930; Kabus v. Seftner, 69 
N.Y.S. 983 (1901); Northwestern Military and Naval Academy 
v. Wadleigh, 267 Ill. App. 1 (1933); Peirce""v. Peacock Mil-
itary College, 220 S.W. 191 (1920); Rogers v. Councill,~6 
S.W. 207 (1924); Stewart v. Lori!J.&, 81 Am. D. 747 (1862); 
Swavely v. Eno, 54 Pa. Su\er. Ct. 82 ( 1913); Tabor Academy 
v. Schwartz~O A. 2d 22 1943); Teeter v. Horrie'rr'Iilitary 
School, 81 S.E. 767 (1914; Van Brink v. Lehman, 192 N.Y.S. 
342 ( 1922); Vidor v. Peac oc k:-I45 S. W. 672 ( 1912); Wentworth 
Military Academy v. Marshall, 283 S.W. 2d 868 (1955); 
William v. Stein, 166 N.Y.S. 836 (1917). 
29van Brink v. Lehman, 192 N.Y.S. 342 (1922). 
28 
schooling for a specific period, a student attended only 
part of the period or even not at a1130 is immaterial. This 
29 
is true even though the contract does not mention a deduction 
31 or refund, but it is particularly true where the parties 
have stipulated for a deduction or refund only in the event 
of some particular occuvreence., such as illness of a speci-
fied length, and that has not happened.32 
The following cases illustrate the principles set out 
in the preceding paragraph. 
-----Where a parent had contracted for a full year of school-
ing for his two sons and the sons were withdrawn from school 
after the first semester, the court said the, 
... military academy is held entitled to recover the tuition 
for the full year as stipulated in the application for ad-
mission signed by the parent, though the childr~u were vol-
untarily withdrawn when the year was half over.jj 
-----Where a student in a military academy voluntarily 
quit during Christmas vacation, his parents were liable to 
the school for the balance due for the full school term, 
under terms of the catalogue, which formed part of the con-
tract between the school and the parents, providing that 
any unpaid balance shall become immediately due and payable 
30Bingham v. Richardson, 60 N.C. 215 (1863). 
31 · Peirce v. Peacock Military College, 220, S.W. 191 
(1920). 




if the student voluntarily withdraws during the term.34 
=====Where a contract between parents and a school was entire 
and indivisible, providing that pupils entered for the entire 
school year, the owner of the school, having fully performed, 
or offered to perform, was entitled to recover the full 
amount due under the contract though the defendant's girl 
left before the end of the first term of the year.35 
====-The full sum agreed to be paid as tuition for a student 
for a session is ordinarily recoverable upon withdrawal of 
the student., even though the contract does not especially 
provide that there can be no deduction, for, ordinarily, it 
would not cause the school any additional expense to perform)6 
The preceding case points out the legal reasoning which 
allows a school to recover on a breached, entire contract 
which it is no longer required to perform. The school has 
provided a place for the student, hired teachers, and in gen-
eral committed its facilities, and the withdrawal of one 
37 student does not appreciably decrease its expenses. Fur-
ther, unless there is a stipulation as to some proportionate 
return, as in the case of board, it is very difficult to 
equitably pro-rate for value received. To further support 
this idea, it is found in Bouligny v. Kirk that a) 
Proprietor of a school may recover the entire charge of 
board and tuition for the term if an application for a res-
ervation is made and accepted, a room reserved for the student, 
and notice of cancellation is first given by the parent of 
the student to the school shortly before the school term 
begins; it is not necessary to allege that other applications 
34wentworth Military Academx v. Marshall, 283 S.W. 
2d 868 ( 1955) 0 
35william v. Stein, 166 N.Y.S. 836 (1917). 
36Peirce v. Peacock Military College, 220 S.W. 191 (1920). 
37This principle is also expressed in Hitchcock Mil-
itary AcaderrJX v. Myers~ 245 P. 219 (1926). 
had been rejected for want of room.38 
The reasoning behind the courts' decisions in the pre-
ceding cases is understandable in the case of the voluntary 
withdrawal of a student. However, the same general prin-
ciples hold if the school should see fit to suspend or ex-
pel the student. It is settled law, that the school's rules 
and regulations, usually expressed in the school catalogue 
and other terms found in the catalogue , become part of the 
contract.39 Should the application, registration form, or 
contract instrument state that the provisions of the cata~ 
logue constitute part of the contract or that the parents 
have read and agreed to the provisions of the catalogue, 
such is the case; for, 
Where a written application for enrollment of a minor son 
at a boarding-school, signed by the father, stated that he 
had examined the school catalogue and entered his son for 
the next school year subject to the terms outlined therein, 
the father could not avoid liability under the terms of the 
agreement as set-out in the application and catalogue on the 
ground that he had not read the contents thereof, in the ab-
sence of allegation and proof that the execution of the ap-
plication without knowledge of the contents was induced by 
mi~re~5esentation, fraud or breach of fiduciary relation-
ship. 
However, the provisions of a catalogue also become part of 
the contract by implication. In Teeter v. Horner Military 
38Bouligny v. Kirk, 79 D.&C . 332 (1956). 
39culver Military Academy v. Staler, 250 Ill. App. 531 
(1929); Head v. Theis, 150 A. 191 (1930; Heath v. Georgia 
Militaryl\cademy, 97 S . E o 2d 601 (1957); Northwestern Mil-
itary and Naval Academy v . Wadleigh, 267 Ill. App. 1 (1933). 
40Heath v . Georgia Military Academx, 97 S~. 2d 601 
(1957). 
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School, the court indicated very clearly that that there is, 
••• the principle of an implied promise, at least, that the 
pupil who has entered the school will comply with its 
reasonable rules and regulations, and tha 41in a proper case 
he may be dismissed for failing to do so, 
and in Goldstein v. N. Y. u., the court said: 
•.• but obviously, and of necessity, there is implied in such 
a contract a term or condition that the student will not 
be guilty of such misconduct as would be subversive of the 
discipline of the college or school, or as would show him 
· .to be morally unfit to be continued as a member thereof. 
The powe·r of suspension or expulsion is 4~n attribute of the 
government of educational institutions. 
Also, in Stewart v. Claudius, the court reiterated that, 
School rules and provisions contained in the school cata-
logue, advertisement, or application blank become part of 
the contract for tuition and other school charges, where no-
tice thereof has been given to the parents or guardians, or 
their attention called thereto, and the contract for a com-
plete course of instruction or for a specified period of 
time is entire4 the school proprietor may recover the whole sum agreed on. 3 · 
Since, that if not expressly then impliedly, the school's 
rules and regulations governing behavior become part of a 
contract, and if a student's behavio~ violates the rules 
and regulations, then the contract has been breached. Fur-
ther, should the student be expelled 11 th.en the school is 
:prevented from fulfilling its part of the contract, not 
through its own actions 11 but rather through the action of 
breach by the student by his behavior.44 
41Teeter v. Horner Military School, 81 S .E. 767 ( 1914). 
42Goldstein v. N.Y.U., 78 N.Y.S. 739 (1902). 
43stewart v. Claudius., 65 P. 2d 933 (1937). 
44Kabus v. Seftner, 69 N. Y .s. 983 ( 1901). 
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It should be noted that there is precedence 45 for the 
abstract proposition that a catalogue, when properly cir= 
culated and made knowti to patrons who enter their children 
under the terms thereof, will constitute a binding written 
contract that cannot be alteredj varied or modified, in the 
absence of actual fraud or mistake, by verbal testimony. In 
. . 46 
Vidor v. Peacock., Mr. Vidor had entered his son, King; 
in school, paid $200.00 and given two notes of $100.00 each. 
The school had sent Mr. Vidor its catalogue which contained 
express provisions concerning withdrawal. Mr. Vidor based 
his case on the fact that he never signed the enrollment 
form which stated that he had read the catalogue and agreed 
to its terms. When he wanted to avoid the contract claim-
ing the catalogue never became part of the contract, the 
court held that although he did not sign, his act in enter-
ing his son with no other provisions different from the cat-
alogue implied acceptance of the terms of which he was fam-
iliar. To illustrate how closely a court will hold to a 
contract and the provisions of a catalogue$ further facts 
from this case are of interest. The son developed ingrown 
toenails and while at home· for treatment also contracted 
trachoma. The catalogue provided that in order to be re-
45A1nesworth v. Peacock Military College, 225 S.W. 866(1920 · Peacock Military College v. Hughes, 225 S.W. 
221 (1920~; Peacock Military College v. Scroggins, 223 S.W. 
232 (1920); Peirce v. Peacock Military Coll~, 220 S.W. 
191 (1920); Vidor v. Peacock, 145 S.W. 672 (1912). 
46vidor v. Peacock, 145 s.w. 672 (1912). 
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leased from the terms of payment a student must be declared 
unfit or too severely ill for the school by a San Antonio 
doctor. Mr. Vidor had an out of town doctor treat his son. 
The court held that where parties have explicitly stated 
terms in the contract it will .not alter them unless they are 
illegal or against public interest and that Mr. Vidor had 
34 
not complied with the terms of the contract by presenting 
evidence of his son's illness in using an out of town doctor. 
(This point may have been decided differently if the son 
had been so sick that he could not have reached a San An-
tonio doctor). 
Although it may seem as though the law is quite clear 
in respect to the entirety of contracts and the fact that 
catalogue regulations are implied in contracts, cases are 
tried on facts. Litigants often feel that the special facts 
in their cases are of such a nature as to distinguish their 
cases from those falling under the general rules of law. 
The following are examples of such cases, wherein some were 
decided for the school and some for the parents. 
====-In an Illinois case, the court decided that} 
A written application for the admission for a specified 
money consideration of the defendant's minor son to the 
plaintiff's school and the plaintiff's subsequent letter 
which stated that the boy was 'duly enrolled, pending the 
receipt of honorable dismissal from his present school,' 
constituted a complete and binding contract, for a breach of 
which defendants were liable, although the certificate of 
honorable dismissal which, in the making of the application., 
defendants·agreed to present 41nd which actually was ob-
tainable, was not delivered. 
47Asheville School for Training in Christian Leader= 
ship v. Kirk, 269 Ill. App. 365 (1934J:'° 
The defendants here felt as though they had entered into 
a conditional contract 1 i.e. there was some condition which 
had to be fulfilled before the contract ripened into a bind-
ing instrument. Specifically, the parents alleged that 
since the honorable dismissal had not been delivered, the 
schoo-1 's ace eptance had not been completed, and therefore 
the cohtract not made. The courtJ however, reasoned that 
the application had been accepted pending the receipt of the 
35 
honorable dismissal and that since the certificate was avail-
able, its lack of delivery did not operate to spoil the con-
tract. 
=----In Heath v. Georgia Military Academy, the school pres-
sident had agreed to refer a demand for the refund of tuition 
to the proper administrative authorities. The parents felt 
that this was an indication of accord in their demand by an 
official of the school. Howe~er, the court held otherwise 
and said, an, 
•.• agreement by the president of a boarding-school to refer to 
the proper administrative authorities a demand for the re-
fund of tuition and board upon the dismissal of a minor son 
from the school for infractions of rules did not constitute 
accord or satisfaction or show mutual recission of the writ-
ten agreement to pay a specified amount for tuition and 
board for the entire year with provision that no part there-
of would be refunded in the event of witnsrawal or dismis-
sal from the school, except for illness. 
-----In the original trial, the Missouri Military Academy, 
a corporation, sued a patron, Brady, for the unpaid bill of 
48Heath v. Georgia Military Academy, 97 S.E. 2d 601 
( 1957). 
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$371.24 for the actual attendance of his son and did not seek 
the full contract amount. The court found for the school. 
Brady appealed the case and the original decision was even-
tually affirmed by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Brady 
was a brother-in=law of the president of the academy and 
claimed that since the president owed him money personally 
to an amount greater than his bill for tuition, it was 
liquidated. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the 
personal debts of an officer of a corporation do not be-
t t . i t 49 come par of he corporations con racts. ·. 
50 
=====In Ham v. Miss g_. E. Mason's School, The Castle, 
an Oklahoma City doctor attempted to avoid his contract for 
his daughter's tuition on the ground that at the time of 
his signing, he was incompetent as the result of an auto-
mobile accident. The evidence was conflictibg as to the ex-
tent of the injuries and their affects upon his competence, 
and the jury found that he was competent. On appeal, the 
court sustained the jury verdict but went on to say that 
regardless of the situation at the time of signing, upon 
recovery the doctor had continued to acquiese in the con-
tract, and this is itself ripened the contract into bind-
ing form. 
==-=-In Chapin v. Little Blue School, the school catalogue 
49Brady v. Missouri Military Academy, 224 P. 707 (1924). 
50Ham v. Miss Q,. !!!• Mason's School, The Castle, 61 s.w. 
2d 1 (19m. 
stated that "pupils, by their presence in the school, are 
registered for the full school year.," and that "no abate~ 
ment is made from these terms for any reason other than that 
of illness. 1151 Chapin I s son suffered from epileptic c onvul-
sions and was expressly received by the school on trial for 
the purpose of testing his capacity to meet the requirements 
of the school. The father's attention was never called to 
the catalogue regulations, and he never agreed to be bound 
thereby, but he did pay in advance the required tuition fee 
and expenses for one half of the year. Within a few weeks, 
the oral contract was terminated because of the severe 
attacks of th~ son. Here, the father was entitled to recov-
er a proportion of his advance payment in that his special 
,agreement covered the contingency which developed. 
-----Some cases turn on the meaning of such terms as "reg-
istered," "enrolled,n 11 admitted 9 11 and nentered." In a re-
cent case, Rosenbaum v. Riverside Militarx Academy, 52 
Rosenbaum requested that a place be reserved for his son 
and paid the school $1,000.00 plus some incidental fees. In 
the fall, he and his son appeared at the school at the be= 
ginning of the termo The boy's luggage was moved to his 
room, and while the boy was busy 9 the father returned to his 
hotel to rest. Upon his return to the school, the son in-
5lchapin Yo Litt1e Blue School, 86 A. 838 (1913). 
52Rosenbaum v. Riverside Military Academy, 92 S.E. 
2d 541 (1956). 
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formed his father that he did not wish to stay. With that, 
the luggage was collected~and they left the school. Rosen-
baum sued the school for the return of his advanced tuition 
38 
fee. The school refused on the ground that the son had been 
enrolled. This point was important because the contract con-' 
tained the provision that if the son did not enrol~ all but 
$25.00 would be returned to the father. The court held that 
the evidence authorized and compelled the finding that the 
son never became enrolled in or admitted to the school even 
though there were ·some indications of entering; never was the 
decision voiced, and the act Of leaving was acknowledged as 
a conclusive decision of not to enter or enroll. These terms 
can seldom be used to stand upon in litigation unless the con-
tract explicitly or impliedly defines them. In this case, 
the contract was explicit enough for the court to find for 
the father. The contract is ?sually binding as of its mak-
ing unless it is conditional upon physical entrance or some 
other requirement. 
-----Rule v. Connealy, 53 illustrates the issuing of a prom-
issory note in connection with a conditional contract. The 
defendant in this case was pressed to enter into a contract 
in the summer but he was not sure that the contract could 
be fulfilled. The school representative then provided that 
his final assent was not necessary until October 1st. With 
53Rule v. Connealy, 237 N.W. 197 (1931). 
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this understanding, the defendant issued a promissory note 
to cover the cost in the event of his final assento Prior 
to October 1st, the defendant elected not to give his assent. 
The school then sued on the promissory note. The Supreme 
Court of North Dakota held that since a promissory note must 
first be shown to be an expression of an obligation and that 
there was no obligation since the conditional contract never 
ripened, the note could not hold. 
-----In Peirce v. Peacock Military College., 54 the defendant, 
Peirce, tested the legality of a contractual statement re-
fusing a reduction or refund of board or tuition in the event 
of a student's withdrawal for other than reasons of sickness. 
He averred that such a statement operated as a penalty clausa 
It is a principle of law that penalty clauses are unenforce-
able. Peirce reasoned that the ·provision operated as a pen-
alty clause in that he was forced to pay by contract for 
his breach by the terms of the contract itself. A penalty 
clause provides for punishment in the event of a breach., and 
as has been said, is unenforceable; however, the courts will 
allow provisions for liquidated damages. Provisions for 
liquidated damages are actually attempts to forecast probable 
damages in the event of a breach. Admittedly, there is a 
fine line of distinction here, and the courts often have dif-
ficulty in determining the real intent of a clause; however., 
54Peirce v. Peacock Military College, 220 S.W. 191 
( 1920). 
in the case of Peirce, the court held that the statement in 
question was not a penalty clause, but rather a provision in-
suring the entirety of the contract. 
-----In Kentucky Military Institute v. Bramblet, the school 
had revised its catalogue over the summer and raised the 
fees $50.00. Bramblet's son returned to the school for the 
third term at the old fee rate, and the father paid $200.00 
as a first installment. The son was found guilty of hazing 
and was dismissed from the school in November. The school 
sued the father for the full tuition fee at the new rate. 
The court ruled that not only could the school not claim the 
new terms of an entire contract but that the higher rate 
would not be allowed. The school was allowed to retain the 
amount of the first installment and the court held further 
that, 
Should a condition exist where there is no contract but a 
parent has paid a certain fee and the son has been sent from 
the school, the parent obligated himself for so much of that 
term as that certain fee would pay for and may not recover 
any thereof of the theoretically unused part of the term 
paid for in tg~t the son's conduct prejudiced his right to 
be in school. 
-----In a similar case, Rogers v. Councill,56 a boy was duly 
enrolled and remained for about a month and left the school. 
His mother had paid the school. $240.00. There was a state-
ment that the parent must bear the cost of a full year if 
55Kentucky Military Institute v. Bramblet, 164 S.W. 
808 (1914). 
56Rogers v. Councill, 266 S.W. 207 (1924). 
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the son was suspended, expelled or withdrawn without cause •. 
In this case, the mother won and did not have to pay because 
the school did not show in its pleading that the student was 
suspended, expelled or withdrawn without cause. It is in-
cumbent upon a plaintiff in a breach of contract suit to 
prove the breach. 
=----In Kentucky Military Institute v. Cohen, Cohen entered 
his son in school for which the fees were $500.00 for tuition, 
$10.00 for a uniform and $10.00 for a quartermaster card. 
Cohen paid $30.00 in advance on the tuition, $10.00 for the 
card, $62.50 for railroad fare and issued a check for $369.00 
which he stopped. After three days in school, the son left 
because of untenable treatment by the teachers and students. 
There was an entire contract. The school sought $494.00 and 
in a cross-suit, the father sought $5,500.00 $5,000.00 for 
the humiliation of his son, $400.00 for cost in preparing 
his son for school and $100.00 for transportation. The court 
allowed the father to recover his advance of $30.00 9 $10.00 
for the card and $62.50 for transportation and sustained the 
school vs demurrer to the $5,000.00. The court said that, 
Damages for money expended for clothing, trunks, and similar 
articles for a son sent to a private school are not recover-
able by the father 9 the presumption being that they can be 
used; but where, on account of intolerable treatment by the 
teachers, the child left after three days 3 the railroad far57 
and money advance to the school for tuition is recoverable. 
-=-=-In Bergman v. Bouli_g__IJX_, the defendant's daughter was in 
57Kentucky Military Institute v. Cohen, 198 S.W. 874 
(1917). 
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schoolJ and her father contracted for the next year by pay-
ing $50.00 to reserve a place. During the summer, the girl's 
mother wrote that for personal reasons the daugh~er would not 
return the following year. The school sued in this case for 
$1J350.oo less $200.00 which represented an amount in the cat-
alogue to be reduced as board not to be paid in such cases. 
The defendant pleaded that the rate of reduction was arbi= 
trary and provided a defect in the contract; however.I) the 
court sa i.d: 
Where a school catalogue provided for the deduction of $25.00 
a month for board in case of protracted illness of a studentj 
and the student failed to return to school for reasons other 
than illness» and the school entered a voluntary credit of 
$25.00 a monthJ and the parent of the student offered notes-
timony as to the value of board or food and made no showing 
that he was entitled to a greater deduction than that pro= 
vided in the catalogue of which he had knowledge 9 the food 
credit allowance of $200.00 which was granted by the schoo~8 
suing the parent for breach of contract was not arbitrary. 
=====Northwestern Military and Naval Academy Vo Wadleigh~ 59 
illustrates that contracts for necessaries which may be 
otherwise unenforceable are binding only so far as they are 
performed. In this case, a mother entered into a contract 
with the plaintiff school which was to provide her son with 
board, lodgingJ clothing, a course in military training and 
business instruction for an annual charge of $1 3 200.00. The 
son withdrew from the academy without the consent of the 
academy and thus prevented it from fulfilling its part of 
58Bergman v. BoulignyJ 82 A. 2d 760 (1951). 
59Northwestern Military and Naval Agademy v. Wadleigh, 
267 Ill. App. 1 (1933). ~ ~ 
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the contract which it was ready, willing and able to do. The 
plaintiff sued the husband/father. In its pleading, the 
plaintiff averred that by virtue of the Smith=Hurd Revised 
Statute of 1931, c. 68 Section 14 of the Illinois Code, 
providing for the joint liability of a husband and wife for 
the expenses of the family and of the education of the chil-
dren1 the father became liable for the balance of $500.00 
due under the contract. The court rejected this plea point= 
ing out quite clearly that such a liability for necessaries 
generally~ and particularly under the cited statute1 involves 
only those benefits actually received and not those contract~ 
for. The court also rejected the plea that the father was 
liable on the theory of an implied contract since he per-
mitted his son to enter the academy with knowledge of the 
terms and conditions of admission and training which were co~ 
tained in a catalogue sent to him on his request. 
Although the decision in this case did not turn on these 
erroneous pleadings» had the plaintiff not sued the mother~ 
the legally liable partyj in her own righ~ it would have 
lost the case. 
=-=--The case of Torbett v. Jones illustrates a lack of con-
sideration in the contractual relationship. The school had 
claimed in its catalogue and at the time of contracting that 
it had high standard~ and its students were accepted at other 
institutions. The school had originally withheld the stu-
dent's accumulated credits in an attempt to force the pay-
ment of an unpaid portion of his fees. This case was an 
attempt to collect those same feeso During the trial, the 
defense introduced evidence that the school had been dropped 
from the Southern Association (for accreditation) and that 
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the school's credits were not acceptable at the local schools. 
The court said: 
Where a private school refused to release the credits earned 
by the pupil on the grouna·that the pupil was indebted to 
the school, and the creditsJ even if released, would not 
have been accepted by accredited schools. the parent 8s con-
tract to pay the stipulate@0tuition was rendered invalid 
for want of consideration. 
There are in any contracts of tuition for instruction cer= 
tain implied provisions which the school is expected to ful-
fill. These imply in the absence of anything to the con-
trary, that schoolrooms and facilities will be rea';onably 
fit for the purpose intended, that the teaching staff will 
be of reasonable skill and judgment in the field in which 
instruction is to be given and will exercise ordinary care 
61 
and diligence to accomplish the purpose of the contract. 
and that the board and lodging to be furnished shall be 
clean 1 decent 9 and reasonably wholesome and suitable to the 
pupils of the schooi. 62 Where the school issues a prospec= 
tus outlining or setting forth the course of study, on the 
faith of which a contract for instruction is made, it is 
bound to give instruction in each of the studies or branches 
60Torbett v. Jones, 86 S.W. 2d 898 (1935). 
61Barngrover v. Maack, 46 Mo. App. 407 (1891). 
62Horner Military School v. ~ogers, 83 S.E. 345 (1914)~ 
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of study so indicated,9 although the details and amount of 
instruction in each are 9 within reasonable limits, left 
to the discretion of the officers or teachers of the school.~ 
=====In Mount Ida School f~ CU.rls v" Kerr J! the jury found 
that where an agent or the school had assured a girl that 
the school had a course in interior decoration that would 
sui~ her needs and that the girl discovered upon enrolling 
that she had had the course in high school and the sc 
offered to send her to Boston or to start a course, that 
s:Jhool was ready and able !I to fulfiJ.l the con°~ 
tract by lts -terms. The student was not obliged to go to 
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Boston nor to wait for the school to establish such a courseo 
to recover on an entire contract. Rogers had signed a con= 
tract for a year 0 s schooling, room and board for his son. 
He withdrew his son and refused to pay the contract price 
because of the living accommodations provided by the school. 
He introduced evidence that the room assigned to his son 
contained '' .•. two old homemade bedsteads, two old dirty and 
filthy mattressess a piece of mirrors a goods box for a 
6') 
bureau 1 and an old wash stand. 11 - The lower court had lgnored 
this evidence in its charge to the jury and instructed the 
jury to consider only whether the contract was entire or not 
63Barngrover v. Maack, 46 Mo. App. 407 (1891). 
64l.\1ount Ida School for Girls v. l(erJ:~ 154 A. 565 ( 1931). 
65Horner Military Schgol v. Rogers» 83 S.E. 345 (1914). 
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and if Rogers had breached it by removing his son. The 
appeal court remanded the case to the lower court on the 
basis of the evidence of the school's failure to fulfill its 
implied agreement that the living accommodations would be 
clean, decent and of a quality suited to the pupils enrolled. 
=====In Lyon v. Sparks, 66 there was a cross=suit which claimed 
that the food provided the defendant 1 s child was not only 
of insufficient quantity but also impure and unfit to eat. 
This claim was dismissed for lack of evidence; however, had 
the condition been proved 1 the school would have breached 
the contract by failing to fulfill its implied agreement to 
provide sufficient, eatable food of a quslity suited to the 
pupils enrolled. 
67 =====In Lenox Ha 11 v. SeelY.§..JJ the defendant parents had 
placed their daughter in school for the prime purpose of 
her receiving a music education in practice and harmony. 
The school had no class in harmony that year and charged ex-
tra for private lessons. Since the school had not fulfilled 
its part of the contract, it lost its suit for recovery of 
the extra charges and the fees for the second semester when 
the student was withdrawn from the school because of dis= 
satisfaction by the parents. 
Although the weight of authority throughout the nation 
is that tuition contracts are entire 3 Michigan does not hold 
661,yon v a Sparks» 112 P. 340 ( 1910). 
67Lenox Hall v. Seelye» 190 P. 737 (1927). 
to this ruleo Michigan holds to the general contract law 
wherein the extent of recovery on a breached contract is 
that of proven damages. The classic case pointing up this 
rule is that of The Mount Ida School for Girls v. Rood. 68 
The school was located in Massachusetts and was suing in the 
courts of Michigan. It was determined that the contract had 
been made in Michigan; therefore. the laws or Michigan gov-
erned. Since Michigan does not allow an automatic recovery 
of the contract price, and since the school pleaded in terms 
of Massachusetts' theory, the school lost the case. As the 
court pointed out, under Michigan law, the injured party 
must prove the extent of damage. 
Georgia courts, upon occasion, have in a similar manner 
held to the ge~eral contract rule concerning proved damages 
· in connection with breached contracts. In a 1926 case, 
' 
Georgia Military Academy v. Rogers, the court said~ 
The parent having breached the contract by refusal to send 
his son to the prtvate school, it was ~~titled to recover 
proved damages for the breach thereof. 
However, this is apparently not settled law in Georgia. 
There are more recent cases which do follow the weight of 
· 70 authority. 
68The Mount Ida School for Girls v. Rood, 235 N.W. 227 
( 1931) .~ 
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69Georgia Military Academy v. Rogers, 134 S.W. 829 (1926i 
70Mathews Vo Riverside Academy, 163 S.E. 238 (1932); 
Heath v. Georgia Military Academy» 97 S.E. 2d 601 (1957). 
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Summary 
It is general contract law that, "the loss or injury 
actually sustained, rather than the price paid or agreed to 
be paid on full performance, is the proper measure of damage 
for a breach of contract. u7l However 9 in the case of tuition 
and board contracts in private schools, this rule has been 
modified to allow for provisions of entirety in contracts. 
It has been judicial reasoning that since private schools 
provide the service they do and that damages are almost im= 
possible to assess in that the loss of one student does not 
appreciably reduce the cost of operation, a provision for 
full payment upon expulsion or withdrawal (except in the 
case of prolonged and incapacitating illness) is justified. 
A school catalogue, prospectus and generally circulated 
rules and regulations become part of a contract. In most 
instances of litigation, the contract instrument so stip-
ulates the inclusion; however, even wh,re such ·stipulations 
are not made, the courts have held that these adjuncts be-
come part of the contract by implication. 
CHAPTER V 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
There is little if any question today but that private 
schools do have the power to adopt rules for the regulation 
of their pupils.72 The authorities of a private school may 
require their pupils to obey the school's rules, provided 
the rules are reasonable, and may suspend or dismiss those 
who disobey.73 It is important that those reasonable rules 
be enforced for the purpose contemplated and not maliciously 
or arbitrarily.74 
Reasonableness~ The determination of the reasonableness of 
a rule and whether its violation is sufficient cause for 
suspension or dismissal are questions of law for the court 
to decide and not a jury. 75 Many decisions have been found 
72nwyer v. Cashen, 232 Ill. App. 493 (1924); Hoadley 
v. Allen, 291 P.~1930); Miami Military Institute v. 
Leff, 220 N.Y.S. 799 (1926); State~ rel. Burpee v. Burton, 
'Ifsw'is. 150 (1878); Teeter v. Horner Militart School, 81 
S.E. 767 (1914); Vidor v. Peacock, 145 S.W. 72 (1912); 
William v. Stein, 166 N.Y.S. 836 (1917). 
73Teeter v. Horner Military School, 81 S.E. 767 (1914). 
74Hood v. Tabor Academy, 6 N.E. 2d 818 (1937) . 
. 75Kentucky Military Institute v. Bramblet, 164 S.W. 808 
(1914). 
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in error on procedure because judges have charged the jury 
with the duty of deciding the above questions. 
The following cases illustrate rules and regulations 
the courts have found to be reasonable. 
-----In Curry v. Lasell Seminary ..Q_Q., the school's rules 
provided that the students were not to be absent from the 
school for holidays, outings, recesses, etc., without the 
school's approval. Further, the school gave notice that it 
did not encourage par_e,nts to, nor favor their request for 
special permission to take their children out. Since all 
50 
of the students did not have parents who could visit them and 
take them out, the school felt that if some were allowed 
this privilege, the pri;:1ctice would be subversive to good 
discipline and morale. After the school had made the ex-
traordinary allowance of three Sunday visits at home in 
six weeks to the plaintiffs, the daughter was again taken 
out of the school over the school's denial of permission. 
The court said that the, 
.•• defendant was not bound to allow the plaintiffs' daughter 
to remain in the school unless with the understanding that 
she should not be absent during the term time_without per-
mission of the officers thereof and that it Lschool7 
was to have absolute discretion to determine as to when an 
absence would be permitted.76 
-----In Hood v •. Tabor Academy, the school had as one of 
its rules the prohibition of smoking in the village of 
Marion. The plaintiff and his son, Brevoort, knew of this 
76curry v. Lasell Seminary Co., 46 N.E. 110 (1897). 
rule. As it happened, some of the teachers overheard 
Brevoort say he was going to have a smoke in town. When 
questioned if he did violate the rule, he denied it but 
later admitted the infraction. Brevoort was expelled on 
this infraction and an accumulation of other discipline 
breaches which rendered his conduct in other respects un-
satisfactory. The court said in this case by the parents 
to recover part of the tuition they paid, the, 
Evidence is held insufficient to establish that the 
student's expulsion by the private educational institution 
for the accumulation of breaches of discipline, including 
smoking, was arbitrary or capricious, or tha 77it was not 
made in good faith and for reasonable cause. 
---=-In Hoadley v. Allen, the court stated plainly that, 
It is well established by a long line of decisions 
L,citing casesJ in practically all of the states in the 
Union that a private school has the power to adopt rules 
for the regulatiog8of its pupils, and to di~miss the pupils 
who violate them.' 
Here, Allen entered his seventeen year old daughter in the 
Marlborough School. The school had a rule which prohibited 
the students from leaving the premises without permission. 
On January 8th, Allen's daughter left the school at 9:30 pm 
unchaperoned and stayed all night in a hotel. She returned 
the next day with her parents. Although there was no in-
dication of improper conduct, the daughter was expelled. 
The court held that the school's rule was reasonable and 
that the daughter had violated the rule, and therefore 
77Hood v. Tabor Academy, 6 N.W. 2d 818 (1937). 
78Hoadley v. Allen, 291 P. 601 (1930). 
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was properly expelled. 
--=--,LNot only must rules b~ reasonable, but also enforced 
for the purpose contemplated, and not maliciously or arbitrar-
ily, ,Lan!i} it would seem imperative and essential to the 
welfare of the school that the power to suspend the offend-
ing pupil at once from its privileges be allowed the officer 
who must necessarily decide for himself whether the case 
required that remedy, unless some other method was provided 
for that purpose.79 
In this case, Teeter's son had been entered in school on Jan-
uary 1st and remained for the rest of that school year. He 
had returned to the school the following fall and was expel= 
led about October 1st. The general charge agains~ him was 
an accumulation of excessive demerits. The specific offenses 
included~ smoking, visiting, leaving his room when he was 
required to be in it, and throwing something in the assembly 
hall. In regard to this, the court said that the, 
Expulsion of a cadet for repeated misconduct and vio-
lation of rules, for which 1excessive demerits' had been 
imposed was jU§Cified, as amounting almost to defiant in= 
subordination. 
---=-In Fessman v. Seeley, 81 the father of a continually 
truant pupil refused to permit the school teacher to whip 
his son for misconduct and' took no steps himself to correct 
the boy. The court found that the school was justified in 
expelling the pupil for his truancy and the lack of coop-
eration on the part of the father. 
79Teeter v. Horner Military School, 81 3.E. 767 (1917). 
80Ibid. 
81Fessman v. Seeley, 30 S.W. 268 (1895). 
-----In Manson v. Culver Military Academy 3 82 the facts re-
veal that the plaintiff's son, a cadet, left ~n extra duty 
squad twice without permission in direct violation of the 
school rules. He also had an accumulation of demerits which 
was in excess of that set by the regulations as being suf-
ficient for dismissal. The court held that the cadet's dis-
missal must be upheld in the absence of any evidence that 
the dismissal was unreasonable or oppressive, or that the 
superintendent acted maliciously, unfairly, or from any im-
proper motive. 
-----The case of Kentucky Military Institute v. Bramblet83 
involved a violation of a rule forbidding hazing. Bram-
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blet 1s son, a third year cadet, had been expelled for hazing; 
the school pointed out in its pleading and evidence, that the 
cadet was familiar with the rulej for it was stated in the 
school catalogue and defined in the book of rules with which 
every cadet was familiar. Bramblet pleaded that the school 1 s 
action was arbitrary and unjust because his son had never 
before been guilty of misconduct. The court struck down 
this plea for lack of evidence of any arbitrary action. The 
court said it would not interefere with or revise a rule 
which was not unlawful or against public policy. 
-----In Hall v. Mount Ida School !.212. Girls 1 84 the secret 
82Manson v. Culver Military Academy, 141 Ill. App. 250 
( 1908) 0 
83Kentucky Military Institute v. Bramblet, 164 s~w. 808 
(1914). 
84Ha],1, v. Mount Ida School .£2£. Girls, 155 N.E. 418 (1927). 
marriage of a girl student was regarded as sufficient ground 
for her expulsion where the court took the view that the 
school had contracted to receive her as a 11miss, 11 and that 
there was an implied condition that the status would con-
tinue until the end of the school year, which condition had 
not been waived. 
-----In Horner School v. Wescott, 85 several cadets went into 
a grogshop on Sunday and got drunk. The court upheld the 
expulsion of the cadets and accepted the view advanced by 
.. 
the school that a dismissal was equivalent to a voluntary 
withdrawal since the cadets consciously and voluntarily vio-
lated a school rule which they knew meant inevitable expul-
sion. 
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-----In Kabus v. Seftner, 86 the suspension of a student until 
an apology should be offered for improper and insubordinate 
conduct in repeatedly charging an instructor with lying was 
rega~ded as proper. 
Some of the foregoing violations or infractions may 
seem quite harmless) or the rules themselves might seem out 
of step with modern life; however, in the instance of pri-
vate schools this is not the concern of the courts. In 
Tanton v. McKenney et al 3 87 the court cited Pugsley v. Sell= 
meyer, in which the court explained its role. 
85Horner School v. Wescott, 32 S.E. 885 (1899). 
86 · · Kabus v. S.eftner, 69 N.Y.S. 983 (1901). 
87Tanton v. McKenney, 197 N.W. 510 (1924). 
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The question therefore is not whether we approve this 
rule as one we would have made as directors of the district, 
nor are we required to find whether it was essential to the 
maintenance of discipline. On the contrary, we must uphold 
the rule, unless we find that the directors have clearly 
abused their discretion, and that the rule is not one reason-
ably calculated to effect the purpose in~8nded, that is 
of promoting discipline in the school ... 
Actually, the courts are prone to declare any rule rea-
sonable which does not infringe upon the constitutional 
rights of the individual, is unlawful or against public pol-
icy.89 The court reasons that the school authorities are, 
within reasonable bounds, a substitute for the parent, ex-
ercising his authority.90 The following is often quoted in 
cases concerning discipline in both public and private schools: 
In the school, as in the family, there exist on the part 
of the pupils the obligations of obedience to lawful com-
mands, subordination, civil deportment, respect for the 
rights of other pupils, and fidelity to duty. These obli-
gations are inherent in any proper school system and c on-
stitute, so to Speak, the common law of the school. Every 
pupil is presumed to know this law, and is subject to it, 
whether it has or has not been re-enacted by the district 
board in the form of written rules and regulations. Indeed 
it would be impossible to frame rules which would cover all 
cases of insubordination and all acts of vicious tendency 
which the teacher is liable to encounter daily and hourly. 
The teacher is responsible for the discipline of his school, 
and for the progress, conduct, and deportment of his pupils. 
It is his imperative duty to maintain good order, to require 
of his pupils a faithful performance of their duties. If 
he fails to do so, he is unfit for his position. To enable 
him to discharge these duties effectually, he must necessar-
ily have the power to enforce prompt obedience to his law-
ful commands. For this reason the law gives him the power, 
88pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 250 S.W. 538 (1923). 
89Kentucky Militarv Institute v. Bramblet, 164 S.W. 808 
(1914). 
90semple School for Girls v. Yieldiqg_, 80 So. 158 (1918). 
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in proper cases, to inflict corporal punishment upon re-
fractory pupils. But there are cases of misconduct for which 
such punishment is an inadequate remedy. If the offender 
is inco91igible, suspension or expulsion is the only adequate 
remedy. . 
Unreasonable Rules : Unreasonable rules center around those 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the state and Federal 
Constitutions. As has been pointed out above, it is quite 
reasonable for a private school to require its students to 
attend religious or devotional services in the school chap-
. ' 
el;92 however, to require students to attend a particular 
church in the town or surrounding community is considered 
unreasonable. In the same case noted above where a Jewish 
cadet was required to attend a Presbyterian Church, the 
court said: 
This was an unusual and unreasonable requirement, which 
he,LcadejJ7 was justified in refusing to obey. The courts do 
not go so far as to sanction such a requirement. The regu-
lations of a school in this respect that are sustained by the 
courts are only those requiring attendance upon the exer-
cises or religious services conducted by the school itself 
as being part of the curriculum and instruction of the in-
stitution. Certainly, the proposition to compel a student to 
march from one church to another of various demoninations 
and of conflicting faiths, independent of the school itself, 
and located outside its boundries and beyond its authority 
and control, cannot ·by any wild stretch of the imagination 
come within the principle laid down by the courts in sanc-
tioning compulsory attendance by the student upon the re-
ligious services conducted by the school itself.93 
91state ~· rel. Burpee v. Burton, 45 Wi.s. ],50 ( 1878). 
92ooiami Military Institute v. Leff, 220 N.Y.S. 799 (1926~ 
93Ibid. 
Summary 
Private schools have the right to make any reasonable 
rules and regulations which are intended to promote educa-
tion within each school. Whether a rule is reasonable or 
not will be decided by the courts and not by juries. 
The courts are not prone to declare .any rule unreasonable 
unless some constitutional or statutory right is violated; 
the courts will not judge t.he wisdom of a rule p but will 
determine if it is arbitrary, malicious or not in concert 
with public policy. 
Students, through either the express or implied terms 
of their parent's contract, are expected to adhere to the 
rules and regulations of the school. An infraction is 
caus~ for dismissal at the discretion of the school. It 
is incumbent, however 9 upon. the school in the face of 
charges of arbitrary actiOn 9 to prove that its action was 
taken as that considered best for the continued operation 




The question of the tort liability of individuals 
involved in the corporal punishment of pupils has been 
treated several times.94 This chapter on tort liability 
is concerned with questions other than those involving 
corporal punishment. Howeverj because the question of 
liability connected with corporal punishment is usually 
of vital interest to private and public educators, mater-
ial concerning this question will be found in Appendix 
A and Appendix B of this work. Appendix A contains an ex-
traction, in toto, from the Restatement of~ Law of Torts 
on the subject of corporal punishment and offers the gen-
eral principles of liability. Appendix B conta~ns an an-
notation, in toto, from the American~ Reports on the 
same subject and supports the general principles with case 
material. From this material, it will be found that there 
is little distinction to be made between the liability of 
public school teachers and private school teachers. All 
94Edwards, pp. 601-615; Madaline K. Remmlein, School 
Law, (New York, 1950) pp. 232-253; 43 ALR 2d 469; Restate-
ment of the Law of Torts, Vol. I, Topic 2, Sections 147-
155. - - - -
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teachers are endowed with immunity from liability for cor-
poral punishment which is reasonable in nature and which 
is administered for a legitimate purpose in a rational and 
malice-free manner. Teachers are representatives of society 
with a responsibility delegated to them by society. To 
accomplish their task, teachers are considered to be in loco 
parentis. Since parents have the right and moral duty to 
punish the1r children within certain limits, this right 
and duty devolves upon teachers as they stand in the place 
of parents. 
In American Law Reports, there are several annotations 
which deal with the subject of tort liability in schools. 95 
However, there is no one annotation which specifically 
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treats the tort liability of non-charity type private schools. 
The material for this chapter is drawn from the scattered 
references in the annotations and from court decisions which 
do not turn on the principle of immunity granted to schools 
deemed to be charitable in nature. 
The legal principles, rules and tests which are ap= 
plied in the determination of the right to charitable im-
munity are a study in themselves. An annotation from the 
American Law Reports has been appended to this work as 
Appendix C. There, particular facts and conditions which 
are determinative of charitable status will be round. Ap-
pendix C is by no means an exhau-istive discussion of the 
95see Appendix B. 
subject; however 9 it does indicate what is considered by 
courts when they are determining if an institution is in 
fact charitable in nature and eligible for immunity from 
tort liability on that basis. In general, it will be 
found that the basis for immunity is in the fact that where 
funds are placed in trust to provide a service needed by 
society, those funds are not considered to be properly 
used to indemnify those suffering from torts of the charity. 
Where the rule of charitable immunity is not applied, 
it is found that the tort liability of private schools is 
governed by the general rules or principles which control 
tort actions against private persons or ordinary business 
corporations. In the cases decided without regard to the 
question of charitable immunity, the courts have only con-
cerned themselves with the question of the existence of 
liability upon the individual facts presented. 
The following cases and comments illustrate the rules 
and principles which control tort actions of private persons 
or business corporations. These have been selected in the 
light of the scope of this work, te. those actions arising 
out of the relationships between patronsj personnel and 
students of private schools. 
----~In the State of Utah, no immunity from tort liability 
is extended to charitable institutions. The case of Brig-
ham Young University v. Lillywhite~ 6is one from Utah which 
96Brigham Young University v. Lillywhite, 118 F. 2d 
836 (1941). 
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involves the question of negligence in the supervision of 
students in laboratory work. The points illustrated are 
that the degree of supervision must be commensurate with 
the dangerous nature of the work and the experience of the 
students; an institution may become liable for the acts 
of its agent or servant wheri he is acting within the scope 
of his employment; and jl class participation does not con-
stitute a joint endeavor wherein the contributory negligence 
of one member of a group is attributable to another. 
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Since the laws of Utah do not afford a charitable in-
stitution immunity from tort liability, the general rules of 
agency and tort liability were held applicable in this action. 
Therefore 9 not only did the negligent instructor become li= 
able for his tort of negligence but also the institution 
which did not deny that the instructor was a paid intructor 
of that institution and was acting in the scope of his duties 
at the time of the accident complained of. The facts reveal 
that an inexperienced group of students in a chemistry class 
were allowed by the instructor to proceed with an experiment 
during his absence from the roomo While absent from the 
room, one of the students improperly combined some chemicals, 
applied heat, and an explosion occurred which injured the 
complaining studento The court observed through the evidence 
that it was not the practice to permit unsupervised exper= 
iments in other schools and that a reasonably prudent person 
could foresee possible disaster in the unsupervised experi= 
menting of inexperienced students in a chemistry laboratory~ 
It was held in this appeal case that the original trial jury 
had sufficient evidence to warrant its finding that the in= 
structor was negligent and that the University became li-
able through its employee's negligenceo 
The University pleaded non=liability on the theory that 
the class was a joint enterprise and therefore, the contrib-
utory negligence of the student who caused the explosion was 
attributable to the complaining student" The principle of 
contributory negligence provides that if the injured party 
has contributed to the negligent ac~ he has no cause for 
action. The court here refused to hold that the class was 
a joint enterprise; therefore» no negligence could be at-
tributed to the complaining student. 
-----The following case illustrates that supervision need 
not be constant except where conditions warrant it, that 
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essentially harmless objects may be left unguarded and that 
should such objects be used in an injury of a person, alleged 
negligence will not lie if it cannot be shown that a reason-
able prudent person would anticipate that such an object 
would be utilized in the injury of a person. In this case 
of Kos v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago 9 97a pupil sustained 
injuries while eating her lunch in a classroom provided by 
the school when she was struck by a hand-brush used for floor 
cleaning which had been thrown by another pupil. The brush 
was kept in a place where it would be available for use in 
97 Kos v. Catholic Bisho12 of Chic ago, 45 N oE. 2d 1006 
( 1942) .~ 
cleaning the floors after the lunch period was over. The 
court held th?t the brush was inherently a harmless object, 
·<·:~ 
and its mere presence in the lunchroom could not be held to 
render the room unsafe or constitute negligence on the part 
of the defendant school. 
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The plaintiff also alleged that the pupil who had thrown 
the brush was older and known to have habitually fought, 
quarreled,9 and "rough=housed 11 with the younger pupils. The 
plaintiff averred that it was dangerous and unsafe for the 
injured six and one-half year old pupil to eat her lunch in 
the room with those older pupils unless the room were con-
stantly supervised by responsible adults. But the court said 
that this contention rendering the school liable for their 
failure to exercise supervision over the pupils while eating 
was untenable. If school authorities were obliged to stand 
guard over children on the school premises at all times, it 
would be fairly impossible to conduct schools without peril 
to the authorities who maintain and operate them. 
The court also held that the failure on the part of 
the school in not removing ~he brush was not the proximate 
cause of the injury. The intervening cause of the injury was 
the act of the pupil who threw the brush~and there was no 
evidence that the presence of supervision supplied by the 
school would have prevented it. 
--=-=Conley v. Martin_,98 also involves the question of super-
98conley v. Martin, 42 A. 2d 26 (1945). 
vision but again points up the necessity of the plaintiff's 
proving that the defendant's act or omission was the prox-
imate (legal) cause of the injury. Here, an eleven year 
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old .. pupil was attending a boarding and training school for 
the treatment and cure of young persons afflicted with stam= 
mering. The school maintained a playground for the use of 
the children, and they were forbidden to go anywhere else 
on the school grounds except under the supervision of an 
adult. The young plaintiff was not mentally deficient and 
fully understood from the time of his entrance into the 
school that he was not to be abroad unattended. On the day 
of the injury in question, the plaintiff, at the suggestion 
of another boy, left the school grounds proper for an ad-
joining area also owned by the school. In order to reach the 
property, the boys had to cross a swamp or pigpen or both, 
and climb over two fences. While on their excursion, the 
two boys attempted to climb an old silo which was in poor 
repair. The young plaintiff slipped on a loose rock on 
the silo when he reached the top and fel~ sustaining the 
injury in question. 
The court refused to support the claim that the school's 
failure to maintain the walls of the silo was the proximate 
cause of the injury or that the school negligently allowed 
the plaintiff to be upon the ground of the school unattend= 
ed where the evidence showed that the boy deliberately and 
with understanding stole away from the group and thus vio= 
lated the schoo1°s rule. 
65 
-==rmrmingerson VO Shattuck School, 99 illustrates the duty of 
th~ plaintiff in alleging negligence by omission and also 
alleged contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. 
In this action, a paying spectator at a football game, was 
injured when she was struck by two players who had tumbled 
over and rolled across· the line against her. It was not the 
custom to fence or rope off the playing field at the defen-
dant school or similar small schoo·ls or c alleges in that 
part of the state. Further, if such barriers had been used; 
it could be inferred that they had been employed to keep the 
spectators off of· the field and not the players on the field. 
The plaintiff alleged that the school was liable for her 
injuries since it negligently failed to rope or fence the 
field. The court concluded that a rope would not have pre-
vented the players from rolling under it and a fence might 
have caused the plaintiff greater injury if it, along with 
the players, crashed down upon her. Thus, the plaintiff 
failed to show that the failure to rope or fence the field 
was a negligent act of omission for it could not reasonably 
have been foreseen under the circumstances that such an 
omission was likely to result in injury to anyone or that the 
suggested action would have prevented it. 
The plaintiff also all,eged that the school was liable 
for negligence in that it did not provide space and proper 
seats for spectators. However, the court struck down this 
99rngerson v. Shattuck School, 239 N.W. 667 (1932). 
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plea because the plaintiff did not show that she had sought 
a seat among those prov'ided. · The court also struck down 
another plea that the school was negligent by virtue of the 
fact that it did not provide enough police or patrolmen dur= 
ing the game to properly police the grounds. There were only· 
between 200 and 300 spectators for which the school provided 
the supervision of the athletic director and other school em= 
ployees. The court held that the presence of more supervi-
sory personnel would not have assured the prevention of in= 
jury to the plaintiff. 
====-A case involving Dartmouth College, Currier v. Dart-
100 
mouth, was decided in a lower court in view of the el= 
eemosynary character of the corporation and that the work 
being done was in furtherance of the chartered trust. How-
ever, although the court on appeal upheld the Judgment., it 
is interesting to note that it pointed out that it was un-
necessary to determine the question of nonliability of the 
college because of its immunity. The facts reveal that the 
school owed the plaintiff no duty in regard to the occurance 
of his injury. As it happened, the superintendent of build-
ings and grounds had issued an invitation to students, staff 
and towns people to view the felling of an old chimney which 
was a school land mark. At the "ceremony," the plaintiff 
was injured by falling rubble. The plaintiff averred that 
the superintendent negligently fell the chimney and·thereby 
lOOcurrier v. Dartmouth, 105 F. 886 (1900). 
through his action brought liability upon the school. But 
I 
the court concluded that the school had not issued the in-
vitation, expressly or impliedlyj and that the lookers-on 
were on the premises without invitation by the school. The 
building superintendent operated outside the scope of his 
employment and in so doing his invitation was not the in-
vitation of the college. Therefore, the college owed those 
present no protection except from hidden dangers of which 
it was aware or should have been aware and each individual 
was charged with his own protection. 
. 101 =====In Cortright v. Rutgers Q.QjJ.eg_e, the plaintiff was 
an invitee of the college; however, it is shown in this case 
that an invitee is expected to use the places provided., 
expressly or impliedly, and that liability does not extend 
beyond the provisions. 
The plaintiff in this case attended a concert on the 
campus. There was a sidewalk of more than sufficient width 
leading from the building in which the concert was held to 
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the street and parking areas. When the concert was over 9 the 
plaintiff left the building with a large number of people 
and used the walk for a short distance. Instead of contin-
uing with the crowd on the walk to the parking lot~ the 
plaintiff took a short-cut to th& parking area across the 
lawn. As it happened, there had been a wire stretched across 
the lawn to keep people from walking on the grass. The 
101cortright v. Rutgers CQ1lege 3 198 A. 837 (1938). 
plaintiff fell over the wire and sustained the injuries com= 
plained of in this case" The court held that the school· 
could not be held liable for neglecting its duty to protect 
invitees to the campus because it had p~ovided more than 
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adequate by=ways of the usual type and could expect that 
people would use them for ingress and egress. There was no 
reason to believe on the part of the school that persons 
attending the concert would wander on the campus and further 
such wandering was not within the scope of the invitation. 
The school had taken reasonable care to provide for the 
guests and when the guest departed from the limits of the 
invitation and went upon the lawn, the duty of the school was 
at an end. 
This case is to be contrasted with the following case 
where a graduate was invited back to his university and was 
injured as he wandered about. 
~====In Guilford v. ¥ale University$ 102the plaintiff» 
Guilford,, was a graduate of the defendant University. He had 
been invited to attend the commencement exercises and class 
reunions. This was a general invitation to be abroad upon 
the campus and to participate in the general festivities of 
the occasion. The class reunion headquarters were in a 
building on the campus. Behind this building, there was a 
retaining wall beyond which there was a considerable drop= 
off. After the headquarters building was closed one night, 
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Guilford walked toward the retaining wall to answer a call 
of nature. As he did so, he fell over the wall and sustained 
injury. The court on appeal held that the jury had sufficient 
evidence upon which to find that the plaintiff was free of 
contributory negligence and had not exceeded the limits of 
his invitation. The University was guilty of negligence in 
failing to anticipate the danger from the particular use 
made of the premises by the plaintiff. It was not an un= 
reasonable burden upon the University to expect it to pro-
vide adequate facilities and grounds free from traps danger-
ous to life and limb. 
=----Again in a California case, it is found that a university 
became liable when it negligently allowed a dangerous situa-
tion t'o persist. In this case 3 Stockwell v. Leland Stanford 
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Junior University, Stockwell was one of 2,000 students 
who participated in a campus-wide cleanup program. The 
9,000 acres of campus were officially declared a game refuge, 
and signs were displayed at numerous places forbidding hunt-
ing and the possession of guns. However, for two years, guns 
had been used promiscuously on the campus. The authorities 
were aware of the situation. 
StockWell was injured by a bullet from a BB gun while 
riding in a truck on the campus during the clean-up. The 
court held that under the existing circumstances, wherein 
103stockwell v. Leland Stanford J1:!!1ior University 
148 P. 2d 405 (1944). -
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a dangerous situation existed of which the school authorities 
were well aware and a student was injured, the evidence was 
sufficient to support the fair inference that the Univer-
sity failed to exercise reasonable care to protect its 
students from the danger. This was particularly true on 
the day of the injury since a large number -of students were 
to be abroad in an area where most of the guns had been 
noted. Further, the school employed seven or eight police 
officers) but only two were on duty the day of the accident 
despite the gathering of a large number of students in the 
danger area. The defendant claimed that the willful and 
ma lie ious ·act of the one who fired the gun was the proximate 
cause of the accident,and,therefore even if negligence on 
its part were assumed, this fact alone relieved it of lia-
bility. The court rejected this plea and said there was 
no evidence that the gun was fired wilfully or maliciously 
and that the determination of the act as an intervening 
cause which broke the chain of causation was a question for 
the jury to decide and not one of law over which it had 
power of review. 
=====In Keyser v. Richards 9 104 the plaintiff alleged that the 
individual negligence of several of the school personnel 
'· 
taken both individually and collectively contributed to the 
continued ill health of his son who finally died in a state 
of complete collapse. 
104 Keyser v. Richards, 130 A. 41 (1925). 
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The facts reveal that the plaintiff entered his son in 
the defendant 0 s school after the son°s two year absence from 
any school. The plaintiff notified the school authorities 
that his son had not been able to attend school because of a 
long series of illnesses among which were tonsilitis, 
rheumatism~ chorea» heart lesion and endocarditis. He 
requested that his son receive personal supervision from 
the head and that the boy should not be required to partici= 
pate in violent exercise. He also made it clear that he 
should be notified at anytime his son appeared to be unwell. 
On February 1st, the boy became ill and was sent'to the 
school infirmary. The rather was not notified 9 as he had re-
quested, and did not learn of his son's illness until February 
4th when he happened to call the school. He was told the 
boy had a cold or grippe. On February 6th, the boy was re-
leased from the infirmary a1thou.gh he had not completely recov= 
ered. 
On February 11th, the pipes in the dorm broke and 
caused the ceiling~ walls and floor of the boy 8s third floor 
room to become thoroughly wet. He was removed to a dry room; 
however, the next day he was moved to a room on the second 
floor;, directly under his third f1oor room 9 which was 
equally damp. He stayed in the second floor room until Feb= 
ruary 16th and was ill all of the time. 
On February 16th, the boy awoke and asked the house-
keeper to take his temperature. She refused and ordered him 
to attend his classes. Instead, he went to the school doctor 
who took his temperature, found that he had a fever and· 
placed him in the infirmary. The plaintiff arrived 
on February 18th to visit his s<!m and found him in a cold 
room with the window up and the wi.nd blowing through the 
room from the outside where the temperature was below freez-
ing. The plaintiff asked to see the doctor, but he did not 
come. While he waited» he observed that his son had to get 
up out of bed and walk through cold and drafty halls to the 
toilet. He asked that a bed pan and urinal be provided and 
that his son be kept in bed. The nurse agreed. 
On February 21st» the boy was very ill with rheumatic 
fever and endocarditis; however» he was moved from the pri-
vate room to the general ward to make room for a visiting 
bishop. He had to make this move by walking unassisted down 
the stairs and through several halls. 
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On February 25th» the plaintiff again complained to the 
doctor who became very angry and told the plaintiff to remove 
his son if he were not satisfied. This was impossible because 
of the boy 1s condition. 
On March 5th» the doctor told the plai.ntiff he proposed 
to administer sodium caccadylate 0 a preparation of arsenic. 
The plaintiff told the doctor that in the past arsenic com-
pounds had been shown to produce ill effects on the boy. He 
asked the doctor to contact the boy's home doctor for con-
firmation. The doctor failed or refused to do it. He admin-
istered the drug for two or three days. At the end of that 
time,9 the boy showed signs of collapse and died on March 13th. 
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As it happened the father lost this case because of im-
proper pleading. It was not shown that any one act or the 
acts collectively caused the death of the boy. The case does 
illustrate, however, how a series of events can lead to an 
end which is fraught with possible litigation. 
-----In Perbost v. San Marino Hall School for Girls, the 
plaintiff's daughter fell or slipped on some grease which 
was on a school driveway. The plaintiffs sued on the theory 
that the school was negligent in its maintenance thereby 
allowing an unsafe condition to exist. The court said here 
in regard to the alleged negligence that, 
In an action against a private school ,,by a pupil and 
guardian for injuries _resulting from a f~ll on the drive-
way of the school, an instruction that the jury must find 
from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants 
must either have created the condition 9 known of it, or 
should have known of it, and that unless one of the con-
ditions could be found to have existed defendants could not 
be found negligent is correct.1°5 
The court said further in regard to the facts that, 
The mere presence of oil or grease on the driveway 
of a private school would not necessarily indicate an un-
safe condition, but only an unreasonable accumulation of 
grease or oi1 might indicate a condition rrom which a jYol 
could reasonably find negligence in respect of a pupil. 
-----In Hellman v. Greater Miami Hebrew Academy 3 l07 a child 
was hurt while playing on the academy's playground monkey 
bar. The court held that there was no cause for action and 
105Perbost v. San Marino Hall School for Girls, 199 P. 
2d 701 ( 1948). 
l06Ibid. 
l07Hillman v. Greater Miami Hebrew Academy, 70 So. 2d 
688 (1954). 
rejected the case because the plea sought to make the school 
an insurer of the child1s safetyo The law merely contem= 
plated that the school shall furnish a reasonably safe place 
to play commensurate with the knowledge and impulses of the 
using childreno 
====·Qin another playground case:, Walter v. Sto Michael's 
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Roman Catholic Church, a pupil was injured when pushed 
onto a banana peel by another pupil. The court held that 
the plea attempting to establish that the school was negli-
gent in selecting its teachers or in providing adequate 
supervision both of which allegedly contributed to the ac= 
cident, was not supported by sufficient evidence. Also, 
the court pointed out that the proximate cause of the ac-
cident was the unforeseen intervention of the other pupil. 
No reasonably prudent person could be expected to foresee 
the particular action of the other pupil. 
=====The case of Marti.n Vo Roman Catholic Archbish_,Q_R, of 
109 Los Angeles, also lnvolved the question of liability in 
connection with supervision. In the facts of the case, some 
boys had broken a window as they pushed out of school at 
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the end of the day. The punishment for the act included a 
tour of weed=pulling either after school or on Saturday. The 
plaintiff went on Saturday and found no supervision at the 
lOBwalter v. St. Michael 1 s Roman Catholic Church, 118 
N.Y.S. 2d 852 (1953). 
109Martin v. Roman Catholic ArchbishQ.Q of Los Angeles, 
322 P. 2d 31 T1958)0 
appointed place. He decided to play football with a group 
. . 
gathered in the vicinity for that purpose. In the course of 
play, his arm was broken. The parents in this case sued for 
the amount of the bills resulting from the broken arm. The 
basis for the suit was a plea that the school was negligent 
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in not providing supervision for the weed-pulling. The court 
held that there was no negligence in placing boys on their 
honor to pull weeds as a disciplinary measure without super-
vision. The non=dangerous nature of the work and the age of 
the boys would not necessitate a reasonably prudent person's 
concluding the necessity of supervision. Further, there was 
no evidence that the presence of supervision could have al-
tered any injury should the boy have decided to play football. 
-~=-~In Gleason v. Acade!I!X. of .!J:1§. Holx Cross 3 llO a nun in-
vited her mother to visit the academy. While there 9 the 
mother decided to observe the singing of a Mass from a 
balcony in the rear of the chapel. Ori entering the balcony, 
she fell on a step which was poorly lighted and unusually 
constructed. The authorities knew of the danger of the step 
because others of the school had fallen on it. The defendants 
alleged that the mother was a gratuitous licensee and there-
fore the school owed her no special care. The court ruled 
that the school was negligent and that the fact that the 
plaintiff was a gratuitous licensee did not alleviate those 
in charge from the negli.gence. 
llOa1eason v. Acadsill!,Y of the Holx. .. Cross~ 168 F. 2d 561 
( 1948) 0 
====min Easton v. Unit·ed Trade School Contracting Co.,lll 
the employing school became liable through the negligent 
acts of its employee. Here, the defendant company conducted 
a school for instruction in automobile driving. One of the 
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teachers who taught driving was also a student in the school. 
He was employed as a chauffeur and instructor. While out 
with a student, he permitted an incompetent pupil to drive 
the car and while doing soj the plaintiff was injured on 
the highway. The court said that the teacher 1 s poor judg-
ment became the poor judgment of the scho_ol since the em= 
ployee was acting in the stead of the school. The pupil-
driver was responsible for his act as was the teacher, and 
the defendant school under whose directions all of the things 
were done, was likewise responsible. 
=====The principle of agency and an employee 0s subsequent 
responsibility for an agent 1s torts found in the above case 
is also present in the case of Malmquist v. Hellenic Com-
munity,112 except in this case the employee went so far outm 
side the scope of h.1s employment that the connection of li-
ability in the employee's act to the employer was broken. 
The school us bus driver was authorized to make a tour 
of the city during the afternoon to collect the students 
and deliver them to the school. However, on one afternoon 
lllEaston v. United Trade School Contracting Co., 
159 P. 597 (1916). 
112Malmguist v. Hellenic Community, 203 N.W. 420 (1925). 
the bus driver drove thirteen blocks off his customary 
route on a mission of his own. While on this side trip, the 
bus was involved in a collision with another automobile. 
The plaintiff in this case attempted to sue the s6hool on 
the theory that the torts of its agent became the torts of 
the school. The court denied this plea on the grounds that 
the driver was so far outside of the scope of his duty when 
the accident occurred that the school could not be connected 
with the act. 
=====In Smith v. Leo 9 ll3 Smith was invited to a dancing 
school dance in an attempt to interest him in taking les-
sons. He paid his admission and was subsequently expel-
led for no established reasono The court allowed him to 
collect compensatory damages to recompense him for the dam-
age to his good name, favor and credit where he was brought 
into public scandal, infamy and disgrace as a result of the 
unprovoked action by authorities of the school. 
=====In Kenney v. Gurley 9 114the plaintiff alleged that the 
school had indulged in libel when it had stated by letter 
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to her parents that she could not be readmitted to the school 
because she had contracted a venereal diseaseo The lower 
court found for the plaintiff; however, on appeal the court 
reversed the decision and remanded it to the lower court 
because there was no evidence that malice was present in 
113srnith v. Leo, 36 N.Y.3. 949 (1895)0 
114Kenney.v. GurleyJ 95 So. 34 (1923). 
the action taken by the schoolo 
=====In Ryan Vo Peekskill Military Academy_, 115the facts 
reveal that the school officials wrote a letter to parents 
explaining that certai.n unnamed instructors had been dis= 
missedo In the letter such terms as 11 insidious plots to 
overthrow the school management 11 and "inciting rebellion 11 
were usedo It was alleged that the statements said o~ in-
ferred that the dismissed instructors were communists and 
that their actions were part of a communist plot. The court 
said that these were strong phrases which might well reflect 
directly on the plaintiff's abilities as teachers and ex= 
pose them to public hatred» ridicule and contempt;, and that 
such.9 migtt be actionableo However.9 such was to be deter-
mined by a jury» and where the jury found such not to be 
1ibelous !, a plea for libel .lliil::, ~ was inappropriate. 
Summary 
The broad general principles of tort liability found 
in this chapter may be listed as followsg 
1, Every individual is responsible for his own torts 
unless the law affords him immunity or he is adjudged le-
gally unable to be charged with responsibility because of 
some mental or physical condition. 
2o An employer is responsible and liable for the torts 
115n1an Vo Peekskill k1111t~ Academy}) 133 N. y .s. 2d 
374 ( 195 . 0 
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of his agents and servants. Liability falls upon the em-
player for both authorized and unauthorized acts so long as 
the agents or servants have acted within the scope of their 
authority. 
3. An unofficial or unauthorized act of an agent 
acting outside the scope of his agency will not bring lia-
bility upon his employer. 
4. An act of omission cannot be declared negligent 
if it cannot be shown that a reasonably prudent person could 
foresee that such an omission would likely cause injury. 
5. Contributory negligence on the part of the plain-
tiff will generally bar his plea of negligence on the part 
of the defendant. 
6. The proximate cause of a negligent act must be 
attributable to the tortfeasor. Any intervening act over 
which the tortfeasor has no foreseeable control breaks his 
privity and thus his liability. 
7. Where instructi.on of a dangerous nature is carried 
on, constant and commensurate superivsion must be provided. 
The knowledge and experience of the students is a factor 
to be considered in the extent of supervision necessary. 
8. A mere looker-on must take care of himself except 
as against wantonness or wilfulness or except under some 
peculiar circumstances of some undisclosed danger. 
9. An invitee can expect only reasonable care on the 
part of his host for his well-being. An invitee is expected 
to utilize those facilities made available to him and when 
' 
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he utilizes others without the knowledge or foresight of 
the host and is hurt, he may not claim negligence on the part 
of the host. 
10. Each individual at any age is charged with a de-
gree of responsibility for his own protection commensurate 
with his age and mental capacity. Oth~rs may rely in their 
judgment on such when determining what supervision is neces-
sary. 
11. A school cannot be an insurer of safety but must 
provide a reasonably safe place for work and play. 
12. The existence of libel or slander is a question 
of fact for a jury to decide. The truth of a libelous or 
slanderous statement is a complete defense to an action for 
such (except where constitutional or statutory enactments 
provide that the act must be free of malicious motives). 
CHAPTER VII 
GENERAL SUMMARY 
The study was concerned with the controversies among 
the personnel, patrons and students of private schools which 
have come before the courts in litigation. The resulting 
cases from such controversies were studied in order to de= 
termine what situations have led to litigation as well as 
to point out the legal principles which the courts have es= 
tablished or applied in their decisions regarding this 
litigation. Since it is only with difficulty and incon= 
venience that most people who wish to are able to become 
familiar with the law, especially that pertaining to pri= 
vate schools, the topics included herein were selected and 
brought together so that the usual time consuming process 
of legal research would be lifted from those who seek such 
information. 
The methods of legal research were used. An orderly 
search of the legal encyclopedical works such as American 
Jurisprudence, Corpus Juris, and Corpus Juris Secundum, 
was made to determine the broad areas of litigation in= 
volving private schools. From these, two broad topics were 
selected. One major topic was concerned with the contrac-
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tual relationships of tuition contracts and employment con-
tracts including a discussion of rules and regulations since 
they become, expressly or impliedly, parts of most tuition 
contracts; and the second major topic involved liability 
in which tort liability was the primary concern. The nine 
series of the American Digest System were used to further 
identify cases concerned with the selected topics. Cases 
were selected for inclusion herein according to three main 
criteria. (1) Did the decision reflect the weight of 
authority and involve the principles of law usually applied 
82 
in such controversies? (2) Did the court break precedent or 
apply any unusual point of law in view of the facts of the 
case? (3) Were the facts of the controversy of such a nature 
as to demonstrate different situations fraught with possible 
litigation? 
Contractual Relationships 
Contracts in Genera 1 ~ A contract is a legally bindi.ng 
mutual agreement between two or more competent parties which 
involves a consideration of money or service and is in har-
mony with the law and public policy. A contract may be oral 
or written (except where statutes require them to be written), 
express, implied or constructive, or binding, voidable or 
void. Actually, a void contract is no contract at all. 
Employment Contracts~ Contracts of employment in private 
schools do not differ in law from other contracts of employ-
ment. However 9 since teaching contracts are for service 
which may not be completed within a year of the contract, 
they may fall under the provisions of the Statute of Fraud. 
If this is the case, they must be in writing to be enforce= 
able in their entirety in the event of a breach. The remedy 
for a breached enforceable contract is a suit in contract 
for the contract price less mitigation, but the remedy of 
an unenforceable contract is a suit in equity for nominal 
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or compensatory damages. The cases selected represented 
controversies includingg oral contracts where no credible 
witnesses were in evidence; the continuance of a working 
relationship after the expiration of the contract; situations 
where contracts were entered into by one body but affirmed 
by another; contracts involving by implication customs and 
habits of localities; provisions for fee-splitting in the 
event of contract severence; a situation where a private 
school shared facilities with a public school; the shop 
right rule; and agents soliciting students. 
Tuition Contractsg Tuition contracts and even those in-
volving board have been generally held to be entire con-
tracts. This rule of law is a modification of the general 
rule that in the event of a breached contract, relief is 
awarded in accordance with the extent of proved damages. 
This modification is justified on the basis of the fact that 
the school has provided a place for the student, hired 
teachers and in general com~itted its facilities, and the 
84 
withdrawal of one student does not appreciably decrease its 
expenses. Sometimes the entire nature of the contract is put 
forth in the school catalogue or brochure. The courts have 
ruled repeatedly that the provisions of catalogues and bro-
chures become, expressly or impliedly, parts of the contract 
except where the language of the contract obviously negates 
this. 
Controv~rsies over tuition contracts are the most num-
erous of any in regard to litigation concerning private 
schools. Even though the rules and principles are well es-
tablished and apply in most of the states, litigation still 
arises prompted by the belief that the special facts of the 
situation distinguish the plea from the general group. 
Rules and Regulationsg A student, through his parent's con-
tract, impliedly or expressly, agrees to abide by the rules 
' 
and regulations of the school. An infraction of the rules 
may be considered by the school as grounds for dismissal. 
If a dismissal occurs, the contract is considered breached 
by the conduct of the student providing, of course, the 
school has not aggravated the situation or acted in an arbi-
trary or malicious manner. 
In litigation involving school rules and regulations, 
the courts will only decide if they are reasonable or not. 
The courts do not attempt to determine if the'rules are wise 
but will look to see if those declared reasonable were en-
forced for the purposes contemplated. 
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Among others, the courts have found the following rules 
to be reasonable and actions involving such behavior or the 
disobedience of such rules to be cause for dismissalg a 
regulation requiring pupils to attend religious or devotion-
al exercises in the school chapel; a rule that pupils shall 
not be allowed to be absent from school except at regular 
recesses; a pupil shall not be truant or go home without 
permission; girls may not leave the school premises without 
permission; marriage of a pupil is forbidden and grounds for 
expulsion; hazing is forbidden; drinking of alcoholic bev-
erages is forbidden; students must apologize for misbehavior; 
lying is forbidden; excessive demerits are cause for dis= 
missal; students may not enter certain restaurants or places 
of amusement; and smoking is forbidden. 
Tort Liability 
A tort is a wrong against person or property invol= 
ving some legal right vested in that person or property. 
This topic was discussed in the light of those cases 
where the doctrine of charitable immunity did not apply 
and hence, the general laws of tort liability were in 
force. The legal principles may be found in the chapter 
summary. Some of the situations which gave rise to the 
actions in tort included in this chapter are as followsg 
a college chemistry instructor left a laboratory and a stu-
dent caused explosion occurred; a child was injured when hit 
by a scrub-brush while eating lunch in a school room; 
a child fell from a silo kept in poor repair on a school-
owned farm adjacent to the campus; a spectator was injured 
by football players while standing on the sidelines during 
a game; a student spectator was injured while watching the 
felling of a chimney; a guest was injured by falling over a 
wire on a lawn after attending a concert on the campus; 
a visiting graduate was injured when he fell over a retain-
ing wall into a ditch while answering a call of nature; a 
student was injured by a BB gun bullet while on a campus 
clean-up; a student fell on a greasy driveway; a child was 
hurt while playing on a monkey bar; a child was hurt when 
pushed and fell on a banana peel; a guest fell on a step 
while going to chapel; a boy was hurt playing football when 
he was supposed to be pulling weeds; a student was injured 
while riding in the car of a school employee; a teacher al-
lowed a student to drive a school car in which an accident 
occurred; a school bus driver had an accident in the bus 
while he was on an errand of his own; a guest was expelled 
from a dance and claimed defamation of character; a school 
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· published the fact that it had dismissed some instructors for 
insidious plots and inciting a rebellion; andJ a school in= 
formed a student 1s parents by letter that she had contracted 
a venereal disease. 
Privilege or immunity from liability in the discipline 
of children is treated in Appendix A of this work and in 
Appendix B. Appendix C includes a discussion of the doc= 
trine of charitable immunity. 
In general, it appears from this study that there is a 
body of law peculiar to private schools especially in the 
area of tuition contracts. Even though the courts tend to 
look upon private schools of other than a charitable nature 
as corporations or simple businesses in search of monetary 
gain, it is recognized by the courts that the educational 
work carried on by these schools is or such an important 
nature that they hesitate to hamper the progress of this 
work with undue restrictions and excessive openings for 
liability. Although there is a body of law which seems to 
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be peculiar·t6 private schools, such schools in their every-
day operation must be guided by the general principles of 
corporation and business law, and the law of torts, contracts, 
and agency. 
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TOPIC 2. PRIVILEGE TO DISCIPLINE CHILDREN. 
Scope Note~ This Topic deals only with the privilege 
which is given in aid of the education and training of 
children to persons against whom a child may maintain a civil 
action under the principles of the law of Torts if the privi-
lege is abused. It isj therefore; not concerned with the 
privilege of a parent to discipline his child. There is no 
case which indicates any tendency to bring the relation of 
parent and child as suchJ including its duties and privilegesJ 
within the scrutiny of the courts at the complaint of the 
child in an action of tort. The only protection for the 
child is the parent's amenability to criminal punishment 
if he exceeds the privilege accorded to him by law. The 
disciplinary privilege of a parent isJ therefore, of im-
portance only in the criminal law. It has no importance in 
the law of Torts, since the parents as such, being immune 
from suitJ does not need the protection of his privilege 
to give him immunity from civil liability. 
Section 147. GENERAL PRINCIPLE. 
One other than a parent who has been given by law or 
has voluntarily assumed in whole or in part the parental 
function of training or educating a child or one to whom the 
parent has delegated such training or educationJ is privi-
leged to apply such reasonable force or to impose such 
reasonable confinement upon the child as he reasonably 
believes to be necessary for its proper training or ed-
ucation except insofar as the parent has restricted the 
privilege of a delegate to whom he has entrusted the child's 
education or training. 
Comment~ 
a. The word 11 parent 11 as used in this Topic, includes 
all persons who share the immunity against civil liability 
which the law gives to a natural and legitimate parent. 
The question whether a stepfather, adopted parent or person 
otherwise standing in loco parentis shares the immunity of 
the natural parent under the rules of the law of Persons is 
not within the scope of the Restatement of this Subject. 
b. The rule stated in this Section determines the 
existence of a privilege on the part of any person other 
than a parent who is exercising in whole or in part the 
parental function of training or educating a child. Such 
persons, unlike the parent, are under a liability to the 
child enforceable in a civil action of tort for any harm 
intentionally done to it unless the act which causes the 
harm is privileged. The privilege here stated is, there-
fore, important as protecting the actor from liability to 
the child enforceable by a civil action to which he would 
otherwise be subject. 
c. The rule stated in this Section applies to any per-
son other than a parent who is exercising the parental func-
tion of training and educating a child. It applies to per-
sons to whom the law has given complete or partial charge 
of such matters. ThusJ it includes a guardian appointed by 
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a court to take charge of the person of the child, the of= 
ficers of a state orphanage or reformatory home, the teachers 
and other officials in a public school to which the parent is 
required to send his child for education, and one to whom 
the child is bound by poor guardians or some other public 
body authorized so to do, It also includes any person whom 
the parent has entrusted as his delegate the performance of 
the whole or any part of his parental duties and privileges 
for the purpose of training or educating his child. In 
the latter case 1 the parent has the power to determine the 
extent of his privilege which he chooses to give his delegate. 
In such case, the delegate has only so much of the parental 
privilege as the parent confers upon him. Thus, the normal 
privilege of a schoolmaster in a private school to inflict 
certain punishments for the purpose of maintaining school 
discipline or effectively performing his duties as school-
master are not available to one who receives a child upon 
whom the parent has stipulated that the usual punishments 
shall not be inflicted. 
Section 148. EXCESSIVE FORCE. 
One, other than a parent, who, in whole or in part, 
is in charge of the education or training of a child is not 
privileged to apply any force or impose any confinement 
which is unreasonable either, 
(a) as being disproportiate to the offense for which 
the child is being punished, or 
(b) as not being reasonablej necessary and appropriate 
to compel obedience to a proper command. 
Comment: 
a. The rule stated in the Section applied to two 
situations: firstJ the privilege to punish for a past offense 
committed or reasonably believed to have been committed by 
the child; second, the privilege to enforce obedience to a 
co.mmand given by the person in charge or the child. In 
determining whether the punishment inflicted for an offense 
is reasonableJ one of the most importsnt factors is the 
comparison between the severity of the punishment and the 
gravity of the offense for which it is inflicted. 
b. Reasonableness of means employed. In determining 
whether a force or confinement is reasonable when applied 
or imposed to compel obedience to a command given to a 
child by the person in charge of him, three factors are 
important. The first factor is the character of the command 
as being one obedience to which is necessary for the proper 
training or education of the child. In determining this, 
account is to be taken, where the entire training, as dis-
tinguished merely from the education of a child is in charge 
of the actor, of the desirability of inculcating in the 
child habits of obedience to commands of those who are in 
authority over him which are not obviously improper. The 
second factor is the necessity of the actor using the par-
ticular means which he adopts in order to compel the child 
to obey his commands. As in all cases in which the question 
arises as to whether there has been an excessive means of 
carrying out the purpose for which the privilege is given, 
the actor is not privileged to use a means to compel obedi-
ence if a less severe method is likely to secure obedience. 
The third factor is the character of the command and the 
importance both to the present welfare and the future train-
~ng or education of a child of his obedience to it. Thus, 
it may be permissible to use very considerable force or to 
impose a prolonged confinement upon a child to prevent it 
from playing in the public streets amid heavy traffic 
although similar methods would not be permissible to compe l 
a child to take his elbows from the dinner table. 
Section 149. PUNISHMENT DEGRADING IN CHARACTER OR PERMAN-
ENTLY HARMFUL. 
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One other than a parent who has been given by law or has 
voluntarily assumed, in whole or in part, the parental 
function of training or educating a child, or one to whom 
tne parent has delegated such training or education, is not 
privileged to inflict upon a child a punishment which is 
degrading in character or which is liable to cause serious 
or permanent harm. 
Comment: . 
a. The privilege to punish a child is given for the 
benefit of the child and for the purpose of securing his 
proper education and training. A punishment which does 
serious or permanent harm to the child or which is of such 
a character as to injure his self-respect is obviously detri-
mental and not beneficial to his future. 
Section 150. FACTORS INVOLVED IN DETERMINING REASONABLE-
NESS OF PUNISHMENT. 
In determining whether a punishment is excessive, the 
nature of the offense , the apparent motive of the offender, 
the influence of his example upon other children of the 
same family or group, the sex, age, and physical and mental 
condition of the child, are factors to be considered. 
Comment~ 
ao The punishment which the actor has the privilege 
to inflict upon a child must be proportionate to the char-
acter of the offense and to a certain degree depends upon 
the character or apparent character of the offender, Thus, 
a more severe punishment may be privileged for an intention-
al offense than for a mere error of judgment or careless in~ 
attention. So too 3 the fact that a child has shown a fixed· 
tendency to certain types of misconduct may justify a pun= 
ishment which would be clearly excessive if imposed upon a 
first offender. If one child in a family or group has shown 
himself to be a ringleader in misconductJ the necessity 
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of correcting his mischievous tendencies in order that the 
other children may not be contaminated may justify a punish= 
ment more sev~re than would be permissible if there were no 
other children likely to be misled by his example. The age 
and sex of the child may also be important. A punishment 
which would not be too severe for a boy of twelve may be 
obviously excessive if imposed upon a child of four or five. 
So tooi it may be excessive to punish a girl for a particular 
offense in a manner which would be permissible as a punish-
ment for the same offense committed by a boy of substantially 
the same age. 
Sect ion 151. PURPOSE OF PUl\TISHMENT, 
Force applied or confinement imposed for any purpose 
other than the proper training or education of the child or 
for the preservation of discipline is not privileged although 
applied or imposed in an amount and upon an occasion which 
would be privileged had it been applied for such purpose. 
Comment~ 
a. The application of force or the imposition of con-
finement upon a child is privileged only if applied or im-
posed for the purpose either of correcting the child's fault~ 
thus improving its characterJ or of compelling obedience 
to proper commands. If the force is applied or imposed for 
any other purpose 1 as to satisfy a violent antipathy taken 
by a schoolmaster to his pupil, it is not privileged even 
though the offense is one which would justify the punishment 
if it were inflicted upon the child for the proper purpose 
of correcting its faults and so molding its character. 
Section 152. PARTIAL CONTROL OF CHILD. 
One who is charged only with the education or some other 
part of the training of a child has the privilege stated in 
Section 147 only insofar as the privilege is necessary for 
the education or other part of the training which is committed 
or delegated to the actor. 
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Comment: 
a. Schools, camps, etc. The rule stated in this Section 
applies not only where the function of educating and training 
a child has been delegated by the parent or one standing in 
loco parentis to it, but also where the child is committed by 
law to the actor for such purposes. Thus, it applies not 
only to a boarding school or camp or to a private day school 
to which the child has been sent by the parent or person 
in loco parentis, but also to public schools to which the 
parents are required to send their children unless they elect 
to send them to a private school. Where the child is sent to 
a boarding school or summer camp, the privilege of the school 
or camp authorities extends to matters necessary not only to 
the education but also to the general training of the child. 
The same is true where the child is committed to a public in-
stitution. On the other hand, the privilege of a day school, 
whether public or private, is confined to matters necessary 
to the education of the child, except_ that the school author-
ities are privileged to maintain the discipline necessary 
not merely to the education of the particular child but to 
the education of the children as, a group and to prevent the 
school from becoming a nuisance to the neighborhood. Thus, 
except insofar as the conduct of the children in the vi-
cinity of the school is such as to cause ari unreasonable 
annoyance to the neighborhood, the authorities of a day 
school whether public or private, are not privileged to pun-
ish a child for offenses committed outside of the school 
premises or in their immediate vicinity. 
Section 153. POWER OF PARENT TO RESTRICT PRIVILEG~. 
(1) An actor who is in charge of the educational 
training of a child soley as the delegate of its parent is 
not privileged to inflict a punishment which the parent has 
forbidden or to punish the child for doing or refusing to 
do that which the parent has directed the child to do or not 
to do. 
( 2) ,An actor who is in charge of the education or 
training of a child as a public officer is privileged to in-
flict such reasonable punishments as are necessary for the 
child's proper education or training, notwithstanding the 
parent's prohibitions or wishes. 
Comment on Subsection (l)g 
a. Private schools. Insofar as the actor is vol-
untarily performing a part of a parent's function of training 
and educating his child as the delegate of the parent, he 
acquires only so much of the parent's privilege as the 
parent chooses to delegate to him. Thus, if a private school 
chooses to accept a pupil whose parent has stipulated that 
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the punishments usual in the school shall not be inflicted 
upon himJ the schoolmaster is not privileged to inflict the 
usual punishments even though they are otherwise permissible. 
If the punishment inflicted by such a schoolmaster is not 
excessive and is inflicted upon a proper occasion, the fact 
that the school or institution forbids it does not destroy 
the schoolmaster's privilege. This is so unless the parent's 
knowledge of the rules is shown to have operated as an in-
ducement to send the child to a particular school, in which 
case the parent may be assumed to have delegated only so 
much of his privilege as is consistent with the school rules. 
Comment on Subsection (2)i 
b. The words "pubJ.ic officer" include a teacher in a 
public school, provided by the State for the Education of 
its children and the staff of a reformatory or other in-
stitution to which children are committed for education or 
training even though such commitment is a penalty for del-· 
inquency. Such persons do not act as the delegates of the 
parent but as officers of the State or municipality, carry-
ing out the public policy thereof. 
c. Public schools. This Subsection applies not only 
where the parent is required to send his child to a public 
school but also where, having the option to send the child 
to such a school or to a private school, he elects the former. 
It is·a1so applicable where the parent, without obligation 
to do so, sends his child to a high school or State college 
or university. In such cases, the fact that the parent 
expresses a desire that the child should not be punished 
in a particular way or for a particular offense does not 
restrict the privilege of the school authorities. The will 
of the parent cannot defeat the policy of the State. The 
school authorities, therefore, have such disciplinary priv= 
ilege as is reasonably necessary to secure the education of 
the child irrespective of the wishes of its parent. The 
same is true where the parent sends the child to a public 
school in preference to a private school as a matter of 
economy or choice. However, no order of the school board 
or other body in charge of the public schools can confer 
upon the school authorities any privilege in excess of 
those stated in this Topic. 
Section 154. PRIVILEGE OF ONE IN CHARGE OF GROUP. 
One who is in charge of the training or education of 
a group of children is privileged to apply such force or 
impose such confinement upon one or more of them as is 
reasonably necessary to secure observance of the discipline 
necessary for the education and training of the children 
as a group. 
Comment: 
a. A schoolmaster or the staff in charge of a summer 
camp is pfivileged to use reasonable force for the purpose 
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of preserving the discipline necessary for the proper education 
or training of the children as a group irrespective of wheth-
er the conduct of a child is such as to require the use of 
such force for its individual training or education. 
Section 155. EFFECT OF EXCESSIVE FORCE. 
If the actor applies a force or imposes a confinement 
upon a child which is in excess of that which is privileged, 
(a) the actor is liable for so much of the force or 
confinement as is excessive, 
(b) the child has the privilege stated in Sections 
63 to 75 to defend himself against the actor's 
use or attempted use of the excessive force or 
confinement. 
Comment: 
a. An excessive punishment inflicted by one who is 
privileged under the rule stated in Section 147 makes the 
actor liable for that part of the punishment which is in 
excess of that which he is privileged to inflict. It does 
not make him liable for so much of the punishment as was 
inflicted before the privilege was abused by the excessive 
punishment. The child is privileged to use force to de-
fend himself from the excessive punishment under the rules 
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I. Scope and related annotations 
a. Sc ope. 
In this annotation it is sought to determine whether, 
and to what extent,~ teacherl may administer2 physical chas-
tisementj to a pupil4 without thereby incurring civil li-
ability.5 
b. Related annotations. 
For the reader's convenience,.the following annotations 
lThe term ''teacher" is, for present purposes, definable 
as any school authority. Thus, cases involving a civil li-
ability of a school principal, or school board officer, for 
punishment administered to a pupil are within the scope of 
the present discussion; on the other hand, such civil actions 
against persons only remotely participating in the disciplin-
ary functions of school teachers and officers -- for example, 
an action against the driver of a school bus -- fall outside 
of the body of case law which this annotation is concerned. 
2As to the liability of a teacher for an assault upon 
a pupil made by one other than the teacher, see, for example, 
Mack v. Kelsey (1889) 61 Vt 399, 17 A 780. 
3As to the liability, in damages, of school authorities 
for punishment of a pupil by suspension from the school, see, 
for example, Burdick v. Babcock (1871) 31 Iowa 562. 
4The reader should note that the term "pupil II a~ used 
in the annotation title does not extend to infants confined 
in correctional institutions. For a case dealing with the 
civii liability of the superintendent of such a correctional 
institution for corporal punishment administered to one 
confined therein, see Burrage v. Gill (1930) 15 La App 126, 
130 So 857. 
5on the question whether a teacher's act in inflicting 
corporal punishment upon a pupil constitutes grounds for 
his discharge from emplo~-rnent, see, for example, Berry v. 
Arnold School Dist. (1940) 199 Ark 1118, 137 SW2d 256. 
And for a case involving the question of the effect 
upon a parent's liability for assault upon a teacher of the 
fact that the assault was motivated by the teacher's ex-
cessive corporal punishment of the child, who was his pupil, 
see Endicott v. Robertson (1922) 211 Mo App 508, 244 SW 
947. 
are noted as dealing with questions closely related in in-
terest to the one presently under discussion: 
Criminal homicide or assault by an excessive or im-
proper punishment inflicted on child by parent or one in 
loco parentis, 37 ALR 704, supplemented in 64 ALR 292. 
Right of one in loco parentis other than teacher to 
punish child, 43 ALR 507. 
Right to discipline pupil for conduct away from school 
grounds, 41 ALR 1312. 
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Personal liability of public school officers, or teach=-
ers, or other employees for negligence, 32 ALR2d 1163. 
As to the liability of a parent or a person, other than 
a teacher, in loco parentis, for personal tort against a 
minor child, see the annotation in 19 ALR2d 423, 
2. Summary 
It is a well-established rule of the law of torts that 
a teacher is immune from liability for physical punishment, 
reasonable in degree, administered to a pupil.6 The teacher 
is held'( (and in some Jurisdictions is stated by statute)b 
to stand in loco parentis, and to share the parent's right 
to obtain obedience to reasonable commands by force.9 
6see Sec 3a, infra. 
7 See Sec 3c, infra. 
Bsee Sec 3e, infra. 
9Note that Sec 147 of the Restatement of Torts states 
that one other than a parent who has been given by law or 
who has voluntarily assumed in whole or in part the parental 
function of training or educating a child, or one to whom 
the parent has delegated such training or educationJ is 
privileged to apply such reasonable force upon the child as 
he reasonably believes to be necessary for the child's pro-
per training and educationJ except insofar as the parent 
has restricted the privilege of one to whom he has entrusted 
the child's education or training. 
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But a t 15cher's right to use physical punishment is a 
limited one. His immunity from liability in damages requires 
that the evidence show that the punishment administered was 
reasonable,11 and such a showing requires consideration of 
the nature of the punishment itself,12 the nature of tbe 
pupi4 1s misconduct which gave rise to the punishment,lj the 
agel agd physical condition of the pupil,15 and the teacher~ 
motivel in inflicting the punishment.17 If consideration 
10The Restatement of Torts, in Sec 148, embodies the 
view that one, other than a parent, who, in whole or in part, 
is in charge of the education or training of a child is not 
privileged to apply any force or impose any confinement 
which is unreasonable either as being disproportionate to 
the offense for which the child is being punished, or as 
not being reasonably necessary and appropriate to compel 
obedience to a proper command. 
llThe question of reasonableness is one of fact. See 
Sec 5, infra. Note that, in some instances, it has been 
stated that there is a presumption of reasonableness. See 
Sec 6, infra. 
12see Sec 7, infra. 
13see Sec 8, infra. 
In Sec 151 of the Restatement of torts, the rule is 
stated that force applied by one having a privilege of ad-
ministering reasonable physical punishment to a child for 
any purpose other than the proper training or education of 
the child or for the preservation of discipline is not 
privileged although applied or imposed in an amount and upon 
an occasion which would be privileged had it been appliep 
for such purpose. 
14see Sec 9, infra. 
15see Sec 10 9 infra. 
16see Sec 11, infra. 
17section 150 of the Restatement of Torts states the 
principle that in determining whether a punishment admin-
istered to a child, by one (such as a teacher) having the 
privilege of reasonable punishment, is excessive, factors 
to be considered are the nature of the child's offense, the 
child's apparent motive, the influence of the child's ex-
ample on other children of the same group, and the sex, 
age, and physical and mental condition of the child. 
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of all of these factors indicates that the teacher violated 
none of the standards impliQit in each of them, then he will 
be held free of liability;lci but it_ seems liability will re-
sult from proof that the teacher, in administering the punish-
ment, violated any one of such standards.19 
II. Teacher's administration of reasonable corporal punish-
ment as 11 pri vilegedrr 
3. General rule. 
a~ Generally. 
It is a well-established principle of the law of torts20 
that corporal punishment which is reasonable in degree, and 
which is administered by a teacher to a pupil as a disciplin-
ary measure, is "privileged II in the sense that the administra-
tion of such punishment does not give rise to a cause of action 
for damages against the teacher. 
Alabama.--Suits v. Glover (1954) 260 Ala 449, 71 So2d 49, 43 
ALR2d 465. 
Arkansas.--Berry v. Arnold School Dist. (1940) 199 Ark 1118, 
137 SW2d 256 (dictum). 
Connecticut.--Sheehan v. Sturges (1885) 53 Conn 481, 2 A 841; 
QHRourke v. Walder (1925) 102 Conn 130, 128 A 25, 41 ALR 1308 
(rule supported by implication); Calway v. Williamson (1944) 
130 Conn 575, 36 A2d 377. 
Illinois.--Swigart v. Ballou (1903) 106 Ill App 226 (rule 
supported by implication); Drake v. Thomas (1941) 310 Ill 
App 57, 33 NE2d 889. 
Indiana.--Cooper v. McJunkin (1853) 4 Ind 290. 
Kentucky.--Hardy v. James (1872) 5 Ky Ops 36 (rule supported 
by implication), 
Maine.--Stevens v. Fassett (1847) 27 Me 266; Patterson v. 
l8For cases holding that the evidence showed th3teach-
er's nonliability, see Sec 14, infra. 
19For cases holding that the evidence showed the teach-
er's liability) see Sec 13, infra. 
20Th · · 1 · 1 . d . th R e pr1nc1p e is express y recognize in e e-
state~ent of Torts. See Sec 2 supra. 
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Nutter (1886) 78 Me 509, 7 A 273, 57 Am Rep 818. 
MiSsouri.=-Haycraft v. Grigsby (1901) 88 Mo App·254 1 later 
app 94 Mo App 74, 67 SW 965; Cook v. Neely (1910) 1~3 Mo App 
632, 128 SW 233 (dictum); Christman v. Hickman (1931) 225 
Mo App 828, 37 SW2d 672. 
Nebraska .==Clasen v. Pruhs (19.03) 69 Neb 278, 95 NW 640, 5 
Ann Cas 112 (recognizing rule). 
New Hampshire.==Kidder v. Chellis (1879) 59 NH 473; Heritage· 
v. Dodge (1886) 64 NH 297, 9 A 722; Wilbur v. Berry (1902) 71 
NH 619j 51 A 904 (rule supported by implication). 
North Carolina.==Drum v. Miller (1904) 135 NC 204, 47 SE. 421, 
65 LR.A 890, 102 Am St Rep 528. 
Ohid.==Guyten v. Phodes (1940) 65 Ohio App 163, 29 NE2d 444 
(rule supported by implication); Quinn v. Nolan (1879) 7 
Ohio Dec Reprint 585, 4 WL BulI 81. 
-
Pennsylvania.=-Guerrieri v. Tyson (1942) 147 Pa Super 239, 
24 A2d 468 (dictum). And see Harris v. Galilley (1937) 125 
Pa Super 505, 189 A 779, and Rupp v. Zintner (1937) 29 Pa 
P and C 625, both of which were decided under Pennsylvania 
statute delegating parental disciplinary authority to teacher.I 
Tennessee.==Marlar v. Bill (1944) 181 Tenn 100, 178 SW2d 634; 
Phillips v. Johns (1930) 12 Tenn.App 254 (recognizing rule). 
Vermont.==Hathaway v. Rich (1846) 19 Vt 102; Lander v. Seaver 
(1859) 32 Vt 114, 76 Am Dec 156; .. Melen v. McLaughlin ( 1935) 
107 Vt 111, 176 A 297. 
Wisconsin.==Morrow v. Wood (1874) 35 Wis 59 9 17 Am Rep 471 
{recognizing rule). 
b. Privilege as abrogated by statute. 
A teacher's privilege to administer reasonable physical 
punishment to a child is 9 in some jurisdictions, embodied 
in statutes. See Sec 3e 9 infra. 
On the other hand, in one case it was contended that 
a teacher's privilege to administer moderate corporal pun= 
ishment to a child to maintain school discipline had been 
abrogated by particular statutory provisions. This was in 
Stevens v. Fassett (1847) 27 Me 266, which involved a 
1As to this statutory provis1on 9 see Sec 3e, infra. 
statute providing that a school superintending committee 
should expel from any school any obstinately disobedient 
scholar; the contention made was that this provision made 
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it unlawful for a teacher to use physical force upon a pupil 
in order to obtain obedience to school rules. The court 
rejected this contention, reasoning that the rule by which 
teachers are accorded the privilege of moderate physical 
punishment is a well=established one, and, if the statute had 
been intended to abrogate ~his rule, and to deny entirely 
the right of a teacher to employ such measures in the gov-
ernment and discipline of his school, it was to be expected 
that it would contain a more explicit declaration of that 
intention. In addition, it was pointed out, the statute 
specified merely the action which might be taken against an 
obstinately disobedient pupil, and did not indicate that 
other action~ fundamentally less severe 9 might not be taken 
against pupils who had simply omitted to comply with the 
reasonable commands and kindly persuasions of instructors. 
c. Rationale of general rule; teacher as person 
in loco parentis. 
A teacher's immunity from civil liability for reasonable 
physical punishment administered to a pupil results from 
judicial recognitions that, as to his pupils, the teacher 
stands in loco parentis and shares, insofar as matters re-
lating to school discipline are concerned, the parent's 
right to use moderate force to obtain the child's obedience. 
Alabama.--Suits v. Glover (1954) 260 Ala 449, 71 So2d 49, 
43 ALR2d 465. 
Connecticut.--Sheehan v. Sturges (1885) 53 Conn 481, 2A 
841 ·(recognizing rule); Calway v. Williamson (1944) 130 
Conn 575. 36 A2d 377. 
Illinois.==Drake v. Thomas (1941) 310 Ill App 57j 33 NE2d 889. 
Indiana.--Cooper v. McJunkin (1853) 4 Ind 290. 
Maine.-=Stevens v. Fassett (1847) 27 Me 266; Patterson v. 
Nutter (1886) 78 Me 509, 7 A 273~ 57 Am Rep 818. 
New Hampshire.-=Heritage v. Dodge (1886) 64 NH 297, 9 A 
722 (rule supported by implication). 
North Carolina.==Drum v. Miller (1904) 135 NC 204, 47 SE 421, 
65 LRA 890 J) 102 Am St Rep 528. 
Ohio.--Quinn v. Nolan (1879) 7 Ohio Dec Reprint 585 3 4 WL Bull 
81 (rule supported by implication). 
Tennessee.--Marlar v. Bill (1944) 181 Tenn 100.IJ 178 SW2d 
643; Phillips v. Johns (1930) 12 Tenn App 354 (recognizing 
rule) . 
Texas.==Prendergast v. Masterson (1917, Tex Civ App) 196 
SW 246. 
Vermont.==Lander v. Seaver (1859) 32 Vt 114, 76 Arn Dec 156. 
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For example, in Stevens v. Fassett (1847) 27 Me 266, 
the court said that the right of a parent to keep his child 
in order and obedience is secured by the common law, and he 
may lawfully correct his child being under age, in a reason-
able manner, for the benefit of his education; a parent may 
also delegate a part of his parental authority during his 
life to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child, who is then 
in loco parentis and has such portion of the power of the· 
parent as may be necessary to answer the purpose for which 
he is employed. 
d. Express delegation of parental authority. 
In at least one action against a school teacher who 
had administered corporal punishment to a pupil, it was 
found that, under the facts presented, parental authority 
to punish the child was expressly delegated by the parent. 
This was in Drake v. Thomas (1941) 310 Ill App 57, 33 NE2d 
889, which involved the corporal punishment of a student in 
a school specially created for truants and ~ncorrigibleso 
The evidence showed that the pupil's mother had twice writ= 
ten to the school principal, reciting the boy's refusal to 
attend school, and asking the principal to see what could 
be done~ and to 11 take whatever steps are necessary 11 to make 
the boy come to school. The court ruled that such letters 
were properly admissible in evidence as embodying an express 
delegation to the school principal and teachers of tHe par= 
ent's authority to correct her son. 
e. Statutory delegation of parental authority. 
The reader should note that in some jurisdictions the 
privilege to discipline pupils is expressly accorded to 
teachers by statute. See 3 for example, the Pennsylvania 
statute involved in Harris v. Galilley ( 1937) 125 Pa Super 
505, 189 A 779, to the effect that every teacher in the public 
schools in the state should have the right to exercise the 
same authority as to conduct and behavior over the pupils 
attending his schoolj during the time they are in attendance, 
including the time required in going to and from their homes, 
as the parents, guardians, or persons in parental relation 
to such pupils might exercise over them. 
In connection with the Pennsylvania statute, it may 
be noted that in Appeal of School Dist. of Old Forge (1941) 
43 Pa D & C 167J the court ruled that the authority dele-
gated to a teacher by such statute extended to all pupils 
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in the school in which the teacher was employedJ and not 
merely to those pupils under the teacher's immediate control, 2 
It may also be noted that in Rupp v, Zintner (1937) 
29 Pa D & C 625J this statute was held to authorize teachers 
to administer no more than reasonable punishment; a teacherJ 
although standing by virtue of the statuteJ in loco parentis 
to a pupil 9 may nevertheless be held liable in damages for 
an unreasonable physical punishment of the pupilJ notwith-
standing that the pupil 0s parents could only be prosecuted 
criminally for such unreasonable punishment. 
4. Persona within scope of rule. 
a. Generally~ identity of "teacher. 11 
Assuming the existence of the rule by which a teacher 
is "privileged" to administer reasonable corporal punishment 
to a pupilJ a question may arise as to whether, in a par= 
ticular situationJ the person who administered such punish-
ment had the status of a "teacher» 11 or whether the person to 
whom the punishment was administered had the status of a 
"pupil. 11 On the first question == the 11 teacher" issue == 
there are a number of pertinent decisions. 
In Peck v. Smith (1874) 21 Conn 442, the court» in hold-
ing that a person charged with the duties of a school dis-
trict committee was not liable for assault for physically 
ejecting from a school building a pupil who had been insub-
ordinate and used profane language, stated that evidence of 
the defendant 0 s status was admissible to explain the char-
acter in wh.ich he was actingJ that is, that he was not·. act= 
ing as a stranger but colors officii. 
Kidder v. Chellis (1879) 59 NH 473~ was an action for 
damages for assault and battery in which plaintiff, a school 
pupil, contended that defendant was without legal right to 
administer corporal punishment because he had not complied 
with a statute providing that no person should be employed 
or paid for services as a teacher until he should produce 
and deliver a certificate of the school committee of the 
town that he was qualified to instruct in the subjects to be 
21\Tote that the School Dist o of Old Forge Case (Pa) 
supra does not fall precisely within the scope of this an-
notation3 since it deals with the question whether a teacher 
may properly be discharged from her employment for adminis-
tering corporal punishment to a pupil. 
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taught in the school in which he was employed to teach. 
Conceding that the defendant had not complied with the stat= 
utory provision, the court said that it did not necessarily 
follow that the plaintiff could recover for the assault, 
which was in the form of punishment administered to maintain 
discipline in the school. The court said that the defendant 
was actually keeping a school in a schoolhouseJ and sustain-
ed to other occupants of the school the relation of teacher, 
and they to him that of pupils. Although defendant was not 
a public teacher by legal appointment, he was a teacher in 
fact, and his authority to govern the school could not be 
contested by those who sought to avail themselves of its 
advantages. 
In connection with the above decisionsJ Mansell v. 
Griffin (Eng) (1908) 1 KB 160, 1 BRC 708,, 12 Ann Cas 350== 
Div Ct 3 a pp dismd ( 1908) 1 KB 947 3 1 BRC 718=-CA, is to be 
noted for a holding that a teacher was not liable in dam-
ages for administering corporal punishment to a pupil for 
a breach of school d1scipline 3 notwithstanding that the 
teacher was not specifically authorized by school regulations 
to inflict corporal punishment upon pupils, especially where 
neither the teacher herself, nor the child's parents, knew 
of any lack of such authority. 
Providing an interesting contrast with the views dis-
cussed above is Prendergast v. Masterson (1917, Tex Civ App) 
196 SW 246, which presented the question whether a school 
superintendent was within the protection of the rule that a 
teacher may 1 without civil liability 3 inflict corporal pun-
ishment upon a child to compel the child's compliance with 
reasonable school ruleso Defendant, from whom damages were 
sought for an assault upon plaintiff, who was a pupil, con~ 
tended that he had taken active charge of the high school 
which plaintiff attended and had active control thereof at 
the time he assaulted plaintiff, and that therefore he and 
plaintiff occupied toward each other the relationship of 
teacher and pupil. Defendant contended, further 3 that if he 
did not occupy the relationship of teacher toward pupil» 
then he was a public officer charged with the duty to main-
tain order in the high schoolJ and therefore it was not un= 
lawful for him to assault plaintiff as he did. In additionJ 
defendant argued that if he was not entitled to defend plain-
tiff8s suit on either of the above grounds, he had a suffic-
ient defense in the custom which recognized a right in a 
superintendent of schools to chastise pupils therein. An-
swering these contentionsJ the court saidJ first, that there 
was nothing in the rules of the school board which author-
ized defendant as a superintendent to take control of the 
high school to the exclusion of the teachers therein; second, 
if 3 as superintendentJ defendant was a public officer, he 
did not thereby have a right to chastise plaintiff, since 
such a right was not conferred by law on any public officer 
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as such; and thirdJ if it was a custom for superintendents 
of schools to chastise pupils therein, the custom existed 
in violation not only of well-established principles of law 3 
but in violation of a provision of a criminal statute de-
nouncing as a crime the use of lawful violence upon the 
person of another. 
And for a case which. supports» by implic ation.9 the 
principle that to be within the scope of a teacher's priv-
ilege to administer reasonable corporal punishment to a 
pupil as a disciplinary measure, it is necessary that the 
person who administered such punishment be responsible for 
maintaining order and discipline) see Suits v. Glover (1954) 
260 Ala 449 1 71 So 2d 49, 43 ALR2d 465. 
b Id t . t: .(.' !l ' l" . .. en i.,.,y 0.1. pupi . 
It seems that in only one case has there been made an 
argument that the rule that a teacher's physical punishment 
of a pupil is privileged as rendered inapplicable by the 
fact that the person punished did not, as a technical matter, 
have the status of a "pupil. 11 In Stevens v. Fassett ( 1847) 
27 Me 266 1 the contention was made that the privilege normal-
ly accorded to a teacher to administer moderate corporal pun-
ishment to a pupil to secure obedience to reasonable rules 
did not exist because the pupil punished was of such an age 
that he was not legally entitled to enrollment in the school) 
It appeared that a teacher had used physical force upon 
a student who was over twenty-one years of age and was not 
entitled to enrollment in the school. The court, ruling 
that the privilege existed regardless of the pupil's age, 
said that when one over the legal age presents himself as a 
pupil, and is received and instructed by the teacher, he 
cannot claim the privilege of attending the school and at 
the same time be subject to none of the duties incident to 
the status of a pupil; if such a person is disobedient, he 
is not exempt from the liability to punishmentJ so long as 
he is treated as having the character which he assumes; he 
cannot plead his voluntary act and then insist that it is 
illegal as an excuse for creating disturbance, and escape 
consequences to which he would be subject either as a re-
fractoryJ incorrigible pupilJ or as one who persisted in 
interrupting the ordinary business of the school. 
3Note that this contention involved a point distinct 
from the question whether the age of a child who is punish-
ed was such that the very fact of punishment showed an abuse 
of the teacher's privilege. On the latter point (that is 1 
whether punishment admi.nistered to a pupil was, in consider-
ation of his age, reasonable), see Sec 9 1 infra. 
III. Determination of reasonableness 
5. Generally; reasonableness as jury question. 
The very nature of the rule which accords to a teacher 
the privilege to physically punish a pupil makes it clear 
that where it is sought to hold a teacher liable in damages 
for such punishment administeved to a pupilj the crucial 
question is the reasonableness of the puriishment. 
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The courts are in harmony in holding that whether par-
ticular punishment administered was 3 under the facts and cir= 
cumstances, reasonable, is a question of fact to be deter-
mined by the jury. 
Connecticut.==Sheehan v. Sturges (1885) 53 Conn 481, 2 A 841; 
Calway v. Williamson (1944) 130 Conn 575, 36 A2d 377. 
Illinois.==Swigart Vo Ballou (1903) 106 Ill App 226 (rule 
supported by implication). 
Kentucky.--Hardy v. James (1872) 5 Ky Ops 36 (rule supported 
by implication). 
Maine.-=Patterson v. Nutter (1886) 78 Me 509, 7 A 273, 57 Am 
Rep 818. 
Missouri.=-Haycraft v. Grigsby (1901) 88 Mo App 354{ later app 
94 Mo App 74, 67 SW 965; Christman v. Hickman (1931) 225 Mo · 
App 828, 37 SE2d 672. -
Nebraska.--Clasen v. Pruhs (1903) 69 Neb 278, 95 NW 640, 5 
Ann Gas 112 (recognizing rule). 
Pennsylvania.=~Harris v. Galille~ (1937) 125 Pa Super 505, 
189 A 779; Rupp v. Zintner (1937) 29 Pa D and C 625 (rule 
supported by implication). 
Vermont.--Lander v. Seaver (1859) 32 Vt 114, 76 Am Dec 156. 
6. "Presumption" of reasonableness. 
a. View that reasonableness is presumed. 
In a few cases the courts, in dealing with the question 
whethe'r, for purposes of determining a teacher's civil li-
ability;· punishment administered by the teacher to a pupil 
was reasonable, have ta~en the view that there exists a 
presumption of reasonableness. 
Illinois.=-Drake v. Thomas (1941) 310 Ill App 57, 33 NE2d 889. 
Missouri.--Haycraft v. Grigsby (1901) 88 Mo App 354, later app 
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94 Mo App 74, 67 SW 965. 
Tennessee.==Phillips v. Johns (1930) 12 Tenn App 254 (recog-
nizing rule). 
In connection with the view which accords a presumption 
of reasonableness to corporal punishment administereq to a 
pupil by a teacherJ Haycraft v. Grigsby (1901) 88 Mo App 
354, later app 94 Mo App 74, 67 SW 965, merits individual 
attention. In that case it appeared that the trial court 
instructed the jury that the presumption was that punishment 
inflicted upon a student by a teacher was in the exercise and 
within the bounds of the teacher's lawful authority. The 
court said that if this instruction meant that the law pre-
sumed that the punishment was not undeserved nor excessive, 
it was a bad mode of stating the rule that the burden was on 
the pupil to establish the punishment's undue violence or 
lack of just provocation by the weight of evidence. The 
court said that in the absence of testimony, the presumption 
would be that the punishment was reasonable, but after evi-
dence was introduced in regard to the matter, presumptions 
concerning it ceased to exist, and the issue of whether it 
was excessive or proper was then to be determined, like any 
other question in the caseJ from the weight of the evidence. 
And, it was added, in the instant case there was abundant 
testimony on both sides of the question, and the jury should 
not have been instructed that there was a presumption favor-
able to either side. 
b. View that teacher is entitled to benefit of 
doubt. 
Differing (it would seem) only in terminology from the 
cases holding that the reasonableness of punishment adminis= 
tered to a pupil by a teacher is to be presumed., are the 
following decisions in which the courts stated that in the 
determination. of reasonableness the teacher is entitled to 
the benefit of any doubt that may exist. 
Connecticut.==Calway v. Williamson (1944) 130 Conn 575, 36 
A2d 377. ' 
Maine.==Patterson v. Nutter (1886) 78 Me 509, 7 A 273, 57 
Am Rep 818. 
Vermont.==Lander v. Seaver (1859) 32 Vt 114, 76 Am Dec 156; 
Melen v. McLaughlin (1935) 107 Vt 111, 176 A 297. 
Thus, for example 9 in Lander v. Seaver ( 1859) 32 Vt 114 .9 
76 Am Dec 156., the court said that in determining the reason-
ableness of corporal punishment administered to a pupil by 
a teacher as a disciplinary measure, considerable allowance 
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should be made to the teacher by way of protecting him in 
the exercise of his discretion, and expecially was this al-
lowance to be made where it appeared that the teacher acted 
from good motives and not from anger or malice. A teacher, 
the court said, is not to be held liable on the ground of 
excessive punishment unless the punishment is clearly ex= 
cessive and would be held so in the general judgment of 
reasonable men, and if there is any reasonable doubt whether 
the punishment was excessive, the teacher should have the 
benefit of that doubt. 
7. Factors to be considered; nature of punishment. 
a . Gene ra 11 y . 
Perhaps the most important of the factors .which the 
courts require to be taken 1nto consideration in determining 
whether corporal punishment administered by a teacher to a 
pupil i.s pri.vileged (with the result that the teacher is 
immune from civil liability therefor) is the nature of the 
punishment itself--that is, the form which the punishment 
took, inc~uding both the means by which the punishm~nt was 
inflicted and the extent of resultant injury to the pupil. 
The necessity that this factor be considered is either ex-
pressly or impliedly supported by the statements of the cour~ 
in the following cases~ 
Alabama.--Suits v. Glover (1954) 260 Ala 449, 71 So2d 49, 43 
ALR2d 465. 
Arkansas.--Berry v. Arnold School Dist. (1940) 199 Ark 1118J 
137 SW2d 256. 
Connecticut.--Sheehan v. Sturges (1885) 53 Conn 481, 2 A 841. 
Indiana.--Cooper v. McJunkin (1853) 4 Ind 290. 
Maine.--Patterson v. Nutter (1886) 78 Me 509, 7 A 273, 57 Am 
Rep 818. 
North Carolina.--Drum v. Miller (1904) 135 NC 204J 47 SE 421, 
65 LRA 890, 102 Am St Rep 528. 
Ohio.--Quinn v. Nolan (1879) 7 Ohio Dec Reprint 585, 4 WL 
Bull 81. 
4As to the various means of punishment used in cases 
in which the teacher was held liable, ~ee Sec 13J infra. 
As to such means in cases in which the teacher was held not 
liableJ see Sec 14 infra. 
Pennsylvania.--Harris v. Galilley (1937) 125 Pa Super 505, 
189 A 779; Rupp v. Zintner (1937) 29 Pa D and C 625. 
Vermont.--Lander v. Seaver (1859) 32 Vt 114, 76 Am Dec 156. 
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Thus, in Cooper v. McJunkin (1853) 4 Ind 290, the court, 
acknowledging a teacher's right to chastise a pupil moder-
ately, said that it did not follow that a choleric school-
master would be justified in beating and cutting the head 
and face of a wayward boy with any weapons which his passions 
might supply. 
And in an action by a pupil against a teacher to recover 
damages for physical punishment administered to the pupil 
by the teacher, it was held in Patterson v. Nutter (1886) 
78 Me 509, 7 A 273;-~7 Am Rep 818, that the trial court had 
erred in telling the jury that in order for a teacher to be 
liable for assault committed in connection with physical 
discipline of a pupil, the punishment administered must be 
so clearly excessive that all persons would agree as to its 
excessiv:eness. The court said that the true criterion, is 
the general judgment of reasonable men, and., under this cri-
terion, a teacher is liable if he inflicts a punishment the 
nature of which is such that the general judgment of such 
men, after thought and reflection, would clearly call it 
excessive; the rule stated by the trial court, which would 
permit a teacher to proceed in severity of punishment until 
it became so great as to excite the instant condemnation of 
all men 1 was said to be clearly wrong. 
b. Punishment causing permanent injury. 
In Rupp v. Zintner (1937) 29 Pa D and C 625, the court, 
in a case in whi~h it appeared that a pupil suffered perman-
ent injury to his ear as a consequence of being struck over 
the ear by a teacher, commented that, if a teacher feels that 
corporal punishment must be administered to a pupil., "nature 
has provided a part of the anatomy for chastisement., 11 and 
tradition holds that such chastisement should be there applied. 
On the other hand, in Drum v. Miller (1904) 135 NC 
204, 47 SE 421, 65 LRA 890.9 102 Am St Rep 528, the court, 
after stating that a teacher ,has authority to correct his 
pupil by corporal punishment when the pupil is disobedient 
or inattentive to his duties, said that any act done by the 
teacher in the exercise of this authority, and not prompted 
by malice, is not actionable, although it may cause permanent 
injury, unless a person of ordinary prudence could reasonably 
foresee that a permanent injury of some kind would naturally 
or probably result from the act. 
8. Offense for which punishment administered. 
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a. Generally. 
In ·ascertaining whether a teacher, in physically 
chastising a pupil, has overstepped the bounds of his 
privilege to inflict reasonable punishment and is thus lia-
ble in damages for the harm caused, the nature of the pupil's 
conduct which gave rise to the punishment is to be consid-
ered. 
Alabama.--Suits v. Glover (1954) 260 Ala 449, 71 So2d 49, 43 
ALR2d 465. 
Arkansas.=-Berry v. Arnold School Dist. (1940) 199 Ark 1118, 
137 SW2d 256 ( rule supported by implication). 
Connecticut.==Calway v. Williamson (1944) 130 Conn 575 3 36 A2d 
377 (rule supported by implication). 
Illinoiso==Drake Vo Thomas (1941) 310 Ill App 57, 33 NE2d 
8890 . 
Maineo==Patterson Vo Nutter (1886) 78 Me 509, 7 A 273, 57 
Am Rep 8180 
Missourio==Haycraft v. Grigsby (1901) 88 Mo 354, later app 
94 Mo App 74j 67 SW 9650 
New Hampshire.--Kidder v. Chellis (1879) 59 NH 4730 
Ohio.-=Quinn Vo Nolan (1879) 7 Ohio Dec Reprint 585, 4 WL 
Bull 81.o 
Tennessee.--Marlar Vo Bill (1944) 181 Tenn 100, 178 SW2d 
6340 
Texas.--Prendergast v. Masterson (1917, Tex Civ App) 196 
SW 246 (rule supported by implication). 
Vermont.==Lander v. Seaver (1859) 32 Vt 144, 76 Am Dec 156; 
Melen v. McLaughlin (1935) 107 Vt 111, 176, A 297. 
Wisconsin.--Morrow v. Wood (1874) 35 Wis 59, 17 Am Rep 471 
(rule supported by implication). 
Thus, for example, it has been said that in determining 
what is a reasonable corporal punishment, the apparent motive 
and disposition of the offending pupil, and the influence 
of his example upon others, are to be considered. 
Connecticut.--Calway v. Williamson (1944) 130 Conn'575, 
36 A2d 377. 
Maine.--Patterson v. Nutter (1886) 78 Me 509, 7 A 273, 57 Am 
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Rep 818. 
Vermont. --Lander v . Seaver (1859) 32 Vt 114, 76 Am Dec 156 
In connection with the principle that in determining 
whether corporal punishment of a pupil by a teacher was 
reasonable the offense of the child, or the reason why the 
punishment was administered, is to be considered, Kidder v. 
Chellis (1879) 59 NH 473, merits more detailed attention. In 
that case it appeared that plaintiff, a pupil in a public 
school, was not prepared when called upon to recite in a 
course on public speaking; defendant, the teacher, tried to 
explain the usefulness of the exercise to plaintiff, but the 
latter persisted in his refusal to speak, and defendant then 
informed him that he might have a period of three days to 
consider the matter, and if he then continued to refuse to 
speak, it would be necessary for him to leave the school. 
At the expiration of the period the pupil refused to speak, 
and the defendant sent him home to stay until he would, and, 
upon the pupil's return to school that afternoon, still 
refusing to conform to the teacher's requirement that he 
engage in public speaking·, the defendant, telling him that 
he must leave, took hold of him and put him out of the schoo~ 
house. The teacher's effort in ejecting the pupil was sharp 
and vigorous, but was no more than was reasonably necessary 
to overcome the resistance of the plaintiff. On the day that 
he was physically ejected from the school, the plaintiff 
notified the defendant that he was acting according to the 
directions of his parents. Dealing with the question of 
the teacher ' s liability was affected by the fact that the 
offense punished was one committed by the pupil at his 
parents' dlrection, the court said that such direction by the 
parents, namely, that they did not desire him instructed in 
public speaking, did not limit the defendant's authority as 
his teacher in lieu of the finding of fact that the regulaticn 
was a reasonable and useful one to the school. The parents, 
it was said, could not require the teacher to receive their 
child under his instruction, without conforming to his 
reasonable rules. Since the pupil was informed that it was 
necessary for him to submit to the rule regarding public 
speaking or leave the school , and he remained, by so remain~ 
ing he tacitly consented to submit, and gave the teacher 
authority to compel obedience. 
It has been held that a teacher has no right to in-
flict corporal punishment upon a pupil to enforce an un-
reasonable rule. Berry v. Arnold School Dist. (1940) 
199 Ark 1118, 137 SW2d 256 (dictum). 
And it may be noted that in Morrow v. Wood (1874) 35 
Wis 59, 17 Am Re p 471, the court saidj by way of dictum, 
that a teacher has no right to administer corporal punish-
ment to a pupil where the pupil's offense, giving rise to the 
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punishment, amounted to no more than obedience to the command 
of th~. pupil's father in respect to a particular course of 
study. The evidence there showed that the pupil's father had 
instructed him not to study geography, but to devote all of 
his time to other courses; that the teacher insisted that the 
child study geography, and that, upon his refusal to do so, 
the teacher resorted to force to compel obedience. The 
court took the view that, upon the facts presented, the 
teacher had no right or authority to chastise the pupil. 
An Illinois court has ruled that in determining the 
reasonableness of corporal punishment administered to a 
pupil by a teacher, not only the acts of the pupil which 
were the immediate cause of the punishment are to be consid= 
ered, but in addition, evidence should be admitted to show 
the pupil 1s past misconduct. Drake v. Thomas (1941) 310 Ill 
App 57, 33 NE2d 889. To the same effect, see Sheehan v. 
Sturges (1885) 53 Conn 481, 2A 841, infra, rubric 14. 
But a different view was taken in Haycraft v. Grigsby 
(1901) 88 Mo App 354, later app 94 Mo App 74, 67 SW 965. 
There it appeared that the trial court, in instructing the 
jury 3 stated that the "disposition" of .the pupil was an 
element to be considered in determining what degree of punish-
ment a teacher might properly administer to him. The court 
said that the expression was misleading, and if it was in-
tended to refer to the pupil 0s temper or disposition at the 
time of the punishment, i.t was used ambiguously. The pupil's 
general disposition was said to be no more helpful to 
ascertain how much he ought to have been whipped, or whether 
he ought to have been whipped at all, than was the teacher's 
in ascertaining whether she whipped him excessively; the 
inquiry was properly to be di~ected to the pupil's docile or 
refractory conduct at the time he was punished. 
b. Particular offenses held punishable.5 
The courts have ruled that (assuming that it is other-
wise reasonable) physical punishment administered to a pupil 
by a teacher will not render the teacher civilly liable if the 
punishment was administered for such misconduct as 
--assaulting the teacher. Sheehan v. Sturges (1885) 53 Conn 
481., 2 A 841. 
--abusing other pupils. 0 1 Rourke v. Walker (1925) 102 Conn 
130, 128 A 25, 41 ALR 1308. 
5cases holding that particular pupil conduct is, by its 
nature, such as not to be punishable, are dealt· with in Sec 
8a, supra. 
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--bringing obscene writing and pictures to school. Lander v. 
Seaver (1859) 32 Vt 114, 76 Am Dec 156. 
--injuring or destroying school property. Id. 
--insubordination. Suits v. Glover (1954) 260 Ala 449, 71 So 
2d 49, 43 ALR2d 465; Berry v. Arnold School Dist. (1940) 
199 Ark 1118, 137 SW2d 265 (dictum); Peck v. Smith (1874) 
41 Conn 442; Drake v. Thomas ( 1941) 310 Ill App 57, 33 NE2d 
889; Lander v. Seaver (1859) 32 Vt 114, 76 Am Dec 156. 
--using profane language. Peck v. Smith (1874) 41 Conn 442; 
Deskins v. Gose (1885) 85 Mo 485, 55 Am Rep 387, infra, 
rubric 8( c). 
--violating school rules. Suits v. Glover (1954) 260 Ala 
449, 71 802d 49 .i 4 3 ALR2d 465; Ber•ry v. Arnold School Dist. 
(1940) 199 Ark 1118.)) 137 SW2d 265; Sheehan v. Sturges (1885) 
53 Conn 481J 2 A 841; Deskins v. Gose (1885) 85 Mo 485, 55 
Am Rep 387 ( rule forbidding use of profane )an~uage, or 
quarreling or fighting on way home from school); Heritage v. 
Dodge (1886) 64 NH 297, 9 A 722; Marlar v. Bill (1944) 181 
Tenn 100, 178 SW2d 634. 
--quarreling or fighting. Deskins v. Gose (1885) 85 Mo 485, 
55 Am Rep 387, infra. rubric 8(c). 
--scuffling in·school hall. Suits v. Glover (1954) 260 Ala 
449.)) 71 So2d 49, 43 ALR2d 465. 
c. Offenses outside of school. 
The courts are in agreement that a teacher 1 s privilege 
to administer reasonable corporal punishment to a pupil is 
applicable to the pupil is misconduct when away from the 
school if correction of such misconduct is related to the 
m~intenance of school order and discipline. 
ThusJ it has been said that the test of a teacher 1 s right 
and jurisdiction to administer corporal punishment for offenses 
not committed on school property or going and returning 
therefrom, but after return of the pupil to his home, is not 
the time or place of the pupil 1 s offense, but its effect 
upon the morale and efficiency of the school, whether it is 
in fact detrimental to the school 1s good order and to the 
welfare and advancement of the pupils thereino 0 1 Rourke v. 
Walker (1925) 102 Conn 130, 128 A 25J 41 ALR 1308. The court 
said that if the conduct punished is detrimental to the best 
interests of the school, it is punishable, and, at least 
where school board rules so authorize, by corporal inflictio~ 
Any other principle, it was saidy would result in a serious 
loss of discipline in school and possible harm to innocent 
pupils in attendance. 
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The 0 1 Rourke Case (Conn) supra, is to .be particularly 
noted for its holding that the punishability of the acts 
involved there (abuse of two small girl pupils) was not 
affected by the fact that such acts occurred on property 
owned by the mother of the pupil punished. Noting that the 
claim was made that the girls who were abused were tres-
passers upon the property of the mother, the court said that 
this claim was of no avail, there being nothing in the record 
to show that the pupil punished was acting under the direc-
tion of his mother; and, it was added, even if he were, such 
conduct as that participated in by him would not be lawful. 
The question whether physical punishment administered to 
a pupil by a teacher was made actionable because it was 
administered in consequence of the pupil's conduct when out-
side the school was also presented in Deskins v. Gose (1885) 
85 Mo 485, 55 Am Rep 387, There it appeared that plaintiff, 
a pupil, had been whipped with a switch by his teacher as a 
consequence of ·~he pupil ' s use of profane language and 
engaging in quarreling and fighting away from the schoolhouse 
after school had adjourned for the day and while the pupils 
were on their way to their respective homes in violation of 
a standing rule against the use of profane language, quarrel-
ing, or fighting among the pupils, either at the schoolhouse 
or on their way home, which the defendant teacher had issued 
and often spoke of in the presence of the school and the plain -
tiff, The trial court refused to instruct the jury that the 
plaintiff, while in attendance at school as a pupil, was 
under the control of defendant as teacher, and that defendant 
had a right to punish him for an infraction of the rule in 
question, and that the verdict of the jury should be for tre 
defendant unless they believed that the punishment inflicted 
was unreasonable or excessive. Reversing a judgment for plain-
tiff, the court said that the trial court erred in refusing to 
give the instruction requested, taking the view that the 
portion of the rule which forbade use of profane language, 
or quarreling, or fighting when pupils were on their way to 
their homes, was within the authority of the teac~er. In · 
support of this holding it was pointed out that the effects 
of pupils engaging in such conduct when on the way to their 
homes would necessarily be felt in the schoolroom, since it 
would engender hostile feelings among the pupils, arraying 
one against the other, as well as among the parents, destroy-
ing that harmony and good will which should always exist 
among the scholars who are daiiy brought in contact with each 
other in the schoolroom . 
And in Lander v. Seaver (1859) 32 Vt 114, 76 Am Dec 156, 
the court stated the rule to be that when a student, outside 
of school property and not during school hours, commits an 
offense which has a direct and immediate tendency to injure 
the school and bring the teacher's authority into contempt, 
especially when the offense is committed in the presence of 
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other pupils and of the teacher and with a design to insult 
the teacher, the teacher has the right to administer corporal 
punishment to the pupil for such acts if the pupil again 
returns to school. But, it was added, such out-of-school 
misbehavior must have not merely a remote and indirect ten-
dency to injure the school, but instead, a direct and immedi-
ate bearing upon the welfare of the school, or the authority 
of the teacher and the respect due him. 
To the same effect as the above decisions, see also 
Cleary v. Booth (Eng) (1893) L QB 465, in which the English 
court took the view that a teacher's authority to administer 
reasonable punishment to a pupil, to secure obedience to 
school rules, extended to a case where the pupil's disobedi-
ent conduct was in the form of an assault upon a fellow stu-
dent while the two were on theii way to school. 
9. Age of pupil. 
It is firmly established that in determining whether a 
teacher is liable in damages for physical punishment of a 
pupil on the ground that such punishment was not reasonable 
in character, the age of the pupil punished is to be consid-
ered. 
Alabama.--Suits v. Glover (1954) 260 Ala 449, 71 So2d 49, 
4 3 ALR2d l.f 65. 
Connecticut.--Sheehan v. Sturges (1885) 53 Conn 481, 2 A 
841; Calway v. Williamson (1944) 130 Conn 575, 36 A 2d 377. 
Indiana.--Cooper v. McJunki.n (1853) 4 Ind. 290. 
Maine.--Patterson v. Nutter (1886) 78 Me 509, 7 A 273, 57 Am 
Rep 818. 
Missouri.--Haycraft v. Gri.gsby (1901) 88 Mo App 354, later 
app 94 Mo App 74, 67 SW 965. 
Ohio.--Quinn v. Nolan (1879) 7 Ohio Dec Reprint 585, 4 WL 
Bull 81. 
Vermont.--Lander v .. Seaver (1859) 32 Vt 114, 76 Am Dec 156; 
Melen v. McLaughlin (1935) 107 Vt 111, 176 A 297. 
As to the effect of the age of the pupil punished 
upon a teacher's liability for particular physical punish-
ment, see the factual analysis of the cases in Sec 13 
and 14, infra. · 
10. Physical condition of pupil. 
a. Generally. 
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Since what is reasonable punishment for a strong, 
healthy child may cause serious, permanent harm to a slight 
child, or one whose health is poor, it is held that the 
ascertainment of whether, on the one hand, particular punish-
ment of a pupil by a teacher was privileged as reasonable, or, 
on the other, the teacher is 11.able in damages for such 
punishment, required that the physical condition of the 
child who was punished be taken into consideration. 
Alabama.--Suits v. Glover (1954) 260 Ala 449, 71 So2d 49, 
43 ALR2d 465. 
Connecticut.--Sheehan v. Sturges (1885) 53 Conn 481, 2 A 
841; Calway v. Williamson (1944) 130 Conn 575, 36, A2d 377. 
Maine.--Patterson v. Nutter (1886) 78 Me 509, 7 A 273, 57 
Am Rep 818. 
Missouri.--Haycraft v. Grigsby (1901) 88 Mo App 354, later 
app 94 Mo App 74, 67 SW 965. 
Ohio. --Quinn v. Nolan ( 1879) 7 Ohio Dec Reprint 585, l~ WL 
Bull 81. 
Vermont.--Lander v. Seaver (1859) 32 Vt 114, 76 Am Dec 156; 
Melen v. McLaughlin (1935) 107 Vt 111, 176 A 297. 
As to the effect of the physical condition of the pupil 
punished upon a teacher's .liability for particular physical 
punishment, see the factual analysis of the cases in Sec 13 
and 14, infra. 
b. Pupil'~ unusual susceptibility to harm. 
In connection with the principle that the physiqal 
condition of a child is to be considered in determining 
whether punishment administered by a teacher gives rise to a 
cause of action for assault and battery, Quinn v. Nolan 
(1879) 7 Ohio Dec Reprint 585, 4 WL Bull 81, is to be noted 
for the court's statement that if a teacher, from the know-
ledge she had of a pupil and from his appearance, would 
be justified in supposing the pupil to be like other child-
ren of his age, and inflicted only a proper punishment, then 
the teacher would not be liable for damages even though some 
hidden defect in the pupil's consititution should cause 
injury to his health to follow the punishment. The court•s 
comment was that i.t is the duty of parents who send to school 
children whose health or disposition would render the punish-
ment permitted by the rules of the school dangerous or im-
proper, to see that the teacher is informed of this fact. 
And for a case embodying implicit support for the. pro-
position that a teacher is not liable for reasonable corporal 
punishment administered to a child, notwithstanding that 
because of the childus unusual susceptibility to harm from 
the type of punishment rendered, which susceptibility was 
unknown to the teachei, the results of the punishment were 
more serious than would normally have been the case, see 
Mansell Vo Griffin (Eng) (1908) 1KB 160J lBRC 708, 12 Ann 
Cas 350-=Div Ct 3 app dismd ( 1908) 1 KB 947, 1 BRC 718=-CA. 
11. Teacher 1 s motive. 
The courts have held that in deciding the reasonable-
ness of physical discipline of a pupil by a teacher, the 
teacher's motive in administering the discipline must be 
considered. 
Alabamao==Suits Vo Glover (1954) 260 Ala 449., 71 S.o2d 49., 
~3 ALR2d 4650 
Connecticuto--Calway v. Williamson (1944) 130 Conn 575, 36 
A2d 377 (rule supported by implication). 
Illinois. =-Drake v. 
889. 
Thomas ( 1941) 310 Ill App 57, 33 NE2d 
Indiana o ==C coper v. Mc Junkin ( 1853) 4 Ind 290. 
Maine. -·=Patterson Vo· Nutter ( 1886) 78 Me 509, 7 A 273, 57 
Am Rep 818. 
Missour.1.--Haycraft v. Grigsby (1901) 88 M.o App 354, later 
app 94 Mo App 74, 67 SW 965. 
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New Hampshire. --Heritage Vo Dodge ( 1886) 6~- NH 297, 9 A 722. 
North Carolina.=-Drum v. Mil.lei' (1904) 135 NC 204, 47 SE 421, 
65 LRA 890, 102 Am St Rep .528. 
Pennsylvania. -.=Harris v. Ga lille:y ( 1937) 125 Pa Super 505, 
189 A 779; Rupp v. Zintner (1937) 29 Pa D and C 625 (rule 
supported by implication). 
Tennessee. ==Marlar v. Bi.11 ( 191i4) 181 Tenn 100, 178 SW2d 634·. 
Vermont.--Lander v. Seaver (1859) 32 Vt 114, 76 Am Dec 156; 
Melen v. McLaughlin (1935) 107 Vt 111., 176 A 297 (rule sup-
ported by implication)o 
England o ==Mansell v o Griffin ( 1908) 1 KB 160 3 1 BRC 708, 12 
Ann Gas 350=-Div Ct, app dismd (1908) 1 KB 947, 1 BRC 718--CA. 
For example 1 it is held that a teacher who, with legal 
malice or·wicked motives, inflicts chastisement upon a child, 
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is liable for damages for assault. Suits v. Glover (1954) 
260 Ala 449 61 So2d 49, 43 ALR2d 465 (rule supported by 
implicationj; Drake v. Thomas (1941) 310 Ill App 57, 33 NE 
2d 889. 
And in Cooper v. McJunkin (1853) 4 Ind 290, the court 
(which acknowledged--and criticized--the right of a teacher 
to chastise a pupil moderately)7 emphasized the necessity 
that teachers understand that whenever correction is admin-
istered in anger or in insolence, or in any other manner than 
moderation and kindness, accompanied with that "affectionate 
moral suasion" so eminently due from one placed by the law 
in loco parentis, the courts must consider them liable for 
assault and battery. 
Similarly, in Haycraft v. Grigsby (1901) 88 Mo App 965, 
which was an action for assault and battery brought by a 
pupil against a teacher, the court, commenting that a teacher 
has a right to inflict reasonable punishment for misconduct 
by whipping but has no right to inflict unreasonable or 
excessive corporal punishment in that mode or any other, said 
that a teacher cannot administer punishment in any degree 
maliciously, there being no such thing as reasonable punish-
ment from a malicious motive; the punishment must be adminis-
tered for a salutary purpose--to maintain the discipline and 
6rt is necessary to note that, in the Suits Case (Ala) 
supra, the court said that to be "guilty of an assault and 
battery" the teacher must "not only inflict on the child 
immoderate chastisement, 11 but he must do so with "legal 
malice or wicked motive." Although the Suits Case was a 
civil action for damages; it seems probable that the rule 
thus stated was intended to express a principle of the 
criminal law of assault. A rule by which a teacher would 
be free of tort liability for immoderate punishment of a 
pupil, merely because of the teacher's lack of wrongful 
motivation, would not only fly in the face of the authorities 
dealt with in Sec 7, supra, but would, it is submitted, 
be entirely inconsistent with fundamental principles of 
civil justice . 
7The court commented that the public seemed to cling 
to despotism in the government of schools which had been 
discarded everywhere else; that the very act of resorting 
to the rod demonstrated the incapacity of a teacher for 
one of the most important parts of his vocation, namely, 
school government; and that it could hardly be doubted that 
public opinion would, in time, strike the ferule from the 
hands of the teacher; leaving him a s the true basis of 
government only the resources of his intellect and heart. 
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efficiency of the school. In that case it was held that the 
trial court had erred in instructing the jury that although 
a teacher imposed immoderate and unreasonable punishment upon 
a pupil, yet two school directors who were present with the 
teacher at the time the punishment was administered would not 
be liable unless they maliciously advised and directed the 
teacher to administer the punishment, or aided and assisted 
her; the court said that the proper rule was that if the 
directors advised or encouraged an immoderate whipping, or 
assisted in it, they would be liable, whether their motive 
was malicious or not. 
In Heritage v . Dodge (1886) 64 NH 297, 9 A 722, it 
appeared that plaintiff} a school pupil, was physically dis-
ciplined by defendant, a teacher , when plaintiff disturbed 
the school by making a noise resembling a cough, which defend-
ant understood was intended as an act of contempt and defiance 
of his authority . In an action to recover for assault and 
battery, plaintiff requested the trial court to instruct the 
jury that if the plaintiff could not help coughing, then the 
defendant was not justified in punishing him, although the 
defendant believed that plaintiff coughed for the purpose of 
defying his authority and disobeying the school rules. The 
court, holding the trial court's refusal to give the requested 
instruction proper, over-ruled plaintiff's exception to a 
verdict for defendant, saying that the instruction requested 
made the defendant liable without regard to whether he 
exercised reasonable judgment and discretion in determining 
whether plaintiff was guilty of intentional misconduct as a 
scholar. A teacher, the court said, is not required to be 
infallible in his judgment, and it is up to him to determine 
when and to what extent correction is necessary; like other 
persons clothed with discretion, a teacher cannot be made 
personally responsible for an error in judgment when he has 
acted in good faith and without malice. 
On the other hand, courts have recognized that if cor -
poral punishment inflicted upon a student is clearly excessive; 
then the teacher should be held liable in damages for assaul~ 
notwithstanding that he acted from good motives in inflicting 
the punishment and in his own judgment considered it neces-
sary and not excessive . 
Connecticut . - -Calway v . Williamson (1944) 130 Conn 575 , 36 
A2d 377. 
Pennsylvania. --Rupp v. Zintner (1937) 29 Pa D and C 625. 
Vermont. - -Lander v. Seaver (1859) 32 Vt 114, 76 Am Dec 156. 
IV. Teacher's liabil ity under pa rticular circumstances; 
factual classification of cases 
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12. Generally. 
In the sections which follow, it is sought to demon-
strate the operation of the general principles already dis-
cussed by viewing actions for damages for physical punish-
ment of a pupil by a teacher from a point of view of result--
that is, from the point of view of the teacher's liability 
or non- liability under particular circumstances. Since the 
basic question in cases of this kind (the question of reason-
ableness) is one of fact,b these holdings can furnish only 
the roughest sort of guide in the determination whether a 
particular instance of pupil punishment can be successfully 
litigated. But the importance of these actual holdings is 
to be emphasized- - the general legal principles applic~ble to 
pupil punishment situations are especially interdependent, a~ 
it is only by a careful balancing~out of the effects that 
juries (acting under proper instructions), or appellate courts, 
or lawyers advising their clients, can reach a sound con-
clusion. 
13. Teacher held liable. 
A teacher's civil liability for physical punishment of 
a pupil has been held established in the following cases, in 
which it appeared --
--that the punishment was administered by a school principal 
wh o was charged with disciplining pupils after the pupil had 
been impudent to one of his teachers; that the pupil punish-
ed was ten years of age, weighed eighty-nine pounds, and was 
somewhat below average height for his age; that the principal, 
after the pupil had refused to leave a schoolroom and go to 
the principal 's office, grasped the pupil by the wrist, pulled 
him across the floor, and because of the pupil's struggling 
and kicking, pushed the pupil to the floor and first knelt 
on the pupil ' s abdomen with one knee, and then sat on his 
abdomen; and that, during the period when the principal was 
kneeling and sitting on the pupil and as a result of pupil's 
efforts to free himself of the principaJ 's weight~ the pupil 
sustained a skin burn or abrasion becoming infected, devel-
oped into osteomyelitis. 
Calway v. Williamson (1944) 130 Conn 575, 36 A2d 377. 
--that the punishment was administered by a teacher as a 
consequence of a difference of opinion or understanding 
between the teacher and a pupil with regard to a trivial 
8 See Sec 5, supra. 
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ma tter occurring in play in which the teacher took part with 
his pupils on equal t erms 3 and that the punishment took the 
form of an assault upon . and a bea t ing of, the pupil by the 
t eacher. Hardy v. James (1872 ) 5 Ky Ops 36. 
- -tha t the punishment was administered by the school 
principal who, as a t eac her 3 was authorized by statute to 
exerc i se parent al control over pupils ; that the punishment 
was administered as a consequence of the principal's belief 
that the pupil was causing a commot ion in the school audit-
orium; tha t the punishment was in the form of a slap on the 
back of t he pupi l ' s nec k wi h t he princ ipal ' s open hand; and 
tha t the pupil suffered permanent inJury as a consequence of 
the punishment . Harris v. Galilley (1937 ) 125 Pa Super 505 , 
189 A 779 ( ho din~ evidence s uff i cient to support jury verdict 
in favor of pupi l ) . 
--that t he punishmen , was admini stered by a teacher who, 
by statute , had been delega t ed parental disciplinary 
aut hority; t hat t he punishment was administered as a conse-
quence of t he pupil ' s conduct in tapping on his desk with a 
pencil; that the punishment t ook the form of a blow over the 
pupil ' s right ear 1 which injured his eardrum and permanently 
impa red his hearing i n tha t ear . Rupp v. Zintner (1937) 29 
Pa D and C 625. 
- -tha t the punishment was administered by a teacher as 
a consequence of defendan· ' s inability to sol ve an arithmetic 
problem at the blackboard ; t hat the punishment consisted of a 
blow with an arithmet i c book over the pupil ' s left kidney, the 
blow being inflic ted at t he time when the pupil was bent over 
t o pick up an eraser which had been shaken from her hand by 
the t eacher; tha t the pupi l was a girl eleven years old , and 
t ha as a cons equence of the punishme nt t he pupil suffered 
g r ea t pa in , and it wa s necessary for her to remain , for a 
period of a lmos t t wo man hs, i n a plaster jac ket extending 
from her armpi s downward t o about a quarter or ha lf the length 
of he r legs . Me en v . Mc Laughlin 935) 107 Vt 111, 176 A 
297. 
--tha t he punis hment wa s adminis t ered by a teacher as 
a c ons eque nce of the pupil's disobed i ence of the teacher ' s 
requi r ement tha t he pupil s tudy geography, t he disobedience 
springing from t he fact t ha t the pupil' s f a t he r had orde red 
hi m not o study geogra phy . Morrow v . Wood (1874) 35 Wis 59 , 
·17 Am Rep 471 . 
- =tha t the pun ishment wa s administered by a t eacher as a 
c onsequence of the pupi l ' s refusal to knee l down aft er he 
had bee n misbeha ving h i ms e lf ; that he puni shment c ons i s ted 
in the eacher dragging he boy by t he ear in orde r t o c ompel 
him to kneel; t hat t he pupil was s even years of age, and 
tha t 9 as a r esult of the puni s hment » a cartilage in the pupi l~ 
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ear was fractured or ruptured and the pupil required extensive 
medical attention. Lefebvre v. La Congregation des Petits 
Freres ( 1890 9 Quebec) Montreal L 6 &; 4 30. 
In connection with the cases dealt with above, it may 
be noted that in Serres v. South Santa Anita School Board 
(1935) 10 Cal App 2d 152» 51 P2d 893 3 the court held that a 
cause of action for battery was stated by a complaint alleg-
ing that the plaintiffs a minors while engaged in athletic 
activities on school grounds, became engaged in an altercation 
for which defendant 9 a teachers proceeded to punish plaintiff 
by commanding him to bend over and grasp his ankles .9 and then, 
after withdrawing some distance to give force and momentum 
to the blow 9 advanced rapidly and negligently and with the 
use of great and excessive force delivered with his open palm 
a violent blow upon the coccyx .bone. of the plaintiffs thereby 
fracturing plaintiff 1s coccyx" The court commented that the 
use of the word "negligent" in describing the teacher I s 
actions did not change the cause of action into one for negli= 
gencej since the facts alleged showed that the teacher was 
charged with responsibility for his deliberate acts consti-
tuting a battery. 
And note also Cooper v. McJunkin (1853) 4 Ind 290; in 
which a complaint alleging that a teacher unlawfully and 
with inhuman violence beat 9 bruised 9 and gashed the face of 
a pupil~ was held not answered by a plea that the punishment 
administered was moderate correction, necessary for the good 
government of a school 9 and inflicted as a consequence of the 
pupilus negligence and disorderliness. The court, remarking 
that to call the acts complained ofs which were acts of 
extreme violences moderate corrections did not change their 
character, said that the taacherus pleading was not a denial 
of the pupil 0 s allegaticins, nor did it. confess and avoid them, 
and such pleading, professing to answer the whole declare= 
tion was bad on demurrer. 
In line with the Cooper Case (Ind) supra, is Hathaway 
v. Rich (1846) 19 Vt 102s which was an action by a pupil 
against a teacher for assault and battery. The court, rever= 
sing a judgment in the defendant 0s favor, said that plaintiff Us 
complaint charging that defendant had laid 'hold of him, and 
struck him a great number of violent blows with a rawhide, 
and with clubs, sticks, fists, and feet, thereby wounding him 
and tearing his clothes, was not sufficiently answered by 
defendants us plea that the assault was authorized by virtue 
of the teacher--pupil relationship. The court said that from 
defendant 0s pleading it could not be determined what degree 
of severity in punishment was called for by plaintiff's 
alleged misconduct as a student 9 but it was clear that 
defendant 1 s allegations as to such misconduct (namelyj that 
the plaintiff behaved and conducted himself "saucily and 
contumaciously 11 toward defendant) disclosed nothing to justi-
fy defendant in proceeding to the extraordinary length des-
cribed in plaintiff's complaint. 
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And in Haycraft v. Grigsby (1901) 88 Mo App 354, later 
app 94 Mo ·App 74, 67 SE 965, the courts, in an action against 
a teacher and against school directors who aided and 1assisted 
the teacher, for injuries sustained by a pupil as a conse-
quence of corporal punishment administered to him, reversed a 
judgment in defendants' favor, commenting that the record 
produced a strong impression that the pupil was maltreated 
and that while he might have needed correcting, unnecessary 
harshness was shown toward him. The evidence giving rise to 
this comment was as follows: the teacher, upon allegedly de -
tecting the pupil talking to another boy and scratching his 
desk, told him to come forward ~nd take a whipping, and when 
he did not come forward, started toward him; whereupon the 
pupil took a piece of broom handle out of his desk, brandished 
it and struck at the teacher; immediately thereafter, one of 
two school directors, who was present in the room with the 
teacher, took hold of the pupil and brought him back to the 
teacher, who whipped him rather severly; later in the day, 
when the pupil was requested to recite his lesson, he was un-
able to read (plaintiff's evidence showing that such inabil-
ity was due to the fact that the pupil was crying, while de-
fendant's evidence tended to show that the pupil was sulky), 
whereupon the teacher struck the slate out of the pupil's 
hand, and gave him an extremely severe flogging, badly stri-
ping and bruising his arm and shoulder and raising a lump on 
his head the s~ze of a walnut. 
Although not embodying a holding that a teacher was 
liable for damages as a consequence of corporal punishment 
administered to a pupil, Drum v. Miller (1904) 135 NC 204, 47 
SE 421, 65 LRA 890, may also be noted at this point. In that 
case it appeared that defendant, a teacher, in order to attract 
the attention of plaintiff, a pupil, who had turned his head 
to see what was causing a disturbance in the schoolroom, 
threw a pencil at plaintiff and struck him in the eye, inflict-
ing a very painful and serious wound which caused partial, · 
if not total , blindness. At . . the trial the jury was charged 
that before they could return a verdict for the plaintiff, it 
was necessary for them to find that the defendant was, at the 
time, able to foresee, by the exercise of ordinary care, 
not only that injury would result from his act, but that the 
particular injury which was received by the plaintiff was the 
natural and probable consequence of his act. Reversing a 
judgment in defendant's favor, on the ground that this instruc-
tion was erroneous, the court said that if, upon a new trial, 
the jury found that the defendant acted maliciously, he would, 
of course, be liable to the plaintiff for the consequent injury 
and damage; but, if defendant inflicted a permanent injury in 
attempting to enforce the discipline of his school and in so 
doing failed to exercise ordinary care, he would still be 
1~ 
liable t o t he plaintiff if the jury found that the injury was 
the natura l and probable result of his negligence and that 
t he defendant, in the light of the attending circumstances, 
and in the exercise of ordinary care, ought reasonably to 
have seen t hat a permanent injury-=not necessarily by specif:lc 
i njury--c ould be t he natural and probable consequence of 
his act . 
For a case in which a school superintendent was held 
liable for physical chastisement of a pupil 3 on the ground 
that the superintendent did not come within the scope of the 
privilege accorded to t eachers to administer moderate cor-
~oral punishment to a pupil, see Prendergast v. Masterson 
( 1917) Tex Civ App 196 SW 246 , supra, 4a. 
14 . Teache r held not l iable. 
The rule t hat a t eac her i s immune from civil liability 
for reasonable physical punishment of a pupil has been held 
applicable , a nd t o bar recovery against the teacher, in the 
fo l lowing cases , in whic h i t was shown--
- - t hat the punishment was administered by a teacher who was 
responsible for maintaining order and discipline and author-
ized t o administer c orpora l ~unishment as necessary as punis~ 
ment for infrac t ions of t he school rules; that the teacher 
acted without anger; t hat the punishment was administered as 
a consequence of the pupil ' s infraction of school rules by 
being insubordi nate and engaging in scuffling in the school 
hall ; t hat the pupil was eight and one-half years old and 
in good health; tha t t he evidence conflicted on the question 
whether t he punishment was (as al l eged by the teacher) in the 
form of a paddling with ping-pong paddle, or (as alleged by 
the pupi l) in the form of a whipping with a slat from an 
apple cra t e; and t ha tJ al t hough the evidence was conflicting 
on whether the pupi l was paddled on his buttocks only, whether 
t he skin was broke n , and whether more than five licks were 
administe r ed , i t appeared t ha t t he pupi l r emained in school 
the r emainde r of the s chool day on the day the incident 
occurred 1 and d id not miss a ny t i me fr om school other 
than t he day following the i ncident . Suits v. Gl over (1954 ) 
260 Ala 449 J 71 So2d 49J 43 ALR 2d 465 . 
--that the punishment was administered , by one who wa s act-
ing as a school district committee, as a c ons e que nce of t he 
pupil ' s insubord i nation, and use of pr ofane language when 
t he defenda nt asked whether the pupi l could not do a bette r 
j ob of removing f r om a school stove pipe c halk ma r ks which the 
pupil had pl aced thereon; a nd that the punishment was in the 
form of the committee's laying his ha nds upon t he pupi l 's 
shoulder a nd leading him to the door a nd out of the school-
house, us i ng no other violence, nor any force unnecessa r y t o 
the eject ion of the pupil. Pec k v . Smi t h (1874) 41 Conn 
132 
442. 
==that the punishment was administered by a teacher as a 
consequence of the pupil's habitually bad conduct and assaults 
upon the teacher (the assaults having occurred more than a 
week prior to the punishment) that the teacher did not in-
form the pupil at the time of the punishment of the reason 
therefor; and that the punishment was in the form of a whip-
ping. Sheehan v. Sturges (1885) 53 Conn 481~ 2 A 841. · 
The court said that it was not necessary that the teacher 
should, at the time of inflicting the. punishment 1 remind the 
pupil of his past and accumulated offenses 1 since the pupil 
knew them well enough without having them brought freshly to 
his notice. 
==that the punishment was administered by a school princi= 
pal who 1 by rules of the school boar~was authorized to 
i.nflict on any pupil corporal puni.shment for misconduct in 
connection with the regulation of the school; that the rea-
son for the punishment was the pupil's conduct in abusing 
two small girl students on their way home from school after 
school hours; that the punishment was in the form of eight 
strokes on each hand with a flat stick two and one-half 
feet long and over one=half inch thick, used in the school 
for that purpose only; and that the punishment was not 
excessive, and no injury was caused thereby. 0 1 Rourke v. 
Walder (1925) 102 Conn 130 3 128 A 25 1 41 ALR 1308. 
--that the punishment was administered by a teacher in 
a school especially created for truants and incorrigibles; 
that the teacher acted without malice;that the punishment was 
administered as a consequence of the pupil's obstreperous and 
insubordinate conduct in disobeying the instructions of 
another teacher; that the pupil was a big boy;! fifteen years 
of ageJ weighing about two hundred pounds; that the punish= 
ment was in the form of blows on the pupil's thighs with a 
paper tube and that on the day following the punishment 1 the 
pupil attended school and bore no marks or bruises upon his 
thighs. Drake v. Thomas (1941) 310 Ill .App 57., 33 NE2d 889. 
--that the punishment was administered by a teacher as a 
consequence of the pupil's refusal to surrender the teacher's 
desk at which the pupil had been allowed to sit temporarily; 
that the punishment was in the form of the forcible ejection 
of the pupil by the teacher with the assistance of another; 
and that the pupil was over twenty-one years of age. Stevens 
v. Fassett (1847) 27 Me 266 (dictum). 
==that the punishment 1r.ras administered by a teacher as a 
consequence of a pupil 1 s infraction of a school rule by 
using profane language and quarreling and fighting when on 
his way home after school» and that the punishment was in 
the form of a whipping with a switch. Deskins v. Gose (1885) 
133 
85 Mo 485, 55 Am Rep 387 (reversing judgment in favor of 
plaintiff and remanding cause for new trial on ground that 
trial court erred in refusing to instruct jury that teacher 
could administer corporal punishment as consequence of pupil 1s 
misconduct when away from school.) 
-=that the punishment was adrnin.istered by a teacher as a 
consequence of the pupil 1s refusal to recite in a public-
speaking class as required by the teacher J and that the pun= 
ishment was in the form of physi.cal ejection of the pupil 
without excessive force, by the teacher. Kidder v. Chellis 
(1879) 59 NH 473. 
--that the punishment was administered by a teacher as 
a consequence of the pupil's disturbance of the school by 
making a noise resembling a cough which the teacher under-
stood was intended as an act of contempt and defiance of his 
authority; and that the punishment was moderate in extent. 
Heritage v. Dodge (1886) 64 NH 297s 9 A 722 (overruling 
pup11 1 s exceptions to verdict in favor of teacher). 
==that the punishment was reiasonable 1.n extent and was 
administered as a consequence of pup11 1s disobedience to 
reasonable school regulations. Wilbur v. Berry (1902) 
71 NH 619s 51 A 904. 
--that the punishment was administered by a teacher, act-
ing without maliceJ as a consequence of the pupil 1s vio= 
lation of a school regulation by going into a classroom dur-
ing recess and raising the windows, and as a consequence 
of the pup11 1 s denial of such act when first asked about it; 
that the pupil was between ten and eleven years of age; and 
that the punishment was sl.i.ght} being in the form of blows 
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III. Particular facts determinative of charitable status 
While in some cases the question whether the activities 
or purpose of a school or college are such as to c lathe the 
institution with the legal status of a charity is not dis-
cussed by the courts, even though some rule of immunity is 
applied, it would seem that where the claim of charitable 
immunity is made, this would constitute an affirmative de-
fense which must be adequately pleaded and proven. 
Whether a school or college, or any other organization, 
is entitled to the status of a charity so as to be entitled 
to an exemption from tort liability is a question that would 
ordinarily seem to be determinable upon the facts of each 
individual case, but some generalities have been vdiced by 
the courts • 
.A public charity is not neces.sarily confined to in-
stitutions or corporations which confine their gifts or 
ass is ta nee to the poor and needy, and one of the earliest 
forms of public charity known to the law was that of a school 
and college. Parks v. Northwestern University (1905) 121 
Ill App 512 (Affirmed in (1905) 218 Ill 381, 75 NE 991, 2 
LRA (NS) 556, 4 Ann Cas 103). 
But in order for a college to be a public charity for 
the purpose of ascertaining its immunity from tort liability, 
the controlling purpose must be for t-he common and public 
benefit, and if it was created by the incorporators, or 
thereafter was administered and maintained by their succes-
sors, for money-making, this essential element is lacking 
even if it may at times have expended money for purposed or 
rendered gratuitous services, which in common speech are 
called charitable. Hall v. College of Physicia_ns and Sur-
geons (1925) 254 Mass 95, 149 NE 675. 
In determining whether a corporation is charitable for 
the purpose of determining its liability for tort, it is 
clear that a corporation is to be deemed eleemosynary or 
charitable where its property is derived from charitable 
gifts or bequest and is administered, not for the purpose 
of gain, but in the interest of humanity, and an educational 
institution, established and endowed by private cha'ri ty, 
falls clearly within the classification. Ettlinger v. 
Randolph-Macon College (1929; CCA 4th) 31 F2d 869. 
However, the fact that the charter of a college cor= 
poration stated that it was formed 11 for the purpose of es-
tablishing and maintaining a college for the prosecution and 
promotion of educational, scientificj and medical purposes," 
was held in Hall v. College of Physicians and Surgeons (1925) 
254 Mass 95, 149 NE 675, not necessarily to make it a public 
charity, since the corporation would be acting within its 
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charter powers if it charged every student in full for tuition, 
and clinical patients for medical care and treatment. 
But the fact that the charter of a charitable corporation 
engaged in the operation of a school provided that it might 
sue and be sued was held 1n Abston v. Waldon Academy (1907) 
118 Tenn 24 J 102 SW 351, 11 LRA ( NS) 1179, not to render ·the 
rule of exemption inapplicable 3 the court saying that there 
was abundant scope for the operation of this clause without 
overturning the pri.nciple of immunityJ based as it was upon 
well-considered authority_9 and upon sound public pol1cy. 
Upon the question of the conclusiveness .of its charter. 
as regards the character, kindJ or purposes of a corporation, 
see annotation in 199 ALR 1012. 
Effect of income from tuition or other school or college 
activiFies. - ~-- - ,_ u · - -
By analogy to the view that the fact that patients of 
a charitable hospital who are able to pay are required to do 
so does not deprive the hospital of its eleemosynary character 
so as to permit a recovery in an action in tort against the 
hospitals the fact that a school or college otherwise formed 
or conducted as a charitable institution requires its students 
to pay tuition, or tuition and room and boardJ has been held 
not to deprive the institution of its charitable character. 
United States.--Ettlinger v. Randolph-Macon College (19:29; 
CCA 4th) 31 F2d 869; Higgons v. Pratt Institute (1930; CCA 
2d) 45 F2d 698, .30 NCCA 217. 
Colorado.--St. Mary's Academy v. Solomon (1925) 77 Colo 
463~ 238 P 22; 42 ALR 964. · 
Georgia.=-Butler v. Berry School (1921) 27 Ga App 560, 
109 s.E 544 (holding that the fact that all of the pupils · 
were required to give a portion of their time to work in the 
various departments of the school, and that some of them 
paid a part of their expenses 3 did not take the school out 
of the general rule laid down as to the immunity, or change 
its character as a charitable institutiono 
Il.linois.==Parks Vo Northwestern University (1905) 121 
Ill App 512 (affirmed in (1905) 218 Ill 381!/ 75 NE 991, 2 
LRA (NS) 556, 4 Ann Cas 103). 
New York.==Cc:illins v. New York Post Graduate Medical 
School and Hospital (1901) 59 App Div 63, 69 NYS 106. 
Tennessee.=-Abston v. Waldon Academy (1907) 118 Tenn 
24, 102 SW 351 3 11 LRA (NS) 1179. 
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Texas.--Southern Methodist University v. Clayton (1943) 
142 Tex 179 176 SW2d 749; Baylor University v. Boyd (1929; 
Tex Civ App) 18 SW2d 700 (requiring payment by patients of 
hospital operated by university). 
Thus, in Parks v. Northwestern University (1905) 121 
Ill App 512 (affirmed tn (1905) 218 Ill 38lr 75 NE 991, 2 LRA 
(NS) 556, 4 Ann Cas 103), the court said: 'The amounts thus 
received from plaintiff and other students are not for private 
gain, but contribute to the funds of the institution and 
enable it more effectually to accomplish the purposes for 
which it was founded and organized. The fact that the 
defendant received from the plaintiff and other students 
tuition, does not make it the less a public charity, nor 
does it expose the trust fund to the liability of being de-
pleted or frittered away by the negligence of its officers, 
professors, or employees. In case of injury the wrongdoer, 
not the trust funds, must respond." 
And it has been said that it is a matter of general and 
common knowledge that the tuition and other charges of public 
educational institutions and those which are privately endowed 
are much lower than would be required to pay even their 
running expenses, being purposely made low so that education 
may be placed within the reach of those who need it, and, 
where the evidence specifically shows that the charges made 
by such an institution cover only a part of the cost of carry-
ing on its work, such institutions are not only engaged in a 
work of charity, but the pay students as well as others are 
the beneficiaries thereof; and, apart from the fact that the 
amount a student pays does not equal the cost of his education, 
he is a beneficiary of the charity for the reason that but fer 
the charitable gift made to the i~stitution and the charit-
able work which it is carrying on, it would not exist to serve 
him. Ettlinger v. Randolph-Macon College (1929:CCA 4th) 31 
F2d 869. 
In Scott v. Wm. M. Rice Institute (1944: Tex Civ App) 
178 SW2d 156, it was held that the fact that a college oper-
ated its athletics at a small profit which was not passed to 
its general funds, but was held as a contingent fund to cover 
any loss which might occur in the future, did not operate to 
deprive the college of its immunity from tort liability to a 
paying spectator who was injured at a college football game, 
the court saying that the holding of a small profit in sus-
pense or reserve to be applied to losses in lean years was 
merely a method of keeping books , that such contingent fund 
was as much a part of the assets of the college as its general 
fund and as much devoted to its general purposes, and that a 
charitable corporation did not have to be unfortunate or un-
skillful in the management of its activities or finances in 
order to enjoy immunity from tort liability. 
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The fact that a non=profit organization incorporated for 
the purpose 11 To maintain and support an industrial school and 
asylum for the sustenance and education of male orphan child-
ren," and which was largely maintained by charitable contribu-
tions, received a small or partial compensation from the 
different counties from which wayward boys were sent and that 
it received a small sum annually from the sale of surplus 
farm products and manufactured articles, did not change its 
charitable character, or render it a private business 
corporation so as to make it liable to the inmates for the 
negligence of its servants 1 where due care was used in their 
selection. Corbett v. St Vincent's Industrial School (1903) 
79 App Div 334, 79 NYS 369 (affirmed in (1903) 177 ~y 16, 68 
NE 997). 
The fact that a charitable corporation operating a post-
graduate medical school and hospital required hospital patients 
to pay a small weekly sum for room, board, and other inci= 
dentals, and also charged tuition fees to those attending the 
course of instructionfl was held in Collins v. New York Post 
Graduate Medical School and Hospital (1901) 59 App Div 63, 69 
NYS 106J not to change the status of the corporation as a 
charitable insti.tution so as to make it liable for the negli-
gence of a surgeon in the performance of an operation for 
which no charge was made to the patient. 
In Heinemann v. Jewish Agri. Soc. (1942) 178 Misc 897, 
37 NYS2d; 354 .• where it appeared that a charitable corporation 
was organized for the purpose of assisting Jewish people to 
become established as farmers in this country, and to that end 
maintained a farm for the purpose of giving instruction in 
farming and enabling applicants for assistance to discover 
whether they were suited to farm life, it wa~ held that the 
fact that applicants for such benefits were required to pay 
a stated weekly sum for their board while at the farm did not 
take them out of the class of beneficiaries of th~ charity, 
where it appeared that this charge was considerably below the 
actual cost of the service rendered 9 the court also concluding 
that the applicantsJ to the extent of the excess cost 3 were 
beneficiaries o 
bo Schools or function entitled to charitable immunityo 
Under the facts appearing in a number of casesJ it has 
been held that a school or college was formed or operated as 
a charitable i.nstitution and thus entitled to the i.mmunity 
from tort liability enjoyed by such organizationso 
So, where the statute incorporating an institution of 
learning for the instruction of persons of both sexes in sci-
ence and literature provided that the income or proceeds of 
the stock should be appropriated to no other use than the 
benefit of the institution as contemplated by the statute, it 
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was held in Hill v. Tualatin Academy (1912) 61 Or 190, 121 P 
901, that the statute created a charitable institution which 
was immune from the consequence of the negligent acts of its 
officers or employees. 
In Baylor Uni ve rs it y v. Boyd ( 1929); ('I'ex Ci v App) 18 SW 
2d 700, it was held that a hospital operated by a university 
was a charitable institution where it was not conducted for 
profit, but on the contraryJ where, if at the end of any 
fiscal year, there should be a surplus, over the expense of 
rnc.J:intain:Lng and operati .. ng the hosp.t.tal.i der:i.ved from payments 
by its patients and public contributionsJ such surplus was 
placed in the general fund of the hospital and used for its 
general charitable purposes. 
In other cases it s also been held that a school or 
ooll(':lf;/;Ec~ \vas so form1::,rl or Ct:induot1;~d ,]s to hav~:1 the char•acte1r··~ 
istlos of a charitable instit lonl and to be entitled to the 
immunity from tort 11ab1J.ity extended to such organizations--
,,,.,w.!Hcn·e a co.l.l(c;:fl)? was operatt."ld b;y a nonstock corporat:Lon 
chartered and organized by the Conference of the Methodist 
Epi.ecopal Church for the purpose of carrying on without profit 
the work of education 1 and the corporation was supported by 
char able gifts and bequestsJ the tuition paid by the students 
not be1. suffic nt fort support of the college. Ettlingar 
V, HE'l O ph,,,)Vj1;1con CoJlegE:1 (1 9, GCA !ftl:i) 31 F'2d 869, 
re J.t upptHJrt:d t.htit; an 1ndu::rtrlal sc.hoo1 Vias charter(:'lCI 
for t purpose or th(? E-~ducllt1on of poor country gi.r1s and 
boys, that the cht:irter mc::1de no prov:Ls1on for capital stocl-c 
i.:ind non01 vH-rn ~?vt,.r 1sfH.lEH1,, that the sch()ol w,Js not conducted 
for private or corporate gain~ none of the officers or 
directors received any salary 1 and the only salaries paid 
were to the teachers ond instr~ctors; that while a nominal 
charge was made against each pupil able to pay, a number of 
them never paid anyth:L.ng Dnd :no student pa:id anything like h:is 
or her pep cap:i.ta E:xpense~3 of operating the school; that it 
was supported primarily by voluntary contributions 3 and that 
it had never received any funds or property except that 
11 donated by charitably inclined people 11 for the purpose of 
carr;ying out the aims of the school as declared in its charter, 
Butler v. Berry Schoel (1921) 27 Ga App 560J 109 SE sJ+l+. 
--where the charter of an incorporated university provided 
that its entire funds 1 whether from tuition fees received fr~ 
students or other sources, was to be used solely for education-
al purposes, that the corporation had no capital stock, could 
not declare c:L:Lvidends or share profits, everything that it 
held in trust was to be applied in such a manner as to best 
accomplish the purpose for which it was created, and that it 
depended on the income from its property and the endowment and 
gifts of benevolent persons for funds to carry out the sole 
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object for which it was created. Parks v. Northwestern Univ-
ersity (1905) 218 Ill 381 , 75 NE 991, 2 LRA (NS) 556, 4 Ann 
Cas 103. 
--where a home was founded and maintained under a trust 
created by gifts for the sole purpose of affording an educa-
tion and maintenance for destitute boys, and whatever advan-
tages the institution offered were conferred without compen-
sation. Farrigan v. Pevear (1906) 193 Mass 147, 78 NE 855, 
7 LRA (NS) 481, 118 Am St Rep 484, 8 Ann Cas 1109. 
--where it appeared that an incorporated college was organ-
ized without capital stock as a charitable association; that 
no founder or organizer of the corporation was entitled to 
receive any pecuniary profit from the operation of a hospital 
or other activity of the c orporation , and that all its funds, 
however derived , were held in trust for the purpose of con-
ducting a school of osteopathyj medicine, and surgery, and 
to conduct infirmaries and hospitals. Roberts v. Kirksville 
College of Osteopathy and Surgery (1929; Mo App) 16 SW2d 625. 
--where it appeared that an incorporated post-graduate med-
ical school and hospital was established for the purpose of 
further instruction of persons already possessing the degree 
of doctor in medicine, and the maintenance of a hospital 
for the treatment of diseased and injured persons, that the 
corporation had no capital stock, that its funds were derived 
from public and private donations, the board of paying patients, 
and the tuition fees of those attending the school, all of 
which was devoted to the corporation's charitable uses and 
purposes; that the officers, directors, faculty, physicians, 
and surgeons rendered their services gratuitously, and no 
charges were made for medical services rendered at the hos-
pital aside from the small weekly sum for room, board, and 
other incidentals to those who were able to pay. Collins 
v. New York Post Graduate Medical School and Hospital (1901) 
59 App Div 63, 69 NYS 106 . . 
--where a corporation was organized "to maintain and support 
an industrial school and asylum for the sustenance and educa-
tio·n of male orphan children;" and where it appeared that tne 
affairs and business of the organization were managed by five 
directors all of whom ·served without compensation, that its 
incorporation was approved by the state board of charities, 
that its immediate management was in charge of a charitable 
order known as the Christian Brothers j none of whom received 
any compensation or salary for their work and labor , and the 
only persons connected with the institution who received any 
compensation for their services were those who had charge 
of some department of work requiring technical skill; that 
there were no shares of stock of the corporat ion, no one 
could receive any financ ial benefit from the operation of the 
institution and that it was largely supported by charity. 
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Corbett v. St. Vincent's Industrial School (1903) 79 App Div 
334, 79 NYS 369 (affirmed in (1903) 177 NY 16, 68 NE 997, 
--where it was shown that a university was incorporated as an 
institution of higher education, that it was owned and main-
tained by the Methodist Church and governed by a board of 
trustees elected by subordinate bodies of the church, that it 
had no capital stock and nobody could receive any pecuniary 
profit from its operation; that football was one of the forms 
of physical training of its students, and that while there 
was an income from athletic contests, football was not self -
sustaining, and over a period of fifteen years this depart-
ment showed a net loss of $55 , 000 to the university's general 
fund; and that besides moneys received from athletic con-
tests, the general fund was comprised of tuition and fees 
collected from students and of income realized from gifts and 
endowments, from which all expenses of the operation of the 
university were paid . Southern Methodist University v. 
Clayton (1943) 142 Tex 179, 176 SW2d 749. 
In Heinemann v. Jewish Agri . Soc . (1942) 178 Misc 897, 
37 NYS2d 354, it was held that a corporation was a charitable 
institution where it appeared that it was organized for the 
purpose of assisting Jewish people to become established as 
· farmers in this country, and to that end maintained a farm 
for the purpose of giving instruction in farming and enabling 
applicants for assistarlce to discover whether they were suitoo. 
to farm life, and provided for their temporary support, that 
it granted loans to mechanics, artisans, and tradesmen, to 
enable them to secure larger earning and accumulate savings 
for the acquisition of homes or suburban, ~gricultural, and 
industrial districts, and proposed to encourage and assist in 
the establishment of co-operative creameries, factories, and 
storage houses, and in the removal of industries pursued in 
tenementi or shops in crowded sections of cities to agricul-
tural and industrial districts. (It is to be noted however 
that in this case, the court appears to have applied the New 
York rule which does not exempt charitable institutions from 
liability from tort where the injuries result from the 
negligence of mere servants or agents). 
c. Schools or functions not entitled to charitable 
immunity. . · 
In some cases the courts have held that the facts shown 
in a particular case were insufficient to support a finding 
that a school or college was formed or operated as a charit-
able institution so as to be entitled to the exemption from 
liability extended to such organizations. 
So, in University of Louisville v . Hammock (1907) 127 Ky 
564, 106 SW 219, 14 LRA (NS) 784, 128 Am St Rep 355, it was 
held that a hospital maintained by a university which was an 
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adjunct of its school of medicine, maintained principally 
because of the advantages it afforded to the students and 
professors of that institution, but which, however, was also 
conducted for compensation and profit, was not a purely 
public charity, so as to be exempt from liability for the 
negligence of its servants, nothwithstanding the fact that it 
also received and treated some patients at the hospital who 
were unable to pay. ·· 
So also, although conceding that hospitals organized 
for charitable purposes are not liable to their patients for 
injuries arising from the negligence of their employees, 
were reasonable care is used in the selection and retention 
of employees, the court, in Baker v. Leland Stanford Junior 
University (1933) 133 Cal App 243, 23 P2d 1071, held that a 
hospital operated by a university was not exempt from 
responsibility for the torts of the servants operating the 
hospital where it appeared that, although the corporate 
defendant was created for the purpose of administrating an 
educational trust, there was nothing in the act of the 
legislature relative to the trust, or creating the corpor-
ation, or in the trust itself, which provided that any trust 
fund should be used for said hospital, nor were such funds 
ever so used, that no charity was dispensed by the hospital, 
but on the contrary, that the usual and customary rates 
charged by other hospital~ were charged by it, and no pretense 
was made of receiving patients unable to pay for the services 
rendered, except in some instances where the payment was 
guaranteed by an independent organization. 
In Hall v. College of Physicians and Surgeons (1925) 254 
Mass 95, 149 NE 675, it was held that there was sufficient evi-
dence from which the jury could find that a medical college 
was not a public charity, but was conducted primarily for the 
private ends of those who managed it, where it appeared that 
the school's charter merely declared that the corporation 
was formed "for the purpose of establishing and maintaining 
a college for the prosecution and promotion of educational, 
scientific, and medical purposes, 11 that the only writte.n. 
evidence of the administration of the college and its sourc es 
of revenue, which was contairted in a schedule of charges for 
tuition, recited that a limited number of suitable persons 
who gave satisfactory evidence of their inability to pay 
the regular college fees might be enrolled as students, and 
that there might be opportunity afforded for a limited number 
of nurses and special assistants to earn a part of their 
expense while in college; that the balance of the evidence 
in this regard was entirely oral , and indicated that the in-
come of the college was derived principally from f ees, of 
students and in part from a trust fund with other minor 
donations, that an incorporated dispensary occupied part of 
the building in which the college was located, to which the 
students of the college were assigned, that such dispensary 
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waB stated to be an advantage to the college , and was 
advertised in the catalog ,to make the college more att rac -
tive to students; that some of the students visited the sick 
at their homes with physicians , all of whom were on the 
staff of the dispensary, while some were employed by the 
college , that during one year there was an interchange of 
patients for treatment between the corporations and at 
that time and prior thereto there were no fixed fees at 
the dispensary and those who came were treated whether they 
could or could not pay, and all moneys received went into 
the treasury of the dispensary; and that while there was 
a great deal of charitable work done at the dis pensary, 
three fourths of the patients were not charitable patients, 
and the remunerations of professors were enhanced because of 
the dispensari> and although it was not conducted for profit, 
its managers 'were ready to receive profits and accept them 
at any time. 11 
The fact that the statute which incorporated "The 
board of trustees of the Associate Reformed Presbyterian 
Synod" declared the Synod to be "a religious association 
engaged in the propagation of the Gospel 11 and the fact that 
another statute amending the charter of a college associated 
with the Synod and placing the college under its jurisdiction 
declared the character of the Synod to be a public charity, 
was held in Vermillion v. Woman ' s College (1916) 104 SC 197, 
88 SE 649 , to be insufficient to prove beyond dispute that 
the college was a charitable institution, the court conclud-
ing that a consideration of the statutes indicated that while 
they warranted an inference that the college was a public 
charity , they did not prove that fact beyond dispute, since 
they were not inconsistent with the view that the college was 
a private corporation conducted for gain, and that the Synod 
might be invested with like authority over a private enter-
prise conducted for gain , on acc ount of the benefits which 
would probably and naturaily inure to ·such an institution by 
reason of its association with a great religious organizatio~ 
In B:lrr v . Brooklyn Children ' s Aid Soc. (1921) 190 NYS 
296, it was held that a complaint of an inmate of a school 
seeking damages for injuries a llegedly resulting from the 
negligence of the defendant ' s servants, agents , and employees 
did not entitle the defendant to a judgment on the plea ding 
upon the ground that the action was one against a charitable 
institution, where, · although the complaint recited that the 
defendant was incorporated under an act relat ing to the in-
corporation of benevolent, charitable, scienti fic, am.mission-
ary societies , it was alleged that the defendant , for a mone-
tary consideration , maintained the place where the injuries 
were received, and that children of plaintiff ' s age not only 
received board and lodging, but received instruct ions in 
various subjects , and it was nowhere alleged in the c omplaint 
that the defendant was a charitable institution, the court 
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saying that while the complaint could not be said to allege 
that the defendant was a benevolent, scientific, or mission-
ary" institution, yet, taken from the most favorable view., 
the complaint might intend to exclude the only class of 
institutions which could be held., as a matter of law, not 
to be iiable, viz., charitable institutions. 
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